Meaney v. Keating
| Decision Date | 23 January 1951 |
| Citation | 200 Misc. 308 |
| Parties | Daniel J. Meaney, Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>Edward J. Keating, Doing Business under the Name of Keating Construction Co., Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Edward J. S. Farrell and George A. Grabow for plaintiff.
Daniel Miner and William S. O'Connor for defendant.
Plaintiff was employed as a laborer by defendant in 1948, and on December 12th of that year he sustained burns in a fire in a building on the employer's construction job. The fire occurred late at night while plaintiff was sleeping in his home nearby. Plaintiff heard the cries of a watchman in the burning building and went there to rescue him, and while in the building also tried to control the fire.
The accident was reported to the Workmen's Compensation Board by the defendant. The board's records show it sent a notice of hearing and other notices as the proceeding progressed to plaintiff and defendant. The records of the board further show a notation that accident, notice and causal relation were established. An award was made and noticed by the board.
Compensation was paid to plaintiff in the amounts specified in the award and was accepted and retained by him in the sum of $1,676. Medical expenses were paid in the sum of $1,592 by the compensation insurance carrier. During the period the case was before the board, plaintiff came to the office of the carrier a number of times for treatment and examination and was paid his expenses for these trips.
The last notice of hearing was given for August 8, 1950, and contained the statement "claimant to be present or case will be closed." The final decision of the board on that day was in this form: "Decision: Closed on previous award — non-appearance of claimant."
The plaintiff did not file, and did not authorize anyone to file for him, a claim for workmen's compensation. He did not appear in any of the compensation proceedings. He has instituted this action for negligence against the employer and he has tendered back the amount of compensation awards, but not the value of the hospital and medical services furnished by the compensation carrier.
If the Workmen's Compensation Board had jurisdiction of the employee's claim against the employer, the Supreme Court has no present jurisdiction of this action on two grounds: (a) the liability of an employer to an employee for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment is exclusively enforcible before the board (Workmen's Compensation Law, §§ 10, 11); and (b) the decision of the board on questions of fact and of law in this case is final (§§ 20, 23) and is an adjudication which the Supreme Court would be required to regard as conclusive and binding.
Plaintiff contends that the board did not acquire jurisdiction of him, both for the reason that he filed no claim and made no appearance before it, and for the reason that the accident itself did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Thus, so it is argued, the board acquired no jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff and had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the accident.
The question of jurisdiction was tried before the court preliminarily and in this part of the record the facts are not in dispute. On the record before me I find that plaintiff received the notices of the proceedings before the board, shown in its records to have been sent out. The trial was continued before the jury upon the general issue of negligence and resulted in a plaintiff's verdict, the motions for dismissal having been reserved.
That the board acquired jurisdiction of the plaintiff is not open to any doubt. The statute provides that "a claim for compensation may be presented to the employer or to the chairman", and that the board shall have jurisdiction of claims "presented to it". (§ 20.)
This language implies, of course, that the injured employee has "presented" the claim to his employer, who in turn reports the accident to the board, or that the employee has presented it directly to the board. But it must be considered in connection with section 28 which provides that in any case in which an advance payment of compensation is made to the employee, the board may order a hearing "in the same manner as though a claim for compensation had been filed."
This provision was intended primarily for the benefit of employees who had neglected to file claims, but it also has set up the jurisdictional basis upon which the board proceeds in a great volume of cases where there is no dispute about the accident and in which the employer or carrier without contest pays compensation or provides medical services. In these cases the report of accident is by the employer and the board assumes jurisdiction upon the payment of compensation.
The statute necessarily must operate reciprocally and be binding equally upon employee and employer on the question of jurisdiction. If the employer is made subject to jurisdiction by this procedure the employee is also. The fact the claim may be "presented" to the employer as well as to the board suggests that a report of accident by the employer alone would give the board jurisdiction, and this, in the sequence of statutory language, is the first method prescribed in section 20 by which a claim may "be presented".
It has been uniformly held that the payment of compensation or compensation benefits operates to give the board complete jurisdiction of the claim as though a formal claim had been presented by the employee to the employer or to the board.
In Matter of Farquhar v. Godwin (250 App. Div. 805) the claimant was a groom who had been injured riding a horse. He had received medical treatment and been paid his regular wages after the injury and had filed no claim for compensation. Five years later he filed a claim and it was held that the payment of wages was the equivalent of compensation and operated to confer jurisdiction on the board in the absence of a timely filing of a claim. This rule applies to medical services as well as the payment of compensation (Matter of Glowney v. Statler's Restaurant, 267 App. Div. 1020). (See, also, Matter of Compana v. Prudential Ins. Co., 267 App. Div. 1007.)
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