Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. White Arrow, LLC
| Decision Date | 16 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-7915 (SRC) |
| Parties | MECCA & SONS TRUCKING CORP. Plaintiff, v. WHITE ARROW, LLC, TRADER JOE'S COMPANY, INC., ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5, and JOHN DOES 6-10. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CHESLER,
This matter comes before the Court on the motions for summary judgment filed by Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. ("Mecca") [Docket No. 40], White Arrow, LLC ("White Arrow") [Docket No. 39], and Trader Joe's Company, Inc. ("Trader Joe's") [Docket No. 41], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment of Trader Joe's. The Court will grant in part and deny in part the motions for summary judgment of Mecca and White Arrow.
This case concerns the transportation of a shipment of cheese. The following facts are not in dispute. Trader Joe's purchased approximately $81,000 worth of cheese from Singleton Dairy, LLC. Trader Joe's requires shipment at or below 40 degrees Fahrenheit and has the right, pursuant to the Master Vendor Agreement, to reject the shipment if temperatures during transit or upon receipt exceed that threshold. Singleton hired Mecca to deliver the cheese from Bayonne, New Jersey to Fontana, California. Mecca subcontracted the job to White Arrow. White Arrow quoted Mecca a rate for shipping pallets "chilled 40 degrees[.]" (Mecca SOF ¶ 7.)
The shipment was in transit between June 18, 2014, and June 24, 2014. Two devices - TempTale, provided by Singleton, and White Arrow's Thermo King WinTrac 4 - recorded the temperatures during shipment. The Thermo King set the temperature inside the trailer; the TempTale devices were placed on the pallets. The temperature of the refrigerated trailer was set to 40 degrees. (Trader Joe's SOF ¶ 31.) However, both units logged higher actual temperatures. The Thermo King registered 957 out 1,702 readings above 40 degrees. (Id. ¶ 33.) Almost all the measures from the TempTale units were over 40 degrees, with spikes reaching over 60 degrees. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38, 40; Mecca SOF ¶ 12.) Because of the warm temperature readings from the TempTale, Trader Joe's refused eleven of the seventeen pallets of cheese. (Mecca SOF ¶ 14.)
The rejected cheese was moved to US Growers Cold Storage Warehouse. There, seven weeks later, Brian Mitchell, an expert retained by White Arrow, inspected the product and concluded that it was not damaged by the heat. Mitchell reported that the cartons were in good condition with no evidence of moisture due to high temperatures, no condensation on the plastic packaging, no loosening of the vacuum bag, which would have indicated bacterial growth, and no evidence of new mold growth. (Gutterman Decl., Ex. F.) In all, Mitchell saw no signs of problems and opined that the shipment should not have been rejected.
Mecca filed a Complaint against White Arrow in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County. White Arrow removed the case to Federal Court. Mecca amended its Complaint to add Trader Joe's as a Defendant. The operative Second Amended Complaint asserts claims sounding in negligence, breach of contract, and indemnification against White Arrow, and a claim forwrongful rejection against Trader Joe's. White Arrow filed a cross-claim against Trader Joe's for wrongful rejection. Trader Joe's filed a cross-claim for indemnification against White Arrow. Mecca subsequently determined that Trader Joe's acted properly and has twice attempted to dismiss the company as a Defendant but was unsuccessful over White Arrow's objections. The case is before the Court upon the parties' motions for summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
"[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. "When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court "must view the evidence 'in the light most favorableto the opposing party.'" Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). It may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) ( same).
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must establish the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). "A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial." Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs and Participating Emp'rs, 134 S.Ct. 773 (2014). However, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations; instead, it must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ().
Trader Joe's moves for summary judgment on Mecca's claim and White Arrow's cross-claim arising out of the alleged wrongful rejection. Mecca does not oppose the motion. The obligations of Trader Joe's with respect to the cheese shipment are governed by the Master Vendor Agreement. The agreement provides that "[a]ll refrigerated products shall be shipped and received at 40°F or less" and allows Trader Joe's to "return . . . any goods that are in violation of any of the terms" of the Agreement. Temperature readings, as measured by both the TempTale and Themro King devices, exceeded 40 degrees. Because thehigher temperatures violated the terms of the Agreement, Trader Joe's had the right to reject the shipment. With this, both the seller and Plaintiff Mecca agree. .
White Arrow has no basis for a claim against Trader Joe's. White Arrow had no contractual relationship with Trader Joe's and was not a third-party beneficiary of the contract with Singleton. White Arrow's argument that its claim derives from the bills of lading that were the contracts of carriage is unavailing. The Master Vendor Agreement between Trader Joe's and Singleton controls the circumstances pursuant to which Trader Joe's may reject the cheese. Under the terms of this agreement, Trader Joe's acted properly. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment of Trader Joe's and enter judgment in favor of Trader Joe's on all claims and cross-claims.
Mecca moves for summary judgment on its Carmack Amendment claim against White Arrow.1 White Arrow's motion for summary judgment asks the Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint against White Arrow. The broker/carrier agreement between Mecca andWhite Arrow provides that "the Carrier's liability for cargo loss or damage shall be governed by the provisions of [the Carmack Amendment] 49 U.S.C. § 14706." (Gutterman Decl., Ex. H.) "The Carmack Amendment governs the liability of common carriers on bills of lading." Paper Magic Grp., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 318 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2003). It allows recovery of damages from a carrier for "actual loss or injury to the property" resulting from the transportation of cargo in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). The Carmack Amendment provides the "exclusive cause of action for interstate-shipping contract [and tort] claims alleging loss or damage to property." Lloyds of London, 762 F.3d at 336 (quoting Hall, 476 F.3d at 688-90).
To establish a prima facie case against a carrier, a person must prove "(1) delivery of goods to the initial carrier in good...
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