Means v. State Highway Dept. of South Carolina

• Decision Date: 17 May 1928
• Docket Number: 12451.
• Citation: 143 S.E. 360,146 S.C. 19
• Parties: MEANS et al. v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

143 S.E. 360

146 S.C. 19

MEANS et al. v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

No. 12451.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 17, 1928

Original action in the Supreme Court by J. E. Means and others against the State Highway Department of South Carolina . Petition dismissed.

B. F Martin, of Greenville, for petitioners.

John M Daniel, Atty. Gen., and Cordie Page, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

STABLER J.

Among the routes directed by the act of 1924 (33 Stat. 1193), known as the "pay-as-you-go" act, to be taken over by the state highway department for construction and maintenance, in Greenville county, is the route, "From Pickens county line northeasterly on routes Nos. 2 and 8 by way of Greenville, Taylor and Greer to the Spartanburg county line;" and in Pickens county, "From Greenville county line westerly on route No. 2 by way of Easley Liberty, Norris, Central and Calhoun to the Oconee county line."

In 1927 the highway department awarded contracts for the construction of a highway between the city of Greenville and the town of Easley, which the department claimed to be a relocation of route 2, designated in the 1924 act to be built and hard-surfaced between these two points. The petitioners then brought this action in the original jurisdiction of the court to restrain the defendant from constructing the proposed substituted highway for the one named in the act; their contention being that the highway department was without legal authority to make the proposed substitution.

At the 1928 session of the Legislature, no decision having yet been rendered by the court, an act was passed, the purpose of which was, as stated in its title, "to establish the location of sections of state highway No. 2 in Greenville and Pickens counties." The petitioners now raise the question of the constitutionality of this act and have asked the court to pass upon it in this action.

The act is as follows:

"An act to establish the location of sections of state highway No. 2 in Greenville and Pickens counties.

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the state of South Carolina: The road from Greenville to Clemson College, designated in Act No. 731, Acts of 1924, for hard surfacing, is hereby located for construction as follows: From Greenville to Easley the route established by the state highway department lying wholly on the south side of the Southern Railway main line track, and more particularly described on plans of the state highway department dated August 29, 1927; from Easley to Liberty the route to be followed is that already graded following plans of the state highway department dated June 8, 1926; from Liberty to Central the road is to follow such location as the state highway department may establish regardless of any route or location that may have been heretofore laid out, marked or designated as state highway No. 2; from Central to Clemson College the location is established to follow the pavement already constructed by the state highway department.

Sec. 2. The state highway department is hereby specifically authorized to proceed with the construction of the above-described road pursuant to construction contracts already awarded, and to award further construction contracts as in its judgment may be required in order fully to complete the construction of the road.

Sec. 3. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act be, and the same are hereby repealed.

Sec. 4. This act shall take effect immediately upon its approval by the Governor." (35 Stat. at Large, p. 1880).

The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the act upon one ground only. Their contention is that the subject of the act is not expressed in the title, and in this respect the act violates section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution, which provides that-

"Every act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."

In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the court will keep in mind certain well-established principles. In the case of McKiever v. City of Sumter, 137 S.C. 266, 135 S.E. 60, it was said:

"This court has repeatedly held, in line with general authority, that, in order to declare a statute unconstitutional, its invalidity should be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and that every

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