Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn.

• Decision Date: 08 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. A078491,A078491
• Citation: 66 Cal.App.4th 672,78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225
• Parties: , 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2242, 136 Lab.Cas. P 10,242, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7012, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9676 MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GREATER BAY AREA ASSOCIATION OF PLUMBING AND MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 225

78 Cal.Rptr.2d 225

66 Cal.App.4th 672, 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2242,

136 Lab.Cas. P 10,242,

98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7012,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9676

MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GREATER BAY AREA ASSOCIATION OF PLUMBING AND MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A078491.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Sept. 8, 1998.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Review Denied Dec. 16, 1998.

James A. Carter, Michelle Q. Carter, Carter & Carter, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Daniel A. Croley, Salime Samii, Littler Mendelson, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.

JONES, Acting Presiding Justice.

This is an action for breach of contract and declaratory relief brought by appellant Mechanical Contractors Association of Northern California (hereafter MCA) against respondent Greater Bay Area Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors (hereafter GBA). Both parties are associations of licensed mechanical and plumbing contractors which act as collective bargaining agents on behalf of their members. At the outset of the trial below, the trial court granted GBA's motion in limine to exclude all of MCA's evidence, in effect granting a nonsuit for GBA. In accordance with the parties' stipulation, the trial court thereafter entered judgment in favor of GBA and against MCA.

The ultimate issue on appeal is whether a contract based on a January, 1994 letter between the parties is invalid or void as a matter of law. GBA contends the contract is invalid as a matter of law because it purports to modify certain collective bargaining agreements (hereafter Agreements) between MCA, GBA, and two labor unions, but without the unions' written consent thereto, as required by the Agreements. GBA also contends the contract is void because MCA failed to comply with federal statutory notice requirements for modifications to collective bargaining agreements. Finally, GBA contends that even if the contract was initially valid, it was superseded when the Agreements subsequently were extended without incorporating the contract therein. MCA opposes all these contentions on their merits.

We conclude that the contract between MCA and GBA is not invalid or void as a matter of law for the reasons asserted by GBA, and that the trial court therefore erred by granting GBA's motion in limine. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the propriety of the order granting GBA's motion in limine, we will apply the standard of review applicable to an order granting a nonsuit.

As was well stated recently by Division Three of this court: "In contrast to the usual motion in limine, which seeks to keep "In either case, the scope of the trial court's inquiry was relatively narrow. Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. The sole issue is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citations.] The scope of a trial court's inquiry on a motion for nonsuit is similarly limited. A motion for nonsuit or demurrer to the evidence concedes the truth of the facts proved, but denies as a matter of law that they sustain the plaintiff's case. A trial court may grant a nonsuit only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence, it determines there is no substantial evidence to support a judgment in the plaintiff's favor. [Citations.]" (Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at pp. 27-28, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 518, italics in original.)

                particular items of evidence from a jury, an 'objection to all evidence' is essentially the same [66 Cal.App.4th 677] as a general demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking to end the trial without the introduction of evidence.  Such an objection is properly sustained where even if the plaintiff's allegations were proven, they would not establish a cause of action.  [Citations.]"  (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp.  (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 26, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 (Edwards ).)   Where, as here, the trial court grants a motion at the beginning of trial to exclude all evidence produced during discovery, the motion "may [also] be viewed as the functional equivalent of an order sustaining a demurrer to the evidence, or nonsuit."  (Id. at p. 27, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.)
                

In Edwards, the court concluded on the record there presented that the trial court's grant of the respondent's motions in limine "was tantamount to a nonsuit." (Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 28, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.) Since the record in this case supports the same conclusion, we shall treat the trial court's order granting GBA's motion in limine to exclude all evidence as a nonsuit. "Therefore, on this appeal we must view the evidence most favorably to [MCA], resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in [its] favor, and uphold the judgment for [GBA] only if it was required as a matter of law." (Ibid.)

We reject GBA's assertion that we must imply factual findings in favor of the trial court's judgment because MCA did not request a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632. As MCA argues, the express language of section 632 requires a trial court to issue a statement of decision only after a "trial of a question of fact by the court." No such trial occurred in this case. Rather, the trial court only granted GBA's motion in limine to exclude all evidence. The general rule is that a trial court need not issue a statement of decision after a ruling on a motion. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294, 240 Cal.Rptr. 872, 743 P.2d 932.) In fact, in ruling on GBA's motion, the trial court was bound to view all factual allegations in the light most favorable to MCA. (Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 27, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.) We must not only do the same, but must also resolve all presumptions, inferences, and doubts in MCA's favor. (Id. at pp. 27-28, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 518.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

MCA and GBA are associations of mechanical and plumbing contractors. Each negotiates and enters into collective bargaining agreements with labor unions on behalf of its member contractors. As multi-employer associations, MCA and GBA are parties to separate collective bargaining agreements with the labor unions whose members work for the contractors. Pertinent to this appeal, these collective bargaining agreements generally provide for the payment of "contract administration and industry funds" (hereafter Funds) by association members to their respective associations. ¹

In 1993, MCA and GBA had several disputes over whether individual members could switch their membership from one association to another while a particular collective bargaining agreement was still in effect. At issue was how to allocate Funds to the associations when a switch occurred. The parties met in December 1993 in an effort to resolve their differences, at which time Scott Strawbridge, then executive vice-president of MCA, informed GBA that MCA would shortly be presenting a written proposal for GBA's consideration.

On January 7, 1994, Strawbridge sent a letter outlining MCA's proposal to Ron Peterson, then president of GBA. Among other things, MCA proposed that the parties agree that an individual member could switch associations simply by giving written notice to both associations and that Funds earned after the effective date of the switch would be paid to the member's new association. Strawbridge included with his letter a check for $5,000 as payment in exchange for GBA's assignment to MCA of GBA's right to collect that sum from another organization known as "CPMCA." ² Strawbridge stated that if GBA found the proposal acceptable, then Peterson should obtain authority from GBA's board of directors to initial the letter to signify GBA's acceptance, at which time GBA could cash the check. If GBA found the proposal unacceptable, then GBA was to return the check to MCA.

Prior to making this proposal to GBA, Strawbridge had contacted the business managers of the two unions whose Agreements would be affected if MCA and GBA agreed on the proposal, U.A. Local 467 and U.A. Local 393. Strawbridge contacted the unions because he knew that modification of any provision in the Agreements required the consent of the unions who were signatory to those Agreements. The unions indicated they would comply with whatever procedure MCA and GBA developed with respect to allowing their members to switch associations. Neither union gave its consent in writing, however.

At a meeting on January 11, 1994, GBA's board of directors agreed to accept MCA's $5,000 check. The minutes of the meeting stated in conjunction with that action that "[i]f anyone wishes to change associations they can change on the anniversary date of each year." On January 20, 1994, Peterson initialed Strawbridge's January 7 letter and returned it to MCA. GBA also sent MCA a separate letter confirming its acceptance of the $5,000 check, and thereafter cashed the check and deposited it in its bank account.

In reliance on the MCA-GBA contract (hereafter the Contract), MCA took such steps as transferring certain Funds to GBA when GBA claimed to have provided services for a contractor that had switched its membership to MCA, and allowing one of its members to switch to GBA. MCA would not have allowed the switch but for the Contract.

The trouble in this case began in 1995 when two members of GBA attempted to switch their affiliation to MCA. GBA refused to recognize the switch on the grounds the Contract was not binding and GBA had not agreed to the switch....