Harmon v. Comm'r of Corr.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | SJC-12895,SJC-12876 |
| Parties | Raymond HARMON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. Brian Racine v. Commissioner of Correction & Others. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
Ruth Greenberg for Raymond Harmon & another.
Richard E. Gordon (Bradley A. Sultan also present) for Commissioner of Correction & others.
Mark H. Bluver, Springfield, for John Stote.
David Milton & Michael J. Horrell for Prisoners' Legal Services of Massachusetts.
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio, Boston, for Dennis Daye.
Edward B. Gaffney for Damien Lockhart.
Sharon L. Sullivan-Puccini, Somerst, for James Carver.
Valerie A. DePalma for Kenneth Junier.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
The plaintiffs in these cases were prisoners at Commonwealth correctional facilities who applied for release under the medical parole statute, G. L. c. 127, § 119A. Both of their petitions were denied by the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner). Raymond Harmon sought judicial review of the commissioner's decision, but died while his case was pending in the Superior Court; his attorney then commenced an appeal in the Appeals Court. Brian Racine requested, because of his worsening health, that the commissioner reconsider her decision; he passed away four days after the commissioner denied this request.
We allowed Harmon's motion for direct appellate review. At approximately the same time, Racine's attorney filed a complaint in the nature of certiorari in the county court, and the single justice then reported the case to this court to address three questions. The questions were, first, whether the death of a prisoner renders judicial proceedings stemming from a denial of a petition for medical parole moot; second, whether the regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction (DOC) to implement the medical parole statute allow a prisoner whose request has been denied to submit a subsequent petition; and, third, whether the medical parole statute applies only to committed offenders or also is applicable to pretrial detainees.2
For the reasons to be discussed, we conclude that claims for a writ of certiorari due to the denial of a petition for medical parole under G. L. c. 127, § 119A, become moot on the death of the petitioner. In particular circumstances, however, where the proceedings raise an issue that is of public importance, worthy of decision by an appellate court, and is capable of repetition yet evading review, a court may in its discretion choose to decide the case. Further, because the regulation restricting the ability of prisoners to file a subsequent petition for medical parole after one has been denied, 501 Code Mass. Regs. § 17.14(4) (2019), conflicts with the language of the medical parole statute and the legislative intent, it is void. In addition, while G. L. c. 127, § 119A, applies only to committed offenders serving a sentence, detainees awaiting trial may seek release due to a terminal illness or physical or mental incapacity by moving for a modification of bail.
1. Background. a. Statutory provisions. The medical parole statute was enacted in 2018 to allow for the release of prisoners who are terminally ill or permanently incapacitated. See generally Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14, 138 N.E.3d 996 (2020). The process prescribed by the statute begins when a petition for release on medical parole is submitted by or on behalf of a prisoner to the superintendent of the prison in which the individual is incarcerated. See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (c ) (1). Within twenty-one days of receiving a petition, the superintendent "shall review the petition and develop a recommendation as to the release of the prisoner." Id. The superintendent then "shall" transmit the petition and a recommendation on whether it should be granted to the commissioner, along with a medical parole plan, a medical diagnosis, and an assessment of the risk of violence by the prisoner if he or she were to be released to the community. Id.
Within forty-five days of receiving the petition and recommendation, the commissioner in turn "shall issue a written decision" as to whether "a prisoner is terminally ill or permanently incapacitated such that if the prisoner is released the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society." G. L. c. 127, § 119A (e ). If these conditions are met, "the prisoner shall be released on medical parole," on terms and conditions imposed by the parole board. Id.
The statute further provides that a "prisoner, sheriff or superintendent aggrieved by a decision denying or granting medical parole" may seek relief in the nature of a writ of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. See G. L. c. 127, § 119A (g ).
b. Plaintiffs' submissions to the DOC. The facts are drawn from the parties' statement of agreed facts, supplemented occasionally by other undisputed facts in the record. i. Harmon. In 1987, Harmon was convicted of murder in the first degree and armed robbery and sentenced to the statutorily mandated term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. See Commonwealth v. Harmon, 410 Mass. 425, 426, 573 N.E.2d 490 (1991). In February 2019, he filed a petition seeking medical parole.3 Although he was an inmate assigned to a maximum security facility, at the time of filing he was receiving medical care for pancreatic cancer
in the locked wing of Lemuel Shattuck Hospital; his petition requested that he be "moved to the free side" of the facility. As of early March 2019, his cancer had not been eradicated, but he had declined to continue with chemotherapy and was refusing artificial nutrition. His body weight was ninety-six pounds.
On March 13, 2019, the superintendent of the facility where Harmon was assigned recommended to the commissioner that Harmon's petition be denied. On April 1, 2019, after a hearing at which relatives of Harmon's victim testified, the commissioner denied the petition; she concluded that, although Harmon was terminally ill, he continued to pose a risk to public safety. On April 8, 2019, Harmon filed a petition for certiorari in the county court; a single justice ordered the petition transferred to the Superior Court. On May 6, 2019, Harmon passed away, and, shortly thereafter, a Superior Court judge dismissed the case as moot. Harmon's attorney then appealed on his behalf, and we allowed her petition for direct appellate review.
ii. Racine. Racine was convicted in 2011 of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen (subsequent offense). He was sentenced to from fifteen to twenty-five years in prison. During trial and throughout his incarceration, Racine was facing pending charges on 2009 indictments for rape of a child by force, assault to rape, and indecent assault and battery on a child.
On November 15, 2018, Racine filed a petition for medical parole on the ground that he was suffering from heart failure. On December 5, the superintendent of the prison where Racine was incarcerated recommended against his release. On January 18, 2019, the commissioner denied the petition, stating that there was insufficient evidence that Racine was terminally ill or permanently incapacitated, as required by the medical parole statute.
In August and September of 2019, Racine's attorney wrote to the superintendent of the facility where Racine was incarcerated to explain that Racine's health was deteriorating. In the first letter, received on August 19, 2019, the attorney expressed concern that there "appears to be no time assigned to the making of a medical parole plan for inmates who apply for reconsideration due to deteriorating health," and requested that the superintendent "advise" the attorney of the superintendent's "time frame." The second letter, received on September 16, 2019, was styled as a "second petition" for release and requested that the superintendent forward a recommendation with supporting materials to the commissioner within twenty-one days "per statute." Clinical examinations in August and September confirmed that Racine's condition indeed was declining.
On December 18, 2019, the commissioner denied Racine's request for reconsideration. She stated that, while she was persuaded by the medical experts that Racine had less than eighteen months to live, she was not convinced that he would not be a threat to public safety if released. The commissioner referred to Racine's still-pending indictments and noted, "Resolution of these pending criminal charges must occur before I can make a determination as to Mr. Racine's eligibility and suitability for release on medical parole."
Racine passed away on December 22, 2019. The next day, his attorney filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the county court. The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. She asked the parties, in addition to any other issues they cared to raise, to address the following three questions:
2. Discussion. We answer in turn each of the questions reported by...
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