Meek v. Harris

• Decision Date: 13 March 1916
• Docket Number: 18040
• Citation: 110 Miss. 805,71 So. 1
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: MEEK v. HARRIS

71 So. 1

110 Miss. 805

MEEK v. HARRIS

No. 18040

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 13, 1916

APPEAL from the circuit court of Jones county, HON. J. M. ARNOLD Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Lydia Harris against F. M. Meek. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

Deavours & Hilbun, for appellant.

Is the appellant, Meek, liable for an alleged threat to have appellee's son arrested and put in jail, when there is no allegation or proof that there was any attempt to put the threat into execution?

The true rule of law in cases of this character seems to be that if the court has jurisdiction of the person and of the offense charged that there can be no liability unless possibly, as some courts have held, the court is actuated by malice or corruption. The declaration does not allege that defendant had no jurisdiction of either the person or the offense.

In 29 Cyc., page 1443, paragraph 4, the rule is stated thus "While officers are liable for negligence in the performance of ministerial duties, no such liability is recognized in the case of discretionary or judicial duties. There are generally three classes of officers who are protected by this rule. In the first place are judicial officers, that is officers holding regular courts for the decision of the cases. These officers when having jurisdiction are never liable for errors or mistakes of judgment, even if actuated by corruption or malicious motives . . . In the third place are the vast number of officers not holding courts, but discharging executive and administrative functions, whose discharge involves the exercise of judgment and discretion; such officers are not liable for a mistaken exercise of such discretion. In many of the cases on the liability of inferior judicial officers, and officers discharging quasi-judicial or administrative functions the opinions would seem to lay stress upon the absence of malice or corrupt intent as an important element in the determination of the immunity from liability. But in most cases what is said in the opinion is merely dictum, inasmuch as the actual decision did not recognize the liability." 23 Cyc, page 567, par. d; 28 Cyc., page 466; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 Ed), page 771; Wilcox v Williamson, 61 Miss. 310; Bell v. McKinney, 63 Miss. 187; E. B. Thompson v. T. H. Jackson, 27 L. R A. 92; Austin v. Brooman, 14 L. R. A. 138; Randall v. Brigham, 19 Lawyers' Edition (United States Supreme Court Reports), page 285; See 24 Am. St. Rep. 137; Pratt v. Gardner, 48 Am. Dec. 625; Calhoun v. Little, 31 Am. St. Rep. 254; Stone v. Graves, 40 Am. Dec. 131; Coleman v. Roberts, 59 Am. St. 11.

The advocate, we are aware, sometimes becomes over-zealous in the cause of his client; sometimes his judgment becomes warped. He cannot always be impartial. But we believe a cursory examination and study of this record will demonstrate that the appellant is entitled to a reversal of this case, and we respectfully submit that we cannot understand, we cannot comprehend, that sort of justice that would permit a judgment for any amount to stand against this appellant, who, according to appellee's own evidence, did nothing more than to threaten one who is not even a party to this suit.

Halsell & Welch, for appellee.

Counsel for defendant have been very diligent in this matter, and have tested what they concede to be every weak point in the plaintiff's case, and it has withstood their assaults before the court, and before the jury.

Whether correctly or not, we will not undertake to say, but one court has recently held that the parent can recover in behalf of the child for wrongs of this kind. The court will bear in mind however that the suit was not founded because of any requirement that the child should not be permitted to attend school, or be confined in the yard of the mother, but because of the latter threat, if the mother did not leave town with the child, the policeman would invade her home, and take the child to jail. Could a more grievous wrong be done anyone? In this land of liberty, where the humblest home is the castle of its inhabitants, though poverty, abide there also, it is surprising when the facts of this case are considered, and it is remembered that the jury by their verdict forever settled the question in favor of the plaintiff, and accepted her theory and statement, that the verdict was for one thousand, six hundred dollars instead of a larger sum?

On page 6 of their brief beginning at the third paragraph, and from that point to the end, counsel devotes much time and labor trying to convince this court that this is an action against F. M. Meek, seeking to recover damages for an alleged threat on his part to arrest, and put Ledyard Harris, appellee's minor son in jail. But the mother is not seeking to recover for threats to the child. The fact is Meek as Mayor, ordered the plaintiff to leave Laurel with her minor son, and if she did not do so he would put the son in jail. Doesn't this order to leave Laurel mean pecuniary loss to appellee, and should she not have redress? Meek, according to Mrs. Harris did not say to her, "Mrs. Harris your son, so rumor says, is a bad boy, and I think he would be better off on a farm, or somewhere else, let me help you to arrange this." But he did not do this, he told her she must take her son and leave Laurel, and later, on another occasion, told her if she did not leave by Saturday, he would put her son in jail. The plaintiff testified this so frightened her she left Laurel at once. Doesn't this give her a right of action? The jury seems to have believed Mrs. Harris' statement, and disbelieved defendant's version. What greater wrong or injury could be done a poor, frail, delicate, little widow, with a minor son, and a frail, delicate mother sixty-five years old, all dependent upon this little widow's wages for support, they having no property except a modest little home, than to tell her she must leave her home and old mother, and take the son, and go out into the cold world an outcast, breaking up a happy family and leaving behind good friends. Had this been a man he would no doubt have told Meek to go to the hot place, but being a poor, frail, delicate woman, with no strong, manly arm upon which she could lean, these words and orders coming from the Mayor, the man in authority, struck terror to her heart, and she left Laurel. Appellants counsel contend in their brief that Meek was acting in his judicial capacity as Mayor. We, however, ask how on earth was Meek acting in his judicial capacity as Mayor; by what rights, or under what laws of the municipality, or under the constitution does he take upon himself the authority to order people to leave a certain place. This is a free country, and we are given the right of free speech, and freedom of individual action. We think the appellant in the latter part of his brief, from page six to the end, is trying to divert the court from the main...