Medlin v. RLC, Inc., No. SD 33437

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: GARY W. LYNCH, J.
• Citation: 467 S.W.3d 865
• Parties: Roy Medlin, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. RLC, Inc., Defendant–Respondent, and Jeremiah J. Hayes, et al.,Intervenors–Respondents.
• Docket Number: No. SD 33437
• Decision Date: 07 May 2015

467 S.W.3d 865

Roy Medlin, Plaintiff–Appellant
v.
RLC, Inc., Defendant–Respondent
and
Jeremiah J. Hayes, et al.¹ Intervenors–Respondents.

No. SD 33437

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

Filed May 7, 2015
Rehearing Denied May 28, 2015
Application for Transfer Denied August 18, 2015

Attorney for Appellant: Steven E. Marsh, Hulston, Jones & Marsh, LLC, Springfield, Missouri

Attorney for Respondents: Lynn C. Rodgers, Evans & Dixon, LLC, Springfield, Missouri

Opinion

GARY W. LYNCH, J.

Roy Medlin appeals the trial court's judgment ordering partial satisfaction of judgment and full release and discharge of a mechanic's lien previously imposed by a judgment entered on June 30, 2008. Finding no error as alleged by Medlin, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Medlin, d/b/a Medlin Excavating, was subcontracted by RLC, Inc. (“RLC”), in April 1999 to provide subdivision development services in connection with the construction of Augusta Heights Subdivision Phase 2, including lots 1 through 31, in Willard, Greene County, Missouri. Medlin provided services until on or about December 10, 1999. Medlin's demand for payment of $36,397.19 was refused by RLC, and on May 15, 2000, Medlin filed a statement of mechanic's lien in the amount of $36,397.19. On November 14, 2000, he brought an action for breach of contract and enforcement of mechanic's lien.

Medlin's action against RLC resulted in a final judgment on June 30, 2008 (“Original Judgment”). Medlin v. RLC, Inc., 423 S.W.3d 276, 284 (Mo.App.2014) (“Medlin I ”). Medlin did not challenge this judgment by appeal or seek relief under Rule 74.06.² Id. at 285. As noted by our court in Medlin I, the Original Judgment, as relevant here, provided:

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court enters Judgment and Orders in favor of [Medlin] and against [RLC] as follows:

Judgment is entered for [Medlin] against [RLC] under Count II in the principal amount of $34,508.83, together with prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 9% on $28,000 from the date of May 22, 2000, plus attorney fees in the amount of $10,050.

The foregoing judgment shall be secured by a judgment of mechanic's lien entered under Count I in the amount of $34,508.83 in favor of [Medlin] against Real estate described in Exhibit A attached.

Plaintiff is also awarded judgment against [RLC] for the costs of this action.

Id. at 280.

As provided by Rule 74.11(c), Intervenors, who claim interests in the real estate

467 S.W.3d 867

subject to the mechanic's lien granted by the Original Judgment, filed a motion for leave to pay proceeds into the court's registry, for an order of partial satisfaction of the judgment, and for an order releasing the mechanic's lien. The trial court's judgment on that motion (“Satisfaction Judgment”), found, in part,

[t]hat the [Original Judgment] awarded damages in favor of [Medlin] and against [RLC] in the amount of $34,508.83, together with pre-judgment interest on a portion of that sum, attorney's fees and court costs. The Judgment further impressed a mechanic's lien on the property described in the Judgment which secured only the sum of $34,508.83, and did not secure payment of any prejudgment interest, attorney's fees or court costs[.]

The Satisfaction Judgment sustained Intervenors' motion in full, finding that $52,524.50 paid into the court's registry represented “the full amount of that part of the Original Judgment, which was secured by the Mechanic's Lien imposed therein, together with all accrued interest[.]” It was further ordered that the mechanic's lien imposed by the Original Judgment be released and discharged.

Medlin timely appeals the trial court's Satisfaction Judgment, contending in three points that the trial court “erroneously applied and declared the law and misinterpreted the [Original Judgment],” in that

prejudgment interest on the mechanic's lien judgment was awarded and included in the [Original Judgment], as mandated by law, the [Original Judgment] imposed and enforced a mechanic's lien to secure the “foregoing judgment” which included prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the mechanic's lien, and the [Original Judgment] did not purport to deny or disallow prejudgment interest on the mechanic's lien judgment [Point I];

prejudgment interest on the mechanic's lien is mandated by law, and the trial court was presumed as a matter of law to have known and correctly applied the law mandating prejudgment interest on mechanic's lien judgments in entering the [Original Judgment] [Point II]; and

even if the [Original Judgment] was ambiguous as to the prejudgment interest, the trial court was presumed to have known and followed the law in entering the [Original Judgment], and the [Original Judgment] thus should have been interpreted and construed to have been entered in accordance with law as to the inclusion of mandatory interest on the mechanic's lien judgment, rather than to be erroneous or void [Point III],

Standard of Review

A trial court's judgment on a Rule 74.11(c) motion is “to be reviewed the same as any other judge-tried case, under the standard set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).” Rhodus v. McKinley, 71 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Mo.App.2002). “As such, we...