Medlin v. RLC, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. SD 32629.,SD 32629.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: Roy MEDLIN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. RLC, INC., Defendant/Respondent, and Jeremiah J. Hayes, et al., Intervenors/Respondents.

423 S.W.3d 276

Roy MEDLIN, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.RLC, INC., Defendant/Respondent,andJeremiah J. Hayes, et al.,¹ Intervenors/Respondents.

No. SD 32629.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

Jan. 13, 2014.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Feb. 4, 2014.

Application for Transfer Denied March 25, 2014.

Steven E. Marsh, of Springfield, MO, and Richard L. Rollings, Jr., of Camdenton, MO, for Appellant.

Lynn C. Rodgers, of Springfield, MO, for Intervenors/Respondents.

RLC, Inc., Ozark, MO, pro se.

WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J.

Roy Medlin (“Medlin”), appeals the “Judgment” of the trial court which sustained Intervenors' “Motion to Vacate or Expunge the Amended Judgment Entered on June 29, 2009, and the Second Amended Judgment Entered on December 28, 2010,” and ordered the “original Judgment entered ... on June 30, 2008,” reinstated. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

Medlin, a subcontractor, performed excavating services for RLC, Inc. (“RLC”), ² in the Augusta Heights Phase 2 subdivision in Willard, Greene County, Missouri. As a result of this work, Medlin filed a mechanic's lien in the amount of $36,397.19 against Augusta Heights on May 15, 2000, and brought an action for breach of contract and enforcement of mechanic's lien. Medlin's initial “Petition,” in (then) Case No. 100CC4418, was filed on November 14, 2000; his “Fifth Amended Petition” was filed on July 6, 2004.³

The Fifth Amended Petition included a claim for a mechanic's lien (Count I), a claim for breach of contract (Count II), a claim for quantum meruit (Count III), a claim for unjust enrichment (Count IV), and a claim for fraudulent transfers (Count V). Counts II, III, and IV sought a judgment against RLC only.⁴ As part of the “fifth amendment,” Count I added purchasers of various lots as additional defendants, and Count V alleged that various subsequent transfers of lots in the subdivision constituted fraudulent transfers and joined subsequent purchasers and lenders as defendants. Count V sought a judgment against RLC and the other defendants in the amount of the mechanic's lien, to have the various transfers set aside, for Medlin's attorney fees, and for punitive damages.

On April 27, 2006, RLC filed a “Motion for Separate Trial of Count V of Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Petition.” The trial court granted the motion on May 2, 2006, and ordered that “Counts I, II, III and IV shall be tried to the Court without a jury. Count V is severed for separate trial by jury.” The trial court also dismissed all defendants to Count I of the Fifth Amended Petition except RLC, stating

the Court ... concludes that all defendants in this case who did not have any interest in the subject property prior to the expiration of the 6–month statute of limitations ... are not necessary parties and should not be parties to Count I ... and are hereby dismissed from said Count I, leaving [RLC] as the only defendant remaining on said count.

As a result of the trial court's order,⁵ Counts I through IV of the Fifth Amended Petition asserted claims only against RLC, while Count V asserted a claim against RLC and numerous other defendants.

Counts I through IV of the Fifth Amended Petition were tried by the trial court on May 4 and 5, 2006; July 28, 2006; and August 23, 2007. Count V of Medlin's Fifth Amended Petition was never tried to a jury or by the trial court, nor was any evidence ever presented or heard as to Count V during the bench trial of Counts I through IV.⁶

Over the course of almost three years following the bench trial, the trial court entered three different judgments in the underlying case: a “Court Memorandum, Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment” on June 30, 2008 (“the Original Judgment”); an “Amended Judgment” on June 29, 2009 (the “First Amended Judgment”); and a “Second Amended Judgment” on December 28, 2010.

The Original Judgment entered on June 30, 2008, provided in part:

The Court finds that [Medlin] and [RLC] entered into a contract upon implied acceptance of [Medlin]'s proposal for $130,000 by receipt of services provided by [Medlin].

The Court further finds that [Medlin] did not complete the contract and granted [RLC] credit for $2500 for his non-completion. The Court finds [RLC] paid a third person $12,188.36 for “clean up” work. A reduction in [RLC]'s balance due of $9688.36 is therefore in order.

The Court further finds that a mechanics lien filed by [Medlin] on May 12, 2000[,] included an exhibit purporting to be a ‘just and true’ account. That statement had a balance due of $36,397.19. The Court finds the May 12, 2000 lien was timely filed and included data required by Chapter 429 RSMo. The Court finds [Medlin] granted a credit for $7800 in error, but failed to grant the $9688.36 credit due for completion costs. The mechanics lien is therefore adjusted to the amount of $34,508.83.

The Court further finds that [RLC]'s agents or representatives acknowledged an amount due of $28,000. The Court finds that Section 431.180 RSMo provides the Court with discretion regarding award of interest and attorney fees in this case. Interest will be granted at the legal rate of 9% on $28,000 from date of the filing of the mechanics lien. The Court finds that an attorney fee of $10,050 award to [Medlin] is reasonable.

The Court finds [RLC] failed in its burden on the Counter-claim except for balance adjustments set out above.

JUDGMENT

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court enters Judgment and Orders in favor of [Medlin] and against [RLC] as follows:

Judgment is entered for [Medlin] against [RLC] under Count II in the principal amount of $34,508.83, together with prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 9% on $28,000 from the date of May 22, 2000, plus attorney fees in the amount of $10,050.

The foregoing judgment shall be secured by a judgment of mechanic's lien entered under Count I in the amount of $34,508.83 in favor of [Medlin] against Real estate described in Exhibit A attached.

Plaintiff is also awarded judgment against [RLC] for the costs of this action.

No other Orders or Judgment are entered on counts, claims, counterclaims or cross-claims and therefore deemed denied and dismissed.

(We have shown the Original Judgment as written without notations to grammatical or punctuation errors) (Emphasis added). Exhibit A to the Original Judgment described the Augusta Heights Phase 2 subdivision, which comprised 31 separate lots per the recorded plat.⁷

On July 28, 2008, Medlin filed a “Motion to Amend, Modify and Correct Judgment,” pursuant to Rule 78.04.⁸ Medlin did not file a notice of hearing contemporaneously with the filing of the motion to amend. In the motion to amend, Medlin argued, among other things, that pre-judgment interest should be modified to include 18% interest on the entire $34,508.83 awarded. Medlin also noted the judgment indicated that all counts and claims have been “decided and/or denied[,]” but “Count V was severed for separate trial and has not yet been adjudicated.”

On September 11, 2008, a hearing was held on Medlin's motion to amend. During that hearing, the trial court heard oral argument on all issues raised in Medlin's motion, but did not sustain or overrule any particular request for relief. The following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: Disposition of Count V.

[MEDLIN'S COUNSEL]: Count V was a claim that included the homeowners and it was a—it is a fraudulent transfer claim pursuant to the fraudulenttransfer statutes of Missouri. If I recall correctly, May 1 of maybe 2006, you entered an order severing Count V from the rest of the mechanic's lien case. And, of course, Count V has never been tried. It's more or less a housekeeping issue. It's never been tried, so I don't what our—where we stand on Count V.

THE COURT: Is that right, [RLC's Counsel]?

[RLC'S COUNSEL]: You know, Judge, I was sitting here trying to think of what Count V was and I've got this humongous file and I really don't know what it was. But if it's a fraudulent transfer claim, I don't know, I think it's—

THE COURT: But if I severed it, I couldn't dispose of it now.

[RLC'S COUNSEL]: Well, you could dispose of it if you dismissed it unless we want to carry this thing even further to anybody else's retirement.

THE COURT: I'll just have to look at it. If it's—is there a docket entry saying that we severed Count V?

[MEDLIN'S COUNSEL]: I think there's a signed order.

[RLC'S COUNSEL]: I don't know. I mean—

THE COURT: A signed order?

[MEDLIN'S COUNSEL]: Yeah, I think there's a signed order and I think it's May 1st.

THE COURT: Then you're right on that.

[RLC'S COUNSEL]: It's probably not a final. It ought to be cleared up so that there's not any question about finality.

THE COURT: Right. So that's the next thing. What are we going to do about Count V?

[MEDLIN'S COUNSEL]: Well, I don't know. I'll-what we would do on that might depend a little bit on what you do on this Motion to Amend, et cetera, frankly.

THE COURT: I see. [RLC's Counsel]'s right. It will continue to be an interlocutory judgment regardless of what we do on this till all issues are resolved, general speaking.

The court concluded the hearing by simply stating, “All right. I'll read the rest of this stuff.”

The trial court did not take any action on Medlin's motion to amend within 90 days of July 28, 2008. The docket sheet in fact indicates the trial court took no action whatsoever on Medlin's motion to amend until June 29, 2009. Medlin filed a “Motion for Entry of Judgment” with a proposed Judgment on December 1, 2008, and again on January 14, 2009. Medlin's motion simply read:

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

[Medlin] moves for the entry of Judgment herein against [RLC]. A copy of the proposed Judgment is attached hereto.

The motion was originally noticed for hearing on December 4, 2008, and later re-noticed for hearing on January 22, 2009. However, the docket does not reflect that any hearing took place, who...