McPherson v. McPherson
| Decision Date | 02 June 1958 |
| Citation | 337 Mass. 611,150 N.E.2d 727 |
| Parties | Rosetta M. McPHERSON v. Roy A. McPHERSON. Roy A. McPHERSON v. Rosetta M. McPHERSON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Joseph F. McEvoy, Jr., Boston, for Rosetta M. McPherson.
Frederick J. Smith, Buzzard Bay, for Roy A. McPherson.
Before WILKINS, C. J. and RONAN, SPALDING, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.
Rosetta M. McPherson brought this petition for the partition and sale of a parcel of real estate in the town of Bourne, which she alleges is owned by her and her former husband, Roy A. McPherson, as tenants in common. Roy A. McPherson brought a petition in equity against Rosetta alleging that the property in question was purchased entirely with his funds, and, although put in the names of himself and his former wife as tenants by the entirety, was not intended as a gift; the petition seeks to establish a resulting trust in favor of Roy and asks for an accounting. The two petitions were heard together.
The judge made findings of material facts which include the following: Rosetta M McPherson and Roy A. McPherson (hereinafter referred to as Rosetta and Roy) were married sometime prior to 1952 (the exact time does not appear). On October 4, 1952, the property here involved (consisting of a house and lot in Bourne) was conveyed to Rosetta and Roy, as tenants by the entirety, by a deed which was duly recorded. Negotiations for the conveyance were conducted by Roy. The purchase price was $7,000 and a payment of $1,000 was made by Roy 'from his own funds.' Six thousand dollars (the amount of the balance) was obtained by a first mortgage of the property to a bank and applied to the purchase price. The mortgage was of the type 'known as a G. I. loan,' Roy having been in the military service. 'Title was taken in the name[s] of * * * [Rosetta and Roy] as tenants by the entirety, after conference with officials of * * * [the bank] in order to facilitate the granting of the loan.' Following the purchase, Roy made some improvements which he paid for 'from his own funds.' Also from his own funds he made the payments of interest and principal required by the mortgage. At the time of the hearing the mortgage was not in default and had been reduced to $4,882.
The payment of $1,000 came from funds standing in the names of Rosetta and Roy. These funds consisted of United States government bonds which were purchased from savings from Roy's pay while he was in the military service. He placed the name of Rosetta on the bonds to facilitate their collection in the event of his death.
On a libel for divorce brought by Roy against Rosetta in the Probate Court for Barnstable County, a decree nisi was entered on January 26, 1954, which became absolute on July 27, 1954.
After finding the foregoing facts the judge ordered (1) a decree to be entered in the partition proceeding dismissing the petition, and (2) the entry of a decree on the petition in equity that Rosetta holds her one-half undivided interest in the property by way of resulting trust for Roy and that she be ordered to convey that interest to him forthwith, subject to the bank's mortgage. From decrees entered accordingly, Rosetta appealed.
In Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685, 52 A.L.R. 886, it was held that a decree of divorce converts a tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common, and one of the former spouses may maintain a petition for partition against the other. The pivotal question in the cases at bar is whether Rosetta acquired the rights of a tenant by the entirety at the time of the original conveyance. If she did there was no resulting trust in favor of Roy and the decrees below cannot stand. We are of opinion that the decrees were erroneous.
Of course, it is settled law that where a person pays the purchase price of property and takes title in the name of another, without more, the beneficial interest in the property enures to the person who...
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