McRee v. Gardner

Decision Date11 December 1895
Citation33 S.W. 166,131 Mo. 599
PartiesMcRee, Appellant, v. Gardner et al
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from the St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. James E Withrow, Judge.

Affirmed.

C Gibson and C. E. Gibson for appellant.

(1) The deed of trust under which defendants claim title was executed by Clark, May 13, 1857, and it matured in six months from date, being November, 1857. The adverse possession, commenced before the deed of trust was executed and at the time of the compromise in 1868 had run more than ten years subsequent to its maturity. Title under the deed of trust was, therefore barred. Ewing v. Shannahan, 113 Mo. 188; Bank v. Fife, 95 Mo. 118. (2) The proceedings in in the Clark-Hammerle case are unquestionably binding on the defendants; this conclusion is founded on the well established doctrine of lis pendens. See Carr v. Cates, 96 Mo. 274; Tilton v. Cofield, 93 U.S. 163. "The continuous payment of taxes of itself is not sufficient to show adverse possession. The title of the real owner of land can not be transferred to a stranger by the payment of the taxes for ten years." Chapman v. Templeton, 53 Mo. 463. See, also, Pike v. Robertson, 79 Mo. 615; Bradstreet v. Kinsella, 76 Mo. 63; Norfleet v. Hutchins, 68 Mo. 597. (3) It has been held in many cases and is a well settled rule that when a defect can only be made to appear by extrinsic evidence, particularly if that evidence depends upon oral testimony to establish it, it presents a case for invoking the aid of a court of equity to remove it as a cloud on the title. Harrington v. Utterbeck, 57 Mo. 519; Gardner v. Terry, 99 Mo. 523; Clark v. Insurance Co., 52 Mo. 272; Beedle v. Mead, 81 Mo. 297; Parks v. Bank, 97 Mo. 130; Brooks v. Owen, 112 Mo. 252; Church v. Hintze, 72 Mo. 363; Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533. (4) The decree generally dismissing plaintiff's bill is erroneous as it would bar plaintiff from ever bringing another action in respect to the premises in controversy.

Kehr & Tittmann for respondents.

(1) It is settled law in this state that a party claiming the legal title to land, and being out of possession, can not go into equity to remove a cloud on such title. Davis v. Sloan, 95 Mo. 552; Graves v. Ewart, 99 Mo. 13; Clark v. Insurance Co., 52 Mo. 272; Odle v. Odle, 73 Mo. 289; Dyer v. Krackauer, 14 Mo.App. 39; Dyer v. Baumeister, 87 Mo. 134. (2) The act of June 13, 1812, was a present, operative grant, investing the claimant from the date of its passage with the full, complete legal title, provided he, or those under whom he claimed, had inhabited, cultivated, or possessed the land prior to December 20, 1803. The certificate of confirmation is evidence of the fact of such inhabitation, cultivation, or possession, and of the extent and boundaries of the claim. Milburn v. Hardy, 28 Mo. 514; Glasgow v. Lindell's Heirs, 50 Mo. 60; Guitard v. Stoddard, 16 How. 494; Glasgow v. Hortiz, 1 Black. 595. (3) A New Madrid certificate can be located only on public lands which had been authorized to be sold. As the title to the land in survey 3307 was in Joachim Roy, or his legal representatives, it was not subject to location, and Mrs. McRee's certificate conferred no title whatever. The question of this particular title has been adjudicated in favor of Clark and against McRee. Clark v. Hammerle, 27 Mo. 55; S. C., 36 Mo. 620. (4) The possession of appellant and those under whom he claims never was hostile or adverse to the Clark title, but always in subordination to it. Gordon v. Eans, 97 Mo. 603; Hamilton v. Boggess, 63 Mo. 251; Budd v. Collins, 69 Mo. 129; Wilkerson v. Thompson, 82 Mo. 317; Wilcoxon v. Osborn, 77 Mo. 629; Lynde v. Williams, 68 Mo. 370; Crispin v. Hannovan, 50 Mo. 536; Scruggs v. Scruggs, 43 Mo. 142; Key v. Jennings, 66 Mo. 356; Music v. Barney, 49 Mo. 458; Fugate v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 447; Sedgwick and Wait on Trial of Titles to Land, sections 730, 731, 754, 756; Tyler on Ejectment, pages 859, 860, 874-886, 887. (5) Nor was it open, notorious, visible, continuous, or exclusive. Sedgwick and Wait on Trial of Titles to Land, section 741. An unrecorded lease is no evidence of possession. Casey v. Steinmeyer, 7 Mo.App. 556. (6) Clark v. Hammerle had been dismissed more than three years before Mr. Gardner took the deed of trust from Mrs. Collins, hence lis pendens can not apply. The suit, moreover, did not terminate adversely to Clark and, hence, there is nothing in it to affect those holding under him. Wortham v. Boyd, 66 Texas, 401. (7) Appellant and those under whom he claims have been guilty of gross laches, and for that reason, if for none other, the bill was properly dismissed. Bliss v. Prichard, 67 Mo. 181; Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239; Burgess v. Railroad, 99 Mo. 496; Ferguson v. Soden, 111 Mo. 208; Sullivan v. Railroad, 94 U.S. 807; Kelley v. Hurt, 74 Mo. 561. (8) The cause was heard, considered, and dismissed upon its merits and the form of the decree is correct. 2 Daniel's Chancery Pl. & Pr., 994, 995; 1 Foster's Federal Practice [2 Ed.], p. 545, sec. 300; Gove v. Lyford, 44 N.H. 525.

Macfarlane J. Barclay, J., does not sit.

OPINION

Macfarlane, J.

This is a suit in equity to remove a cloud from plaintiff's title to one and a half acres of land situate in the city of St. Louis. The petition states that plaintiff is the owner in fee and is in the lawful possession of the land described. The title under which plaintiff claims is stated to be one acquired by adverse possession.

The charge is that in 1853 under color of title his grantor, Mrs. Mary McRee, took possession of a tract of fourteen acres which included the one in question. That afterwards, in 1856, Levi B. Clark claiming the whole tract commenced a suit in ejectment against the said Mary McRee to recover its possession. A judgment was afterward rendered in favor of the said Clark and an appeal was taken to the supreme court of the state where the judgment was affirmed, and the case was taken to the United States supreme court upon writ of error. While the case was pending in that court in the year 1868 it was compromised by the parties. By the terms of the compromise Clark conveyed to Mrs. McRee the tract in question here, and Mrs. McRee conveyed to Clark the rest of the tract.

In 1857 and pending said litigation the said Clark executed to John M. Krum as trustee a deed of trust on the whole tract to secure an indebtedness owing the firm of E. W. Clark and brother. This deed was duly recorded but Mrs. McRee had no further notice thereof, when she compromised her suit, than the constructive notice the record of the deed imported. On the fourteenth day of August, 1872, the debt not having been paid, the acre and a half in question was sold at trustee's sale and was bought by Stephen Gardner to whom a deed was made. Defendants claim title through Gardner. The suit is to remove the cloud these conveyances cast upon the title of plaintiff.

It is further stated that from 1856 to the commencement of this suit plaintiff and his grantor Mrs. McRee had been in the actual, continuous, notorious, and uninterrupted adverse possession of the premises.

On the trial the facts charged, except as to the possession of the land, were uncontroverted. Evidence was introduced by both parties as to the possession of the land, not only during the period plaintiff claimed to have held it, but at the time the suit was commenced.

After a hearing the court found for defendant and plaintiff's bill was dismissed and a general judgment of dismissal was rendered from which plaintiff prosecutes this appeal.

The grounds upon which the finding of the court was predicated do not appear. Intricate questions of law as well as controlling questions of fact are involved and were discussed in oral argument as well as by brief of counsel. We have examined with much care the evidence as preserved in the record with a view of fully comprehending the facts upon which the conclusions of law must rest.

The evidence shows very conclusively that Mrs. McRee owned a triangular tract of land containing fifty-six acres. One angle of the triangle pointed to the south. In connection with this tract, at a date prior to 1856, she had inclosed under color of title, and was in possession of, a tract of fourteen acres lying along the north side of the triangle.

In 1857 one Levi B. Clark commenced a suit in ejectment to recover possession of the fourteen acre tract. This suit was pending until 1868 when it was compromised. This was done after a judgment in favor of Clark had been rendered in the trial court and while the suit was pending on a writ of error taken by defendant Mrs. McRee. By the terms of the compromise Clark conveyed to Mrs. McRee one and one half acres, being the west end of the fourteen acre tract, and Mrs. McRee conveyed to Clark the balance of the fourteen acre tract. Mrs. McRee thereupon dismissed her writ of error.

It was very conclusively established also that immediately after the compromise each party took the actual possession of the land conveyed to him respectively. The land conveyed to Mrs. McRee, which is the land here in dispute, adjoined the triangular tract at the northwest corner.

The evidence tended to prove that from the date of the compromise until 1890 Mrs. McRee and the plaintiff, who was her grantee, used the premises in question continuously in connection with their triangular tract.

In the year 1890 Chouteau avenue was extended east and west, along the north side of the triangular tract and separated the land in dispute from it. In improving the avenue the waste dirt was used in filling a pond on the land in...

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