Mcso v. Maricopa County Employee Merit

• Decision Date: 21 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. CV-04-0046-PR.,CV-04-0046-PR.
• Citation: 211 Ariz. 219,119 P.3d 1022
• Parties: MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARICOPA COUNTY EMPLOYEE MERIT SYSTEM COMMISSION, and Daniel Juarez, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1022

119 P.3d 1022

211 Ariz. 219

MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARICOPA COUNTY EMPLOYEE MERIT SYSTEM COMMISSION, and Daniel Juarez, Defendants-Appellees.

No. CV-04-0046-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

September 21, 2005.

Richard M. Romley, Former Maricopa County Attorney, Andrew Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney, by Mary C. Cronin, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Maricopa County Sheriff's Office.

Kutak Rock, L.L.P., by Michael W. Sillyman, David M. Park, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission.

Bihn & McDaniel, P.L.C., by Martin A. Bihn, Donna M. McDaniel and Law Office of Loyd C. Tate, by Loyd C. Tate, Phoenix, Attorneys for Daniel Juarez.

OPINION

JONES, Justice.

¶ 1 Daniel Juarez, a Maricopa County merit system employee, worked as a detention officer at the Madison Street Jail. He also worked in an extra-duty capacity as an employee of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (the "MCSO"), assigned to work at the Gran Mercado Swap Meet in Phoenix. During the evening of February 11, 2001, two individuals were arrested at the swap meet on suspicion of criminal activity and brought to the sheriff's field office. Juarez, assisted by a deputy sheriff, took the two detainees to the sheriff's transport van.

¶ 2 Each detainee was handcuffed in front, with a separate pair of handcuffs connecting the two. The first entered the van, but the second resisted and began yelling and swearing at Juarez. Juarez grabbed the detainee by his shirt and pushed him into the van, prompting the detainee to kick Juarez in the upper thigh and groin area. The detainee continued to yell and swear at him. Juarez then lost composure and struck the detainee four to five times with a closed fist. He aimed for the face.

¶ 3 As Juarez threw the punches, the deputy grabbed Juarez' arm, attempting to restrain him both verbally and physically. Juarez pulled his arm away and struck at the detainee at least two more times.

¶ 4 Based on this incident, the MCSO terminated Juarez' employment. Although Juarez had been disciplined in 1995 for using excessive force on an inmate, MCSO did not rely on the earlier incident in imposing discipline. The discipline, based on undisputed facts, was consistent with MCSO policy and practice that an employee who strikes a physically restrained detainee is subject to discipline up to and including discharge.

¶ 5 Juarez appealed the termination decision to the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission (the "Commission") which, after an adversary proceeding before a hearing officer who made recommendations, concluded that some measure of discipline was appropriate, but that termination from employment was disproportionate to the offense of striking a handcuffed detainee. The Commission also disagreed with the MCSO's determination that Juarez' past employment record was unimportant.

¶ 6 The Commission reversed Juarez' termination, reinstated him to his position, and reduced discipline to a fifteen-day suspension. The MCSO appealed to the superior court, which, in its appellate capacity, affirmed the Commission's decision. The MCSO then appealed to the court of appeals which, in a 2-1 memorandum decision, affirmed the judgment of the superior court, citing deference to the Commission's decision as the standard of review. The MCSO then petitioned for review in this Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution, Rule 23 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-120.24.

I.

¶ 7 We granted review to clarify the role of the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission when a merit system employee challenges a disciplinary action taken by the employee's appointing authority. In today's opinion, we define the standard of review by which the Commission, a quasi-judicial, fact-finding body, must process appeals in cases that involve employee discipline.

¶ 8 The employer, referred to in the statute as the "appointing authority," is authorized to take disciplinary action against merit system employees by written order stating the reasons for the action. A.R.S. § 11-356(A);¹ see Pima County v. Pima County Merit Sys. Comm'n, 186 Ariz. 379, 381, 923 P.2d 845, 847 (App.1996) ("Logan"). An employee dissatisfied with the decision of the appointing authority may appeal to the Commission, A.R.S. § 11-356(B),² whose authority under the statute is broadly stated as the power to "affirm, modify or revoke the order." A.R.S. § 11-356(C).³

¶ 9 Following a hearing in which evidence is presented de novo, the duty of the Commission is to apply the correct standard under which the case must be reviewed. While § 11-356(C) grants the Commission broad authority ("affirm, modify or revoke"), the statute is silent as to the standard of review to be applied in appeals to the Commission.

¶ 10 Because the statute is silent, we turn to the rules of procedure adopted by Maricopa County to be applied in all Commission proceedings. Rule 10.16 of the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Rules sets forth a standard of review that restricts the Commission's remedial powers to cases in which the action appealed from was "arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause."⁴ That standard, applicable to the Maricopa County Commission,⁵ was unchallenged by any party to these proceedings.

II.

¶ 11 In the instant case, the Commission acknowledged the Rule 10.16 standard — "arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause" — but strayed from its proper application. It reduced Juarez' termination to a fifteen-day suspension on the basis that discipline is necessarily "arbitrary and capricious" if it is "so greatly disproportionate to the offense ... that it is shocking to one's sense of fairness." Merit Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 17.

¶ 12 The "shocking" standard, based on perceived disproportionality between the seriousness of the offense and the severity of punishment, is not found in any statute or rule in Arizona and appears to have been a creation of court decisions. The dilemma this standard presents is that to determine whether a disciplinary order is "shocking to one's sense of fairness" calls for subjective analysis, effectively engaging the Commission in a determination of the appropriateness of a disciplinary action as measured against the seriousness of the offense, thereby opening the door to a substitution of the Commission's judgment for that of the MCSO. In contrast, Rule 10.16, given its plain meaning, creates an objective standard, requiring the employer's discipline be upheld unless "arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause." Rule 10.16 limits the Commission to a deferential role, requiring a determination within fixed legal parameters. Properly stated, the Commission's role is strictly an objective one. It requires deference to the appointing authority's decision in all cases in which the appointing authority has complied with the Rule 10.16 standard. Disposition of this case therefore depends on a correct understanding of what the Rule 10.16 standard is, and how it should be applied.

III.

¶ 13 By way of background, we note that the Commission's initial task is to create a record and to ascertain the facts. Generally, the employer must prove the essential facts warranting discipline by a preponderance of the evidence. The disciplined employee, of course, is entitled to challenge any or all factual assertions through his or her own evidence. When it is determined from the evidence that some level of discipline is warranted, the Commission then reviews the action taken by the appointing authority, not in a broad context requiring that the severity of discipline be measured against the seriousness of the offense, but in a narrow and deferential context under a Rule 10.16 analysis, whether the action, viewed objectively, was "arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause."

¶ 14 The terms "arbitrary" and "without reasonable cause" have been defined in our jurisprudence. In Arizona, "arbitrary action" has been characterized as "unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances." Pima County v. Pima County Merit Sys. Comm'n, 189 Ariz. 566, 568, 944 P.2d 508, 510 (App.1997) ("Mathis") (quoting Tucson Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Pima County v. Green, 17 Ariz.App. 91, 94, 495 P.2d 861, 864 (1972) ("Green")). An "arbitrary" action is one taken "capriciously or at pleasure," or an action taken "without adequate determining principle." Black's Law Dictionary 104 (6th ed.1990). Similarly, the phrase "without reasonable cause" indicates the lack of evidence sufficiently strong to justify a reasonable person in the belief that the acts charged are true. See Mathis, 189 Ariz. at 568, 944 P.2d at 510 ("If the Merit Commission determines the evidence does not support the charge giving rise to the action taken, it must revoke the [disciplinary] order because the action taken was arbitrary or taken without reasonable cause.").

¶ 15 Both terms — "arbitrary" and "without reasonable cause" — require analysis by reference to these governing principles. The role of the Commission is thus limited as a matter of law. The Rule 10.16 standard does not permit the Commission to substitute its independent judgment simply on the belief that a reduced level of discipline would be more appropriate to the offense.

¶ 16 By imposing a fifteen-day suspension, the Commission obviously believed that some discipline was justified. That being the case, if the discipline originally imposed falls within the permissible range, it would be unlikely the action could be seen as arbitrary.⁶ Ariz. Dep't of Corr. v. State Pers. Bd., 202 Ariz. 598, 600, ¶ 10, 48 P.3d 1208, 1210 (App.2002). Similarly, if the record contains credible evidence, either by admission or by sufficient proof, that the employee in fact...