Meade v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston

• Decision Date: 17 February 1953
• Docket Number: No. CC799,CC799
• Citation: 137 W.Va. 834,74 S.E.2d 405
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: MEADE, v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL OF CHARLESTON.

Page 405

74 S.E.2d 405

137 W.Va. 834

MEADE, v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL OF CHARLESTON.

No. CC799.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 27, 1953.

Decided Feb. 17, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. "A charitable hospital is not liable to a paying patient for the negligent acts of its servants, agents and employees in the absence of negligence in the selection and retention of such servants, agents and employees." Point 1, Syllabus, Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Association, W.Va. .

2. Procurement by a charitable corporation, which conducts a charitable hospital, of insurance indemnifying it against liability to a patient does not create liability in instances in which such corporation is immune from liability.

Ben K. Baer and Stanley E. Dadisman, Charleston, for plaintiff.

Stanley C. Morris, A.P. Hudson, Wilson Anderson and Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, for defendant.

HAYMOND, President.

This is an action of trespass on the case instituted in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by the plaintiff Harold V. Meade, Administrator of the estate of Pricilla June Meade, deceased, to recover damages from the defendant St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, West Virginia, a corporation, for the alleged wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent. To the declaration of the plaintiff the defendant filed its written demurrer and its special plea. The plaintiff filed a demurrer, a general replication and a special replication to the special plea; and to the special replication the defendant also filed its written demurrer. The circuit court overruled the demurrer to the declaration, sustained the demurrer to the special plea and overruled the demurrer to the special replication, and, upon its own motion certified its rulings on those pleadings to this Court.

The questions certified by the circuit court to this Court are: "1. Is a charitable corporation conducting a hospital legally liable to a paying patient for the negligent acts of its agents, servants and employees in the same manner as a corporation organized for profit?" and "2. If not, is a charitable corporation conducting a hospital legally liable to a paying patient for the negligent acts of its agents, servants and employees when its properties and assets, including, for example, liability insurance coverage, exceed the uses, requirements and limits of the charitable trust?"

The declaration charges in substance that the defendant, as the owner and the operator of a hospital in the City of Charleston, Kanawha County, West Virginia, was engaged in the business of providing care, treatment and hospitalization generally for patients and persons admitted to and born in such hospital, including maternity cases in which expectant mothers were admitted for care, treatment and delivery of their offspring and for care, treatment, attention and hospitalization of such newborn offspring; that the operations of the hospital were conducted by and through physicians, nurses, attendants, and other agents, servants and employees and by the use of rooms, wards, beds, nurseries and other facilities and equipment in and about such hospital; that it was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care in the selection, retention, discipline, organization and management of its physicians, nurses, attendants and other agents, servants and employees and in the provision, arrangement and retention of suitable and adequate rooms, wards, nurseries and other facilities and equipment for care, treatment and hospitalization of patients admitted to and born in such hospital and to use reasonable care in attending, treating and hospitalizing its patients; that the defendant admitted to its hospital, as a paying patient, Lealie Jane Meade, the expectant mother, who on May 22, 1951, gave birth to a baby girl, Pricilla June Meade, plaintiff's decedent, who was an accepted patient of such hospital; that the plaintiff's decedent, a physically normal baby, was treated and placed in the nursery of the hospital apart from its mother in the care and the custody of doctors, nurses, attendants, and other agents, servants and employees of such hospital; that the defendant failed and neglected to use reasonable care in the selection, retention, discipline, organization and management of its physicians, nurses, attendants, and other agents, servants and employees and in the arrangement and the retention of a suitable and adequate nursery and facilities and equipment, and failed and neglected to use reasonable care in treating, caring for and hospitalizing plaintiff's decedent at that time; and that as the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant plaintiff's decedent on May 23, 1951, choked, strangled and died.

The special plea of the defendant states that it is organized as a nonstock, nonprofit, charitable corporation under the laws of this State for the purpose of conducting a hospital without profit for the benefit of the general public, and that it must rely upon charitable bequests from various individuals and groups. It further states that the defendant, though not admitting that it has been guilty of negligence as charged in the declaration, has no property or funds out of which a judgment can be paid other than funds which are administered as a charitable trust. The special plea then alleges that its agents, servants and employees who attended the plaintiff's decedent in particular and the public in general were selected by the defendant with reasonable care; that reasonable care was exercised by the defendant in the retention of its agents, servants and employees; and that all such agents, servants and employees who attended the plaintiff's decedent were competent, experienced and qualified for the duties assigned to each of them.

The special replication alleges that the properties and the assets of the defendant exceed the uses, requirements and limits of a charitable trust and are available for payment of any judgment rendered on account of the wrongs of its agents, servants and employees as charged in the declaration; and that at the time of the commission of the wrongs charged to the defendant it had liability insurance coverage out of which any judgment recovered in this action could be paid.

The declaration sufficiently states a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and the ruling of the circuit court in overruling the demurrer to the declaration was correct. "A declaration in tort for personal injuries which charges the duty of the defendant, that this duty was breached by his particular acts, stated with reasonable certainty, and that the injuries and the damages complained of were caused by such negligent acts, is good on demurrer. Holton v. Clayco Gas Company, 106 W.Va. 394, 145 S.E. 637; Diotiollavi v. United Pocahontas Coal Company, 98 W.Va. 116, 128 S.E. 278. The allegation of the duty, the existence or presence of negligence in its performance, and the act working the damage, renders the declaration sufficient. Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W.Va. 661, 28 S.E. 733 ." Gilkerson v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 129 W.Va. 649, 41 S.E.2d 188.

The question whether the special plea sets up a valid defense to the claim of the plaintiff, is controlled by the decisions of this Court in the case of Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W.Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318, 42 A.L.R....