McNeil v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 17 May 1994
• Citation: 633 N.E.2d 399,417 Mass. 818
• Parties: Douglas McNEIL v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 399

633 N.E.2d 399

417 Mass. 818

Douglas McNEIL v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued March 10, 1994.

Decided May 17, 1994.

Thomas E. Abruzzese, Boston, for Com'r of Correction.

Barry Barkow, Peter Costanza and James R. Pingeon, Boston, with him, for plaintiff.

Scott Harshbarger, Atty. Gen., and Pamela L. Hunt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Atty. Gen. & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

John M. Townsend and Melissa J. Garand, Boston, for Sheriff of County of Berkshire & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

We transferred this appeal to this court on our own motion to interpret G.L. c. 127, § 129D (1992 ed.), which provides for the grant of "good conduct credits" to be applied to the sentences of prisoners who participate in certain approved educational, training, and work programs. The precise issue is whether such credits should be applied to sentenced prisoners for their prior participation in approved programs while they were held in custody awaiting trial. The Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) argues that § 129D does not apply to pretrial detainees. The plaintiff, Douglas McNeil, argues for himself, and for similarly situated prisoners, that the statute requires that good conduct credits be awarded to pretrial detainees as well as to prisoners serving sentences, and that, even if such awards are not required by the statute, they are required by the equal protection provisions of the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. A judge in the Superior Court agreed with the plaintiff on his statutory argument and ordered relief for him and prisoners similarly situated. We conclude that § 129D provides for the earning of good conduct credits only by sentenced prisoners, and that, so interpreted, the statute complies with Federal and State constitutional equal protection guarantees. Accordingly, we vacate the relief ordered in the Superior Court and order the entry of a new judgment.

The background of the case is as follows. The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a declaration of rights under G.L. c. 231A, and injunctive relief, requiring the commissioner to award him earned good conduct credits under G.L. c. 127, § 129D, for his participation in approved programs during the period of time he spent in pretrial detention. The plaintiff's original complaint was amended, a record prepared, and cross motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (b), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). A judge of the Superior Court denied the commissioner's motion and allowed the plaintiff's.

Subsequently, numerous other prisoners filed pro se pleadings which were docketed as "complaint[s] for contempt" seeking relief similar to that given the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed motions to amend his complaint to (a) add class action allegations; (b) certify a class consisting of all sentenced prisoners who had participated in, or were participating in, programs that would qualify for earned good conduct credits but for the prisoners' participation in those programs while in pretrial detention; and (c) enter partial final judgment on his claims pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974). These motions were allowed, ¹ and it was ordered that the sheriffs of the Commonwealth's fourteen counties be joined as necessary parties. ² Thereafter, at the judge's direction, a preliminary injunction entered ordering the commissioner to credit "all sentenced Massachusetts state prisoners" with the maximum days of earned good conduct credits under G.L. c. 127, § 129D, for each full calendar month of their pretrial detention until the commissioner received sufficient records to determine the actual credit appropriate for each prisoner. A partial final judgment also entered in the plaintiff's favor. A single justice of the Appeals Court entered a stay of the preliminary injunction at the commissioner's request. Proper appeals were taken by the commissioner from the grant of the preliminary injunction and the partial final judgment, and all matters were consolidated in this court for purposes of appellate review.

1. Section 129D provides that prisoners may earn good conduct credits "while confined at a correctional institution of the commonwealth, or any jail or house of correction." ³ The plaintiff argues that the inclusion in § 129D of the reference to a "jail" demonstrates that the provision was intended to include pretrial detainees, because, as the plaintiff contends, "[i]n Massachusetts, a county jail, or the 'jail side' of a combined county correctional facility, means the facility or portion of the facility used to hold persons who are awaiting trial, whereas the house of correction, or 'house side' of a county correctional facility, is for sentenced prisoners." We analyze § 129D under the general rule that "a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513, 333 N.E.2d 450 (1975), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975). We also apply two other principles of statutory construction. First, "where two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose." Board of Educ., supra 368 Mass. at 513-514, 333 N.E.2d 450. Second, "the statutory language itself is the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose." Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977).

We initially note that in our view the plaintiff reads too much into the inclusion of the word "jail" in § 129D. As the plaintiff acknowledges, G.L. c. 126, § 4 (1992 ed.), provides that jails are used both "for the detention of persons charged with crime and committed for trial," and for those "committed pursuant to a sentence upon conviction of crime." See also G.L. c. 127, § 21 (1992 ed.) (permitting the classification of "prisoners sentenced and committed to jails and houses of correction"); G.L. c. 279, § 33A (1992 ed.) (directing judge to credit pretrial detention time "on imposing a sentence of commitment to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, a house of correction, or a jail"). ⁴ Determination whether § 129D was intended to apply to pretrial detainees necessarily must go beyond the use of the word "jail" in the statute and requires a closer look at the statutory structure of which § 129D is part.

We begin by observing that G.L. c. 127 is primarily, if not exclusively, devoted to sentenced prisoners. The chapter is entitled "Officers and Inmates of Penal and Reformatory Institutions. Paroles and Pardons." ⁵ The reference to "penal and reformatory" institutions clearly suggests that it is convicted prisoners that are at issue; because pretrial detainees are presumed innocent, they are considered not to need punishment or reform. The provisions of G.L. c. 127 cover such various topics as solitary confinement, inmate privileges, parole, and pardons, all of which apply to convicted prisoners. Moreover, § 129D itself is included in that part of G.L. c. 127 entitled "Permits To Be at Liberty and Discharge," which includes not only the various statutes providing for reductions in sentence but also statutes governing parole. This further suggests that § 129D is intended to apply to convicted prisoners.

The general impression discussed above is borne out by the specific language of § 129D. Section 129D describes the programs approved thereunder, as those that are "valuable to [the] prisoner's rehabilitation." As the United States Supreme Court has said, "it would hardly be appropriate for the State to undertake in the pretrial detention period programs to rehabilitate a man still clothed with a presumption of innocence." McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1061, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973). ⁶ This notion of rehabilitation is supported by the statutes that establish the three basic types of programs under which prisoners can earn good conduct credits under § 129D; all of these statutes suggest that the programs are intended for convicted prisoners. First, G.L. c. 127, § 48 (1992 ed.), which provides for the establishment of "education, training and employment programs," does so only for persons committed to the custody of the department of correction or to county "correctional facilities." ⁷ Neither G.L. c. 124, governing the Department of Correction, nor G.L. c. 125, governing "correctional facilities," evidences any indication that they are meant to apply to pretrial detainees, in contrast to G.L. c. 126, governing jails and houses of correction, which specifically mentions persons held for trial. Second, G.L. c. 127, § 71 (1992 ed.), which governs the handling of funds from prison industries, refers to the participants in such programs as "committed offenders," a category that includes only convicted prisoners. ⁸ Third, G.L. c. 127, § 86F (1992 ed.), which provides for work release programs, states that sheriffs may establish such programs for "persons sentenced to the house of correction."

In addition, § 129D, unlike several related statutes, indicates that accrual of the credits for which it provides is to occur while the prisoner is serving his or her sentence. Section 129D allows a "deduction of sentence ... for each month while said prisoner is [participating in approved programs]." Because a pretrial detainee has no sentence from which to deduct earned good conduct credits, and...