Meadows v. Meadows

• Citation: 196 W.Va. 56,468 S.E.2d 309
• Decision Date: 14 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 22812,22812
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Parties: Donna Jeannette MEADOWS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. James Ernest MEADOWS, Jr., Executor of the Estate of James Ernest Meadows, Sr., and Joseph Judson Meadows, Defendants Below, Appellees.

Page 309

468 S.E.2d 309

196 W.Va. 56

Donna Jeannette MEADOWS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. James Ernest MEADOWS, Jr., Executor of the Estate of James

Ernest Meadows, Sr., and Joseph Judson Meadows,

Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 22812.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 10, 1996.

Decided Feb. 14, 1996.

[196 W.Va. 57] Syllabus by the Court

1. Where the competence of the maker of a testamentary document is put in issue, the West Virginia Dead Man's Statute, W.Va.Code, 57-3-1 (1937), does not bar a party or interested witness from testifying as to the deceased's appearance and demeanor and the witness may give an opinion as to the deceased's competency if the other prerequisites of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence are met. Thus, this Court's prior decisions of Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170, 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955), and Freeman v. Freeman, 71 W.Va. 303, 76 S.E. 657 (1912), are overruled to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.

2. When communications between a deceased and a party or interested witness are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but are merely the basis for an opinion regarding the mental competency of the deceased, the party or interested witness may use these communications to help explain the opinion.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, Honorable Robert A. Burnside, Judge, Civil Action No. 93-C-1569-B.

Barbara H. Allen, Allen & Allen, L.C., Charleston, for Appellant.

Warren A. Thornhill III, Beckley, for Appellees.

CLECKLEY, Justice:

This case involves a will contest brought by the plaintiff below and appellant herein, Donna Jeannette Meadows. The plaintiff appeals the final order of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, entered on August 1, 1994, which directed a verdict in favor of the defendants below and appellees herein, James Ernest Meadows, Jr., Executor of the Estate of James Ernest Meadows, Sr., and Joseph Judson Meadows, after it granted their motion in limine to exclude testimony and references of any personal transactions or communications between the plaintiff and her deceased husband, James Ernest Meadows, Sr., pursuant to our Dead Man's Statute, W.Va.Code, 57-3-1 (1937).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

James Ernest Meadows, Sr., died testate on July 5, 1993. The testator is survived by the plaintiff, his wife, and the defendants, two sons from a previous marriage. In his will written on March 31, 1993, the testator left the plaintiff a house which is valued at $80,000, along with the household furniture valued at either $6,000 or $6,750. ¹ The plaintiff also received the proceeds from a life The plaintiff maintains that she and the testator had lived together since December, 1983; however, the couple was not married until February 16, 1993, approximately five months prior to the testator's death. On March 1, 1993, the testator underwent surgery for a brain tumor. According to the plaintiff, after he was released from the hospital, the testator was taking Dilantin, Tylenol 3, and Decadron, a steroid. The plaintiff cared for the testator after his release from the hospital and asserts he did not leave their house until March 31, 1993, the day he executed his will.

[196 W.Va. 58] insurance policy valued at $22,980.54. The remainder of the testator's estate was left to the defendants. ²

After the testator died and the plaintiff learned of the contents of his will, she brought an action to contest the will alleging, in part, that the testator was of unsound mind within the meaning of W.Va.Code, 41-1-2 (1957), when the will was executed. W.Va.Code, 41-1-2, provides that "[n]o person of unsound mind, or under the age of eighteen years, shall be capable of making a will." The plaintiff stated the testamentary provisions in the will did not reflect her husband's intent for the disposition of his assets. The plaintiff generally claims she was under the impression that the testator was leaving her an income.

On June 3, 1994, the defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude "any testimony by the plaintiff ... to any personal transactions or communications between such person and the decedent ... in accordance with the provisions of Code 57-3-1." The defendants filed a second motion in limine on June 8, 1994, requesting the exclusion of any declarations or statements made by the testator that he would " 'take care' of the plaintiff[.]" A pretrial hearing was held before the circuit court on June 8, 1994, to address these issues.

At the hearing, plaintiff's counsel asserted that if the plaintiff were permitted to testify she would state:

"[F]rom the moment she brought him home from the hospital from his brain surgery, which was the 10th or 12th of March, that there was a dramatic change in his conduct. For one thing, he couldn't read, which is very important in a will contest when the question of whether or not he read the will comes up; that he couldn't keep his train of thought; that she had to be responsible for giving him his medications because he simply was very forgetful; that he didn't sleep at all; that she was simply up with him all day and all night; that she would wake up at 2:00 in the morning and find that he was fully dressed and thinking that he was about to go out someplace."

Plaintiff's counsel argued that these factors went to the competency of the testator but conceded she would offer no medical testimony as to competency.

In addition to this testimony, plaintiff's counsel informed the circuit court that she would offer the testimony of Richard D. Edwards who would say that he saw the testator near the time the will was executed and "he could detect a lapse in [the testator's] concentration." Plaintiff's counsel also would offer testimony that the testator told his sister the plaintiff "would be taken care of" and, after the will was executed, told his brother the plaintiff "would never have to worry about anything for the rest of her life, that she was taken care of." Furthermore, several family members would state that the plaintiff had a job and wanted to continue working but gave it up when she went to live with the testator. ³

At the hearing, defendants' counsel stated that the will executed on March 31, 1993, virtually was identical to the testator's preceding will executed in 1990 or 1991. The only alleged difference between the two wills is that language referring to the plaintiff as a In its final order, the circuit court ruled that pursuant to W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, the plaintiff would not be permitted to testify about any personal transactions or communications she had with the testator. This ruling excluded testimony from the plaintiff "as to the mental and physical condition or impressions as to the sanity of [the testator] between the date of his brain surgery on March 1, 1993, and the date of his death on July 5, 1993[.]" It also excluded testimony from the plaintiff that the testator declared "that he would take care of [her] and would make provision for her to have a monthly income[.]" Upon consideration of the remaining evidence, namely that the testator reportedly had "some problem concentrating" and "one or more witnesses ... heard [the testator] ... say before and after the making of the said Will that he intended to take care of the plaintiff and see that she had a monthly income, which it was contended was inconsistent with the provisions left her by Will," the circuit court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants.

"beloved friend" was changed to wife. The plaintiff asserts in her brief that neither the original nor a signed copy of this earlier will has been produced. ⁴

II.

DISCUSSION

The issue presented in this case is whether the West Virginia Dead Man's Statute prohibits the admission of an interested party's observations and opinions regarding the mental competency and capacity of a deceased. In ruling on this appeal, we must decide the propriety of our prior opinions in Freeman v. Freeman, 71 W.Va. 303, 76 S.E. 657 (1912) (Syllabus Point 5), and Kuhn v. Shreeve, 141 W.Va. 170, 177, 89 S.E.2d 685, 691 (1955), where this Court held that the term " 'personal transactions' " as referred to in the statute "include[s] every method whereby one person may derive impressions or information from the conduct, condition or language of another." Upon review, we find that many of our prior cases have misconstrued the legislative intent of W.Va.Code, 57-3-1, and, therefore, we establish new guidance for its application. In doing so, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand this case for further consideration.

A.

Standard of Review

In this appeal, the plaintiff alleges the circuit court erred in ruling that her testimony was barred by the West Virginia Dead Man's Statute. In reviewing a circuit court's application of the Dead Man's Statute, we utilize a bifurcated process. First, we review a circuit court's factfinding for clear error and give due deference to the circuit court's application of the statute to the facts applying an abuse of discretion standard. McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 235, 455 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1995); Michael v. Sabado, 192 W.Va. 585, 595, 453 S.E.2d 419, 429 (1994); Grillis v. Monongahela Power Co., 176 W.Va. 662, 666-67, 346 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1986). To the extent the exclusion of the evidence was based either upon a legal precept or an interpretation of a statute, our review is plenary. In other words, we review a circuit court's ruling on the admissibility of testimony under an abuse of discretion standard, but to the extent a circuit court's ruling turns on an interpretation, meaning, or scope of the statute or a rule of evidence our review is de novo. Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 517-18, 466 S.E.2d 171, 176-77 (1995).

B.

Analysis

It now is confirmed that the West Virginia Supreme Court possesses paramount authority to adopt rules of evidence for trial courts in this State. Mayhorn v. Logan Medical Found., 193...