Meader v. Inhabitants of Town of West Newbury

• Decision Date: 26 May 1926
• Citation: 152 N.E. 315,256 Mass. 37
• Parties: MEADER v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF WEST NEWBURY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

256 Mass. 37

152 N.E. 315

MEADER

v.INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF WEST NEWBURY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

May 26, 1926.

Report from Superior Court, Essex County; F. Freeman, Judge.

Action by Harriet E. Meader against the Inhabitants of the Town of West Newbury. On report after verdict for defendants. Judgment on verdict.

A. B. Rigney, of Boston, for plaintiff.

J. M. Raymond, of Boston, for defendants.

CROSBY, J.

This is an action of contract in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for the use of an automobile. In March, 1922, the plaintiff's husband, upon being elected one of three constables of the town of West Newbury, was appointed by the selectmen ‘to be in charge of police matters of the town, with the title of chief of police.’ Shortly after his appointment he had a conference with the selectmen concerning the use of the plaintiff's automobile during the ensuing season, and thereafter, during that year, he used it in connection with his duties as constable and chief of police. The jury before whom the case was tried found that at the conference above referred to the selectmen made an agreement with the plaintiff, acting through her husband, to compensate her for such use.

In 1923 the plaintiff presented a bill of $813.92 for the use of the automobile, and the selectmen caused a special town meeting to be held in August following. The warrant for the meeting contained two articles, the first of which was:

‘Art. 1. To see what action the town will take in regard to a bill of Harriet E. Meader for the use of ther automobile by police in 1922.’

The record of the meeting kept by the town clerk was as follows:

‘Art. 1. Under this article the vote to pay the bill for the use of Mrs. Harriet E. Meader's auto in 1922 was lost.’

A substitute motion was made and voted. It declared that-

‘The town authorize the selectmen to approve such portions of the bill as they can lawfully do, and to the extent which they have authority provided the claimant furnish to the town a receipt for all bills due her up to Aug. 1, 1923.’

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $583.31. The judge, in accordance with leave reserved under G. L. c 231, § 120, entered a verdict for the defend ants. The case is before this court on a report, in which it is recited that, in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, if it should be determined that the selectmen, by virtue of their office, had authority to make the agreement above referred to on behalf of the defendants, or if the vote of the town was a ratification of the agreement, then in either case the verdict for the defendants is to be set aside, and judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for the amount found by the jury. Otherwise judgment is to be entered for the defendants on the verdict.

Selectmen are public officers, whose powers and duties are controlled by statute. A person who enters into a contract with a public officer is bound at his peril to ascertain the extent of the authority of such an officer with whom he deals. Wormstead v. Lynn, 184 Mass. 425, 68 N. E. 841;Higginson v. Fall River, 226 Mass. 423, 115 N. E. 764, 2 A. L. R. 1209;Franklin Savings Bank v. Framingham, 212 Mass. 92, 98 N. E. 925;Conners v. Lowell, 246 Mass. 279, 140 N. E. 742.

There is nothing in the statutes which expressly authorizes the making of a contract such as is here sought to be enforced; and while there are of necessity certain implied powers of selectmen incident to the special and limited authority conferred upon them (Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318;Clark v. Russell, 116 Mass. 455) they have no implied authority to make a contract of this nature.

[3] Although the town had not accepted the provisions of G. L. c. 41, § 97, the plaintiff contends that section 96 of the same chapter, which provides that ‘selectmen may appoint police officers, who shall hold office during their pleasure,’ authorizes the making of the contract in question. It is plain, however, that that section has no application to the question involved in the present case. The plaintiff's husband, for whose use it is claimed the automobile...