Medlin v. RLC, Inc.
Decision Date | 07 May 2015 |
Docket Number | No. SD 33437,SD 33437 |
Citation | 467 S.W.3d 865 |
Parties | Roy Medlin, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. RLC, Inc., Defendant–Respondent, and Jeremiah J. Hayes, et al.,Intervenors–Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Attorney for Appellant: Steven E. Marsh, Hulston, Jones & Marsh, LLC, Springfield, Missouri
Attorney for Respondents: Lynn C. Rodgers, Evans & Dixon, LLC, Springfield, Missouri
Roy Medlin appeals the trial court's judgment ordering partial satisfaction of judgment and full release and discharge of a mechanic's lien previously imposed by a judgment entered on June 30, 2008. Finding no error as alleged by Medlin, we affirm.
Medlin, d/b/a Medlin Excavating, was subcontracted by RLC, Inc. (“RLC”), in April 1999 to provide subdivision development services in connection with the construction of Augusta Heights Subdivision Phase 2, including lots 1 through 31, in Willard, Greene County, Missouri. Medlin provided services until on or about December 10, 1999. Medlin's demand for payment of $36,397.19 was refused by RLC, and on May 15, 2000, Medlin filed a statement of mechanic's lien in the amount of $36,397.19. On November 14, 2000, he brought an action for breach of contract and enforcement of mechanic's lien.
Medlin's action against RLC resulted in a final judgment on June 30, 2008 (“Original Judgment”). Medlin v. RLC, Inc., 423 S.W.3d 276, 284 (Mo.App.2014) (“Medlin I ”). Medlin did not challenge this judgment by appeal or seek relief under Rule 74.06.2 Id. at 285. As noted by our court in Medlin I, the Original Judgment, as relevant here, provided:
The Satisfaction Judgment sustained Intervenors' motion in full, finding that $52,524.50 paid into the court's registry represented “the full amount of that part of the Original Judgment, which was secured by the Mechanic's Lien imposed therein, together with all accrued interest[.]” It was further ordered that the mechanic's lien imposed by the Original Judgment be released and discharged.
A trial court's judgment on a Rule 74.11(c) motion is “to be reviewed the same as any other judge-tried case, under the standard set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).” Rhodus v. McKinley, 71 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Mo.App.2002). “As such, we will affirm the orders of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support them, they are against the weight of the evidence, or they erroneously declare or apply the law.” Id. Under this standard, de novo review of questions of law is applied. Pearson v. K os t er, 367 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. banc 2012). “With respect to such questions, ‘the appellate court reviews the trial court's determination independently, without deference to that court's conclusions.’ ” Id. at 43–44 (quoting Moore v. Bi–State Dev. Agency, 132 S.W.3d 241, 242 (Mo. banc 2004) ).
Medlin I, 423 S.W.3d at 284–85 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the language in the Original Judgment as to the amount of the mechanic's lien judgment imposed upon the real estate is plain, unambiguous, and certain—“a judgment of mechanic's lien [is] entered under Count I in the amount of $34,508.83 in favor of [Medlin] against Real estate described in Exhibit A attached.” (Emphasis added).
Medlin argues in all three of his points, however, that as a matter of law, in addition to the expressed certain amount of $34,508.83, the mechanics lien judgment in favor of Medlin against the real estate includes an additional amount equal to the prejudgment interest awarded to Medlin against RLC in the judgment on Count II. Considering all three of his points together, Medlin supports this argument in essentially three ways: first, the mechanic's lien judgment on Count I begins with “[t]he foregoing judgment shall be secured by[,]” and that this reference to the judgment on Count II incorporates the prejudgment interest awarded under that count (Point I); second, the Original Judgment did not “purport to deny or disallow prejudgment interest on the mechanic's lien judgment” (Point I); and third, “prejudgment interest on the mechanic's lien is mandated by law, the trial court was presumed as a matter of law to have known and correctly applied the law[,] ... and the [Original] Judgment thus should have been interpreted and construed to have been entered in accordance with law as to the inclusion of mandatory interest on the mechanic's lien judgment, rather than to be erroneous or void” (Points II and III). None are persuasive or correct.
Medlin is correct that the beginning phrase of the mechanic's lien judgment on Count I—“[t]he foregoing judgment shall be secured by”—references the preceding judgment in favor of Medlin and against RLC on Count II. That judgment includes three damage elements: “[1] the principal amount of $34,508.83, together with [2] prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 9% on $28,000 from the date of May 22, 2000, plus [3] attorney fees in the amount of $10,050.”
Medlin then argues that because section 429.210, RSMo 2000, mandates prejudgment interest on mechanic's lien amounts, the introductory language to the mechanic's lien judgment3 makes the prejudgment interest—the second damage element awarded in the Count II judgment—includable as an additional amount secured by the mechanic's lien judgment. Medlin concedes in his brief, however, that a mechanic's lien judgment cannot secure the attorney fees' award, the third damage element in the Count II judgment, and that the mechanic's lien judgment on Count I cannot and does not include the attorney fee amount. The flaw in Medlin's analysis is that the introductory phrase he relies upon does not draw any distinction between prejudgment interest and attorney fees in the “forgoing judgment” and, therefore, it logically must either include both or...
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...argues the trial court erred in finding it granted compound interest not expressly stated in its Judgment. Medlin v. RLC, Inc. , 467 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015). The District argues the Prompt Pay Act, under which the Judgment awarded penalty interest, is silent on compound interes......
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Medlin v. RLC, Inc.
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