Medina v. Lopez-Roman

Decision Date30 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. 03-00-00096-CV,03-00-00096-CV
Citation49 S.W.3d 393
Parties(Tex.App.-Austin 2000) Christopher Medina, Appellant v. Dr. H. Lopez-Roman and Dr. Stuart Crane, Appellees
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Kidd and Yeakel

Marilyn Aboussie, Chief Justice

Appellant Christopher Medina brought article 4590i (health care liability) claims and various non-article 4590i claims against appellees, Dr. Stuart Crane and Dr. H. Lopez-Roman (collectively, "the doctors"). See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 4590i, §§ 1.01-16.02 (West Supp. 2000). The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of the doctors on all claims. In this consolidated appeal, Medina challenges both orders. We will reverse and remand.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 3, 1993, fifteen-year-old Christopher Medina was admitted to Williams House, a residential treatment center in Lometa, Texas, for the purposes of conducting a mental health evaluation and determining the most appropriate residential or foster care placement for him. Williams House staff approached Dr. Stuart Crane, who was leaving Williams House after working with some of the children, and explained that Medina had left his prescription medications behind. A staff member asked Dr. Crane to write a prescription for Medina; Dr. Crane wrote Medina a prescription for Ritalin and Tegretol.

Approximately two to three weeks after Medina entered Williams House, staff members brought Medina to the Metroplex Pavilion in Lampasas, Texas, for a screening to determine whether Medina required psychiatric treatment on an inpatient basis. Dr. Crane, who was working at the Metroplex Pavilion that day, evaluated Medina and spoke with Williams House staff, ultimately determining that Medina could remain at Williams House and be seen on an outpatient basis.

On March 3, 1994, Medina fell on his head while at Williams House and injured his neck. Staff members drove him to the emergency room at Rollinsbrook Medical Center in Lampasas, where he was treated by Dr. Lopez-Roman. When Medina arrived, he complained of dizziness and pain in his neck, and commented that he was unable to move his upper extremities. Dr. Lopez-Roman performed a physical examination of Medina and ordered cervical spine X-rays, a blood count, and a blood chemistry test. Because no radiologist was on staff that evening, Dr. Lopez-Roman viewed the X-rays himself but found nothing abnormal. Throughout the approximately two-hour period Medina was in the emergency room, Dr. Lopez-Roman's examinations revealed various findings; for example, at one point Medina did not respond to painful stimuli, but he later complained that the IV needle being inserted into his arm was painful. Medina complained that he could not move his arms, but he later moved his hands and legs. Because of Medina's fluctuating symptoms and psychological history, Dr. Lopez-Roman asked hospital staff to contact Medina's psychiatrist. Hospital staff paged Dr. Crane, who soon called Dr. Lopez-Roman.

Dr. Lopez-Roman asked Dr. Crane whether it was possible that Medina might "somatize," i.e., express physical symptoms because of emotional factors. Dr. Crane informed Dr. Lopez-Roman that there was a possibility of somatization with Medina, considering his history of developmental disorder and mild retardation. Based on his examination of Medina and consultation with Dr. Crane, Dr. Lopez-Roman noted that he believed Medina was exhibiting psychosomatic symptoms, not spinal-cord injuries. Dr. Lopez-Roman discharged Medina from the emergency room later that same evening.

Medina returned to Williams House where he spent the night. The following morning, Williams House staff transported Medina to Austin, Texas, to be returned to the custody of Arturo Escajeda, a caseworker with the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. Because Medina was still complaining about pain, Escajeda demanded that Medina be transported to a local hospital where he was diagnosed with a broken neck. Medina subsequently underwent surgery to fuse his C-1 and C-2 vertebrae and began ongoing physical rehabilitation.

On May 13, 1994, Medina sent a statutory pre-suit notice letter, as required under article 4590i of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (the "Medical Liability Act"), to Dr. Lopez-Roman, asserting a health care liability claim relating to the injury he sustained March 3, 1994 and threatening to file suit. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 4590i, § 4.01 (West Supp. 2000). Medina brought suit against Dr. Lopez-Roman in December of 1994 but later filed a non-suit. On April 3, 1996, Medina turned eighteen. On October 15, 1996, Medina sent a statutory pre-suit notice letter to Dr. Crane alleging that Dr. Crane failed, among other things, to properly diagnose Medina and provide accurate information to Dr. Lopez-Roman on March 3, 1994. On October 31, 1996, Medina sent a second pre-suit notice letter to Dr. Lopez-Roman. Medina filed suit against both doctors on April 3, 1998, his twentieth birthday. Medina requested service of citation simultaneously with the filing of his suit, but Dr. Lopez-Roman was not served until October 6, 1998.

Both doctors filed motions for summary judgment on the basis that the applicable period of limitations had expired and Medina's claims were therefore barred. Medina thereafter filed his first amended petition, adding non-article 4590i causes of action against both Dr. Crane and Dr. Lopez-Roman. On October 27, 1999, the district court rendered a summary judgment in favor of the doctors on Medina's article 4590i medical malpractice claims. On January 3, 2000, the district court rendered a second summary judgment in favor of the doctors on all of Medina's remaining non-article 4590i claims. Medina now appeals both orders.

DISCUSSION
Limitations Period for Medina's Article 4590i Claims

Medina's first four points of error all concern the applicable limitations period for his article 4590i claims. Medina contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that his article 4590i claims were barred by limitations. The standards for reviewing motions for summary judgment are well established: (1) the movants for summary judgment have the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in his favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has the burden of conclusively establishing that defense as a matter of law. KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999).

The statute of limitations for health care liability claims is found in section 10.01 of the Medical Liability Act. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 4590i, § 10.01 (West Supp. 2000). Section 10.01 provides:

[N]o health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed; . . . .

Id. The Supreme Court of Texas, however, deemed this provision unconstitutional as applied to minors. Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995). In striking down section 10.01, the court relied on its decision in Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983), in which the court held a limitations provision of the Texas Insurance Code similar to section 10.01 unconstitutional as applied to minors under the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 318-20. The court reasoned that because section 10.01, like the provision at issue in Sax, restricted a child's right to bring a medical malpractice action, section 10.01 also violated the Texas Constitution as applied to minors. Id. The court then proceeded to determine the appropriate limitations period to apply to a minor's medical malpractice claims, concluding that "[s]ections 16.001 and 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code together provide a general statute of limitations for minors' personal injury claims." Id. at 321. Section 16.003 establishes a two-year limitations period while section 16.001 tolls the period until the minor reaches eighteen years of age. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 16.001, .003 (West Supp. 2000). Applying sections 16.001 and 16.003 to the facts of that case, the court stated: "We therefore hold that [the plaintiff] had two years after attaining age eighteen to bring suit for the acts of medical malpractice allegedly committed during his minority." Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 321 (emphasis added).

Although Dr. Crane and Dr. Lopez-Roman concede that Medina's causes of action are governed by the general tolling and limitations provisions of sections 16.001 and 16.003, both doctors contend that Medina's claims are nonetheless barred because the period of limitations expired one day before Medina filed suit. The doctors acknowledge that the limitations period was tolled until April 3, 1996, the day Medina turned eighteen. However, the doctors argue that because the two-year period began to run on April 3, 1996, it expired on midnight of April 2, 1998, a "full two years later." In support of their argument, the doctors rely on dicta in Weiner, contrary to its holding, which states that "[t]aken together, [sections 16.001 and 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code]...

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