Meador v. State

• Decision Date: 13 June 1923
• Docket Number: (No. 7428.)
• Citation: 253 S.W. 297
• Parties: MEADOR v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

253 S.W. 297

MEADOR v. STATE.

(No. 7428.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 13, 1923.

Appeal from District Court, Ward County; Chas. Gibbs, Judge.

William Meador was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

John Howard, of Pecos, G. E. Lockhart, of Tahoka, and Williams & Williams, of Waco, for appellant.

R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Ward county of murder, and his punishment fixed at 99 years in the penitentiary.

Appellant was a boy 19 years of age. Deceased was a tenant or hired man upon the ranch of appellant's father. Feeling had grown up between the two men and had culminated in an encounter between them shortly before the homicide. On the day in question Andy Meador, the father of appellant, accompanied by appellant and some other members of his family, went down to the ranch. Without going into details, there was trouble shortly after their arrival. Andy Meador with his family went to a neighbor's house and phoned for the sheriff. They started back toward their own ranch and on the way met deceased and his wife. We do not deem it necessary to state the details of what occurred here, but the testimony of the state, consisting principally of that of the wife of deceased on the one side, and that of the defense, as given by appellant and his sister, on the other side, differs very materially. All parties agree that they remained at this place several hours, and that finally deceased was tied by appellant and got into the car of the Meadors, in company with his wife and the Meador family, and shortly thereafter the homicide took place. The state's theory is that during the time the party were at the place where the homicide occurred, and when deceased submitted to be tied and got into the car, he was under duress and acting according to the orders of appellant and his father, and that after the party got into the car appellant and his father assaulted deceased and his wife with their hands, fists, a pair of pliers, and by beating them with guns, and finally by the shooting of deceased by this appellant. The defensive theory was that deceased agreed to go to the county seat in the car of appellant's father, and that he consented to be tied and carried therein; that, after getting in the car under those circumstances, in some manner deceased got his hands loose and made a violent assault upon Andy Meador under such circumstances and in such manner as to cause this appellant to believe that he was about to kill Andy Meador; and that so believing and in defense of his father appellant shot and killed deceased.

By his plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court appellant attacks the law of 1905 authorizing district judges to call special terms of their courts when deemed advisable, at times fixed by them, etc. It is urged that said act is violative of sections 35 and 36 of article 3 of our Constitution; that said act is invalid in that it attempts to authorize district judges to call special terms of their courts without having theretofore fixed the time for convening such court, and without having given notice in some sufficient way of the time for the convening of such special terms. Sections 35 and 36 of article 3 of our Constitution relied on by appellant, are those forbidding the passage of laws by bills containing more than one subject, which must be expressed in the title; or the amending of laws merely by reference only to their titles. This contention of appellant seems to us to be directed at the soundness of the opinion in Mayhew v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 187, 155 S. W. 191, in which this court held that the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1911, from which were omitted certain provisions of chapter 4, tit. 28, Rev. St. 1895, relative to the calling of special terms of district courts, and by which, in lieu of said omitted articles of the statute, the provisions of chapter 83, Acts Reg. Sess. 29th Leg. (1905) were inserted, operated as a repeal of the omitted parts of the statute. In our judgment the opinion in the Mayhew Case is correct, and we do not discuss the application of sections 35 and 36 of article 3 of the Constitution, to the act of the Thirty-Second Legislature in 1911 adopting the Revised Statutes omitting the above articles and inserting in lieu thereof others, further than to call attention to section 43 of said article 3 of our Constitution which in terms exempts from the operation of sections 35 and 36, supra, those acts of the Legislature having for their purpose the adoption of revisions or digests of former statutes. We might, however, further observe that in the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1911, the Legislature included the revision of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure of this state, and in articles 93 to 97, c. 3, tit. 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure as adopted in 1911, we find the articles relative to special terms of district courts which are included in the civil statutes. In the Mayhew Case, supra, we said that there is now no notice required to be given or published of the convening of any special term of the district court, and that the judge can make any order at such special term as he could make at a regular term, unless forbidden by statute. The Mayhew Case is approved in Davis v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 539, 204 S. W. 652, which cites many authorities; also in Shaw v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 205, 229 S. W. 509, and other cases since. We uphold the validity of the statute authorizing the calling of the special term at which the indictment herein was returned.

In view of our disposition of the case, we do not discuss appellant's application for a continuance.

Appellant has a number of bills of exception complaining of the refusal of the learned trial judge to allow him to ask the veniremen if they were prejudiced against the law of self-defense based on real or apparent danger. There seems no doubt under the decisions in this state that for the purpose of enabling the accused to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges he has the right to ask any question whose answer would reasonably affect his choice of jurors. If one is opposed to a certain law involved in the case on trial, he might be subject to challenge for cause if it appear that his opposition is such that he could not give to the party entitled the benefit of such law. If opposed at all, even though he be ready to answer that notwithstanding such attitude he could render a verdict unaffected, the parties litigant have the right to ask and be informed so that they may act thereafter with knowledge. Hibbitt v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 527, 236 S. W. 739; Campbell v. Campbell (Tex. Civ. App.) 215 S. W. 137; Houston v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 190, 202 S. W. 86; Fernandez v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 129, 198 S. W. 301; Barnes v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 501, 168 S. W. 858; Caton v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 473, 147 S. W. 590. The recent case of Reich v. State (No. 7277) 251 S. W. 1072, opinion May 30, 1923, discusses the principle involved and cites authorities. It follows that in our opinion the action of the learned trial judge was erroneous.

A shooting upon malice aforethought can be neither in self-defense nor manslaughter, but in our opinion a charge would be better if it told the jury that if they believed from all the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant A. B. shot and killed the deceased C. D. in E. county, Tex., about the ____ day of ____, and that such shooting was not in self-defense, nor under circumstances which would reduce it to manslaughter, but was upon malice aforethought, then in such event they should find him guilty of murder and assess his punishment,...