McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 5122.,5122.
• Citation: 743 S.E.2d 843,404 S.C. 186
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ammie McNEIL, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Jon E. Ozmint, Robert Ward, and Bernard McKie in their individual capacities, Defendants, Of whom South Carolina Department of Corrections is the Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2011–202887.

404 S.C. 186

743 S.E.2d 843

Ammie McNEIL, Appellant,

v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Jon E. Ozmint, Robert Ward, and Bernard McKie in their individual capacities, Defendants,Of whom South Carolina Department of Corrections is the Respondent.Appellate Case No. 2011–202887.

No. 5122.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 30, 2012.

Decided May 1, 2013.

Rehearing Denied June 25, 2013.

J. Lewis Cromer and Julius Wistar Babb, IV, both of J. Lewis Cromer & Associates, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Steven Michael Pruitt and Hannah K. Metts, both of McDonald Patrick Poston Hemphill & Roper, LLC, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

SHORT, J.

Ammie McNeil appeals from the trial court's order granting the South Carolina Department of Corrections' (SCDC) motionto dismiss her claims for due process violations, public policy discharge, and defamation. We affirm.

FACTS

SCDC employed McNeil at Kirkland Reception and Evaluation Center (Kirkland) as a captain. SCDC maintains custody of, exercises control of, and provides for the care of inmates and prisoners incarcerated by the state, including Kirkland, which is located in Richland County. An inmate, who was prescribed hypertrophic medication for threatening suicide, was transported to Kirkland, and despite his request for his medication, he did not receive it. McNeil claimed she was not made aware of the inmate's prescribed medication when he arrived at Kirkland. Even though the inmate was a known suicide risk, he was not placed in a cell with a closed-circuit camera as required. On the night of the incident, only McNeil and one other officer were on duty in violation of Kirkland's regulations requiring four to six officers. Sometime between 4 and 4:45 a.m. on August 11, 2006, the inmate committed suicide by stuffing toilet paper in his mouth and nose, asphyxiating himself. McNeil made this discovery when she tried to rouse the inmate for the 4:45 a.m. standing count.

SCDC performed an internal investigation as to the inmate's death and asked SLED (State Law Enforcement Division) to perform its own investigation. Thereafter, McNeil was cleared of any responsibility for the inmate's death and was promoted to sergeant in November 2008. In December 2007, the inmate's family filed a wrongful death lawsuit against SCDC. The case was mediated and settled in July 2009. In September 2009, McNeil was terminated because of alleged negligence in her duties at the time of the inmate's death and falsification of documents after his suicide.

On December 8, 2010, McNeil filed a complaint against SCDC, and SCDC Director Jon Ozmint, SCDC Director of Operations Robert Ward, and Kirkland Warden Bernard McKie, in their individual capacities.¹ Her complaint alleged causes of action for due process violations, public policy discharge, negligence, gross negligence, defamation, and civil conspiracy. McNeil claimed that because of the large settlementand the high scrutiny placed on them, Ozmint, Ward, and McKie “feared pressure from the media and certain legislators resulting in an agenda to find a scapegoat or to punish someone to take the pressure off of themselves.”

SCDC filed a motion to dismiss McNeil's claims on March 28, 2011, alleging she failed to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted. After a hearing on the matter, on August 15, 2011, the trial court issued its order granting SCDC's motion to dismiss McNeil's claims. The order notes McNeil alleged in her complaint “she was terminated for ‘personal, political, pretextual, and scapegoating purposes' in violation of public policy.” However, the court explained, “South Carolina has long recognized the doctrine of employment at-will, such that an employer may terminate an employee for good reason, no reason, or bad reason without liability.” Further, the court stated McNeil “does not dispute that she was an at-will employee and even if she was terminated for personal reasons or as a scapegoat as she alleges, she still fails to state a claim and her action must be dismissed.” Additionally, the court noted McNeil neither alleged her discharge was in violation of any statute or act by the General Assembly, nor cited to a South Carolina case that has found a violation of public policy without a violation of a statute or act by the General Assembly. As a result of failing to state a claim for wrongful termination, the court found her remaining causes of action could not go forward and must be dismissed.² McNeil filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, which the court denied. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, this court applies the same standard of review as the trial court. Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007). “In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint based on a failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court must base its ruling solely on allegations set forth in the complaint.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper if the facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory. Id. The court should not dismiss the complaint merely because it doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action. Id.

LAW/ANALYSISI. Public Policy Discharge

McNeil argues the trial court erred in finding she failed to state a claim for public policy discharge on the face of her complaint because she pled she was terminated after complaining about institutional safety violations and testifying after being subpoenaed in a civil trial. We disagree.

“An at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason, with or without cause.” Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d 634, 636 (2011). “Under the ‘public policy exception’ to the at-will employment doctrine, however, an at-will employee has a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where there is a retaliatory termination of the at-will employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy.” Id. at 614, 713 S.E.2d at 637. “The primary source of the declaration of the public policy of the state is the General Assembly; the courts assume this prerogative only in the absence of legislative declaration.” Citizens' Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190, 133 S.E. 709, 713 (1925); see Barron, 393 S.C. at 617, 713 S.E.2d at 638 (stating the determination of what constitutes public policy for purposes of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is a question of law for the courts to decide). “The public policy exception clearly applies in cases where either (1) the employer requires the employee to violate the law, or (2) the reason for the employee's termination itself is a violation of criminal law.” Barron, 393 S.C. at 614, 713 S.E.2d at 637;see Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985) (holding the public policy exception is invoked when an employer requires an at-will employee, as a condition of retaining employment, to violate the law); Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 246, 422 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1992) (finding employee would have a cause of action for wrongful discharge if he was discharged because he refused to contribute to a political action fund). The Barron court found the public policy exception is not limited to these two situations; however, the exception has not yet been extended beyond them. 393 S.C. at 614, 713 S.E.2d at 637.

As the dissent notes, in two cases for wrongful termination based on the public policy exception, our courts have reversed the trial court's dismissal pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion because the allegations were novel and deserved further development of the facts. We find these cases are distinguishable from this case. In Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 318 S.C. 223, 223, 456 S.E.2d 907, 908 (1995), the employee alleged his employer terminated him in retaliation for reporting to the United States Department of Energy and the news media his concerns about radioactive contamination and unsafe working conditions at the Savannah River Site and for voluntarily testifying about his concerns before the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Our supreme court held the trial court's dismissal of the employee's wrongful discharge action based on the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine for failure to state a claim was inappropriate when the employee alleged his employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting and testifying about radioactive contamination and unsafe working conditions at the nuclear facility. Id. at 226–27, 456 S.E.2d at 909–10. The court stated “[w]hether the [public policy] exception applies when an employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting and testifying about radioactive contamination and unsafe working conditions at a nuclear facility is a novel issue, and such issues should not ordinarily be decided in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id. at 226, 456 S.E.2d at 909. We find Garner to be distinguishable because the existence of radioactive contamination and unsafe working conditions is a matter of public interest and public policy, and the employee specifically alleged his termination was in retaliation for reporting his concerns to the proper authorities.

In Keiger v. Citgo, Coastal Petroleum, Inc., 326 S.C. 369, 370, 482 S.E.2d 792, 793 (Ct.App.1997), the employee alleged her employer terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting her concerns to the South Carolina Department of Labor about violations of state and federal labor laws for reducing her pay without prior notice. The employee told the manager she had contacted the state labor board and, based on the advice she had received, if the violations were not corrected immediately, she would file a formal complaint with the...