Mead v. Park Place Properties

• Decision Date: 24 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 5665-III-1,5665-III-1
• Parties: Robert L. MEAD; and Mead's Foods of Selah, Inc., a Washington Corporation, Respondents, v. PARK PLACE PROPERTIES, a Washington Limited Partnership; Hank Gordon and Jane Doe Gordon, husband and wife; Robert M. Parks and Jane Doe Parks, husband and wife; Zitting and Sons, Inc., a Washington corporation; John Roe and Jane Roe, husband and wife; Unnamed Partners of Park Place Properties, a Washington limited partnership; and The Rainier Fund, Inc., a Washington corporation, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 403

37 Wn.App. 403

681 P.2d 256

Robert L. MEAD; and Mead's Foods of Selah, Inc., a Washington Corporation, Respondents, v. PARK PLACE PROPERTIES, a Washington Limited Partnership Hank Gordon and Jane Doe Gordon, husband and wife; Robert M. Parks and Jane Doe Parks, husband and wife; Zitting and Sons, Inc., a Washington corporation; John Roe and Jane Roe, husband and wife; Unnamed Partners of Park Place Properties, a Washington limited partnership; and The Rainier Fund, Inc., a Washington corporation, Appellants.

No. 5665-III-1.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 3, Panel Three.

April 24, 1984.

As Amended May 1, 1984.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1984.

F. Steven Lathrop, Ellensburg, for appellants.

Jay R. Inslee, Peters, Schmalz, Leadon & Fowler, Selah, for respondents.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Park Place appeals the trial court's granting of Mead's motion for summary judgment dismissing Park Place's counterclaims.

Park Place Properties (Park Place) leased part of a shopping center to Robert Mead and Mead's Foods of Selah, Inc. (Mead). The lease included a paragraph entitled "Parking and Rights of Way", which provided the maintenance of the parking area would be borne equally by the parties; another provision required each party to pay one-half of the expenses for common use area repairs and upkeep. In 1980, Park Place entered into an $82,792.50 contract with Superior Asphalt to work on the parking lot. The contract included removal of the existing pavement, excavation, and the installation of crushed gravel overlaid with asphalt. A dispute arose as to the obligation of each party to pay the cost of the work.

In February 1981, Mead brought an action against Park Place for breach of leasehold obligations and general trespass. In March, Park Place answered and counterclaimed for damages for failure (1) to keep premises in good repair; (2) to pay one-half the cost of the parking lot repair; (3) to pay one-half of required maintenance (of common areas); (4) to pay one-half the cost of certain insurance; and (5) to hold landlords harmless. At the same time, Park Place brought a separate action for unlawful detainer based on RCW 59.12.030(4). ¹ Mead's motion for consolidation was denied.

The unlawful detainer action, tried to a jury, resulted in a verdict in favor of Mead. Park Place appealed and this court affirmed. Park Place Properties v. Mead, 34 Wash.App. 1029 (1983) (unpublished opinion, No. 4740-III-7, filed April 7, 1983). Thereafter, Mead sought to have the Park Place counterclaims dismissed relying on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Mead's motion was granted and Park Place appeals. We reverse in part.

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel seek to prevent multiple litigation of the same issues. For res judicata to apply,

[t]here must be identity of (1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.

Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wash.2d 643, 645, 673 P.2d 610 (1983). Collateral estoppel differs slightly; it prevents a second litigation of issues even if presented in a different claim or cause of action. Rains v. State, 100 Wash.2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983). In addition:

Before the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied, affirmative answers must be given to the following questions: (1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? (4) Will the application of the doctrine not work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied?

Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wash.App. 888, 894, 471 P.2d 103 (1970) (cited with approval in Rains v. State, supra 100 Wash. at 665, 674 P.2d 165).

Park Place's unlawful detainer action was based on breach of three of the five items included in its counterclaims. Nevertheless, Park Place contends the damage issue was not and could not have been litigated in the unlawful detainer action. In fact, a motion was made by Mead to consolidate the two cases and try them together. The trial court denied the motion.

An unlawful detainer action is a special proceeding and "the superior court's jurisdiction in such action is limited to the primary issue of the right of possession, plus incidental issues such as restitution and rent, or damages." (Italics ours.) Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wash.App. 382, 386, 628 P.2d 506 (1981); see also Kessler v. Nielsen, 3 Wash.App. 120, 472 P.2d 616 (1970); RCW 59.12.170. ² Here, had the jury determined Park Place was entitled to possession, it would have been proper to award damages incident to the right of possession. See Lenci v. Owner, 30 Wash.App. 800, 638 P.2d 598 (1981); cf. MacRae v. Way, 64 Wash.2d 544, 392 P.2d 827 (1964); Lees v. Wardall, 16 Wash.App. 233, 554 P.2d 1076 (1976); and Kessler v. Nielsen, supra. (In these three cases, plaintiff lost the right to claim damages when plaintiff transferred the right to possession to a third party.) However, the jury found Park Place was not entitled to possession. Therefore, the issue of damages as that word is used in the unlawful detainer statute was not and could not be reached.

Mead argues the jury's verdict, by necessity, resolved the damage issues adversely to Park Place. We disagree; it is impossible to determine the basis for the decision. True, the jury may have found Park Place failed to prove its case, Mead did not breach the lease, and Park Place was not entitled to damages. On the other hand, the jury may have found Mead proved one of its defenses: (1) compromise agreement, (2) laches, or (3) waiver. Or, as Mead contended, the jury may have found the notice of termination was inadequate under the statute. Thus, the jury may have believed there was a breach but that Park Place was not entitled to possession. We cannot say the jury's verdict in the unlawful detainer action necessarily decided the damage issues adversely to Park Place.

As noted above, res judicata requires concurrence of four elements. Here, there was identity of (1) subject matter, (2) parties, and (3) quality of the parties. However, since the unlawful detainer action was limited to the issue of possession, there was no identity of cause of action.

Nor does collateral estoppel bar the damage claims. Collateral estoppel requires a prior determination of an issue on its merits. The doctrine will preclude relitigating only those issues which have actually been tried and determined. If there is ambiguity or indefiniteness in a verdict or judgment, collateral estoppel will not be applied as to that issue. See 2 L. Orland, Wash.Prac., Trial Practice § 368, at 411-12 (3d ed. 1972); Bradley v. State, 73 Wash.2d 914, 442 P.2d 1009 (1968). If there is uncertainty whether a matter was previously litigated, collateral estoppel is inappropriate. Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wash.App. 864, 515 P.2d 995 (1973). For collateral estoppel to be available as a bar to the subsequent action, it must be clear the same issues were litigated in the prior action. Roper v. Mabry, 15 Wash.App. 819, 551 P.2d 1381 (1976). Thus, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Mead argues the court could have granted summary judgment based on Washington Hydroculture, Inc....