McNeely v. Blanas
Decision Date | 18 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-15860.,02-15860. |
Citation | 326 F.3d 1056 |
Parties | Dock McNEELY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lou BLANAS, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Daniel J. Broderick, Chief Assistant Federal Public Defender, Sacramento, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.
Craig S. Meyers, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for the respondent-appellee.
Before NOONAN, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Dock McNeely ("McNeely" or "Petitioner"), a California pretrial detainee, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition.1 McNeely contends that his constitutional speedy trial rights are being denied because he has been in custody since April 1998 without a preliminary hearing or trial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we reverse.
Petitioner is a defendant in a pending California state felony case. He was arrested on April 13, 1998, and was charged two days later with lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of 14 and failing to register as a sex offender in violation of Cal. Pen.Code §§ 288, 290. Petitioner had not yet received a preliminary hearing or trial as of the conclusion of briefing in this case.2
The case has been repeatedly continued due to a combination of competency hearings, replacements of counsel, a period from February 19, 1999, to August 19, 1999, when McNeely was found to be incompetent and committed to a state hospital, the disqualification of two judges, and numerous other continuances. The precise reasons for many of the continuances are unclear due to the cryptic notations which constitute much of the state court record, the absence of transcripts of the various hearings, and the absence of any record for the last two-year period.
Petitioner filed state court petitions for relief, most of which were summarily denied. On October 20, 1998, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, raising the failure to hold a preliminary examination within the statutory time period, which required that he be released on his own recognizance. On October 29, 1998, the court of appeal summarily denied McNeely's petition. On December 31, 1998, Petitioner filed an ex parte application for an order directing issuance of a writ of mandate, prohibition, or other extraordinary relief in the California Court of Appeal. Among other things, he raised the failure to conduct a preliminary examination or trial within the statutorily-required time limit. On January 7, 1999, the court of appeal denied that petition. On February 3, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, raising among other things the lack of a preliminary examination. On February 17, 1999, the state supreme court summarily denied his petition for review. On January 6, 2000, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the Sacramento County Superior Court, raising the lack of a preliminary hearing and the violation of his speedy trial rights. On February 8, 2000, the superior court dismissed the petition because he had not substantiated his allegations and because he had a Marsden3 motion pending in his underlying criminal case. On May 22, 2000, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights. On May 25, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the state court of appeal, alleging that the superior court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and to release him from custody pursuant to Cal. Pen.Code § 859(b). On June 8, 2000, the court of appeal denied the petition.
Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court on June 21, 2000. After the initial petition was dismissed without prejudice due to the presence of unexhausted claims, Petitioner filed an amended petition, excluding the unexhausted claims, on September 25, 2000. In his answer, Respondent agreed that Petitioner has exhausted his remedies on the issues raised in the amended petition. On January 11, 2002, the magistrate judge filed his report recommending that the state court complaint against McNeely be dismissed and that he be released without prejudice to the institution of civil commitment proceedings. Both parties filed objections. On March 26, 2002, the district court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss the amended petition, dismissing McNeely's speedy trial claim. McNeely timely appeals.
We review the district court's denial of a habeas petition de novo. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir.2002). The district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir.2000).
At oral argument, Respondent was unable to report what had happened to McNeely since December 2000, the last date of any entry in the state court "minutes" contained in the record. Respondent's counsel reported that he believed the state court had "suspended" proceedings pending the outcome of the habeas petition and conceded that McNeely was still incarcerated in legal "limbo." In other words, no proceedings have apparently taken place in McNeely's felony case in the last 27-months and there is no explanation for this inactivity.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
Although the government failed to supply a fully comprehensible record, the scant record that is available is adequate to demonstrate that McNeely's constitutional rights have been violated. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine when government delay has abridged the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The factors to be considered include: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused's assertion of the right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. No single factor is necessary or sufficient. Id. We examine each factor seriatim.
(1) Length of the Delay
The district court found the length of the delay (three years at that time) to be substantial. Given that the delay has now reached nearly five years, this factor weighs heavily in Petitioner's favor. Further, given the length of the delay, prejudice is presumed and triggers a Barker inquiry. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).
(2) Reasons for the Delay
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the prosecutor and the court have an affirmative constitutional obligation to try the defendant in a timely manner and that this duty requires a good faith, diligent effort to bring him to trial quickly. See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973) ( ); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970) ().
Numerous lower courts have, thus, held that the prosecution bears the burden of explaining delay in bringing an accused to trial. See e.g., United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir.1999) ( ); United States v. Graham, 128 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir.1997) ( ); Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.1979) ( ); Morris v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1390 (8th Cir.1975) ( ); Georgiadis v. Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility, 450 F.Supp. 975, 980 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1330 (2d Cir.1978) ( ). Although Barker did not explicitly identify the burden of proof for pretrial delay, it refers to the reason for the delay as "the reason the government assigns to justify the delay." 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. We likewise hold that the prosecution bears the burden of explaining pretrial delays.
In contrast to unexplained circumstances, when the record demonstrates the reason for the delay, the following principles guide attribution of the delay to either the defense or the prosecution. A deliberate attempt to delay proceedings to hamper the defense counts heavily against the government. Id. "A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily, but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than the defendant." Id. On the other hand, delay attributable to the defendant's own acts or to tactical decisions by defense counsel will not bolster defendant's speedy trial argument. United States v. Goeltz, 513 F.2d 193, 197 (10th Cir.1975).
Respondent contends that all of the delay, except for three minor continuances, were due either to McNeely's decisions, competency hearings, or other reasonable delays, such as plea negotiations.4 The district...
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McNeely v. Blanas
...D.C. No. CV-00-1358-DFL. Before: NOONAN, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges. ORDER The opinion filed on April 18, 2003, and reported at 326 F.3d 1056, is withdrawn and replaced by the amended opinion filed concurrently with this order. With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny th......