McNalley v. State, 8 Div. 131
| Decision Date | 26 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 131 |
| Citation | 468 So.2d 209 |
| Parties | Melvin K. McNALLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
This court's opinion of February 12, 1985, is withdrawn and the following is substituted as the opinion of this court.
Appellant, Melvin K. McNalley, pleaded guilty to the September 18, 1980, murder of his wife, Carolyn Vest McNalley, and was sentenced to life imprisonment on November 25, 1980. No appeal was taken. Subsequently on March 23, 1983, appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama. Counsel was appointed to represent appellant and a hearing on the merits was held on March 26, 1984. Appellant's petition questions the validity of his guilty plea, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel's representation. For the purposes of this opinion, we need only address the question of voluntariness of the guilty plea, and need not address the ineffectiveness claim, for the treatment of the first claim requires reversal.
The trial court determined that the plea was voluntarily entered, and that appellant understood the consequences of his plea within the meaning of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The court's findings were based on a limited colloquy between the trial court and appellant, and an unexecuted Ireland form. Ireland v. State, 47 Ala.App. 65, 250 So.2d 602 (1971). We cannot agree that the requirements of Boykin have been met, nor was appellant correctly informed of the minimum and maximum range of punishment applicable to the crime charged. The State contends that the Ireland form supplements the Boykin requirements, and therefore these requirements are satisfied. For the reasons which follow, we cannot concur in the State's position.
At the coram nobis hearing appellant denied signing an Ireland form, or having his retained counsel explain to him the rights and matters contained therein. A copy of this form was appended to the record and is complete in all respects, save the signatures of appellant and appellant's counsel. Counsel testified that he had reviewed with appellant the rights and matters contained on the form prior to the taking of appellant's guilty plea. Counsel stated that he "went over" the Ireland form with appellant, but neglected to have it signed by appellant or by himself. Defense counsel's testimony in reference to the Ireland form is as follows:
" A. Yes.
Appellant denied that his counsel "went over" the Ireland form with him and denied ever seeing it or having it explained to him. Appellant's parents were present during much of the discussion concerning entering a guilty plea. Both parents admitted seeing counsel with a "piece of paper" in his hand, but denied knowing what it was, and maintained that no document or paper was shown or explained to them or to their son in their presence. Defense counsel had represented appellant in two previous criminal cases where guilty pleas were entered by appellant, and in those cases Ireland forms were properly executed and filed. These forms were introduced in evidence in the instant case, and the State argues that this is strong evidence that he was familiar with Ireland forms at the time of entering the guilty plea in the case now before us. Appellant testified that counsel did not explain the Ireland forms to him in the previous cases.
In the colloquy between the appellant and the trial judge at the time of entering the plea, the only reference to the Ireland form, if in fact it is such a reference, is as follows:
The transcript of the guilty plea proceeding reveals that a very limited colloquy took place between the trial judge and appellant. At this proceeding the indictment was read to appellant. Appellant was informed that he had a right to a jury trial; that the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and that he had the right to testify in his own behalf or decline to take the stand and testify. The State then recommended a sentence of life to run concurrently with any other charges, including a ten-year sentence previously imposed due to conviction for another crime for which appellant had been placed on probation. Appellant pleaded guilty to murder, and a sentence hearing was waived.
The trial court did not discuss or attempt to ascertain appellant's understanding of his right to confront his accusers, a right which must be explained to an accused as a constitutional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea as mandated by Boykin. Furthermore, the unexecuted Ireland form does not act to supplement the requirement of Boykin under the facts of this case. No effort was made to determine if appellant had read the Ireland form in the court's possession, or whether he understood the rights and matters contained therein. The trial court made no direct reference to the Ireland form in the colloquy. No questions were directed to appellant or counsel to determine whether appellant understood the matters contained in the form, nor to determine why no signatures appeared on the form.
Thus, the evidence presents an unexecuted Ireland form and a colloquy which fails to ascertain appellant's understanding and acknowledgement of the form, and furthermore fails to inform appellant of his right to confront his accusers. The record contains no minute entry to enlighten us. We are aware that the trial judge on petition for writ of error coram nobis made a finding that the appellant understood the contents of the form, and that it was inadvertently not signed by the parties.
In a guilty plea proceeding, the trial judge should undertake a factual inquiry to determine if the plea is voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The trial judge should also be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. Twyman v. State, 293 Ala. 75, 300 So.2d 124 (1974); Cashin v. State, 428 So.2d 179 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Dingler v. State, 408 So.2d 527 (Ala.Crim.App.), writ quashed, 408 So.2d 530 (Ala.1981); Fields v. State, 339 So.2d 1088 (Ala.Crim.App.1976); Ireland v. State, supra. In Twyman v. State, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court...
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