Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-4852,92-4852
• Citation: 985 F.2d 1471
• Parties: Carrie MEEK, Xavier Suarez, James C. Burke, Maurice A. Ferre, Pedro Jose Gonzalez, Ralph Packingham, Victor de Yurre, Prisciliano Falcon, Orlando Urra, Betty Ferguson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, George F. Knox, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants, R.H. Swann, David Sampson, the Miami-Dade Chapter of the A. Phillip Randolph Institute and the Northeast Citizens of Dade County, Movants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1471

985 F.2d 1471

25 Fed.R.Serv.3d 390

Carrie MEEK, Xavier Suarez, James C. Burke, Maurice A Ferre, Pedro Jose Gonzalez, Ralph Packingham Victor de Yurre, Prisciliano Falcon Orlando Urra, Betty Ferguson Plaintiffs-Appellees, George F. Knox, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants, R.H. Swann, David Sampson, the Miami-Dade Chapter of the A. Phillip Randolph Institute and the Northeast Citizens of Dade County, Movants-Appellants.

No. 92-4852.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 26, 1993.

Stuart L. Simon, Key Biscayne, FL, for movants-appellants.

Stephen M. Cody, Miami, FL, for Suarez, et al.

Eugene E. Stearns, Stearns, Weaver, Milles, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, FL, Thomasina H. Williams, Mitchell, Williams & Clyne, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Packingham and Ferguson.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a post-judgment motion to intervene for purposes of appeal. Having found that the at-large voting system used by Dade County, Florida ("Dade County"), to elect the members of its County Commission dilutes black and hispanic voting power in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, the district court barred further elections.

                The intervenors, who were denied leave to intervene as parties below, contend that the district court erred in condemning the at-large system under section 2 as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986).   We reverse the denial of intervention and review the merits of the injunction.   On the merits, we affirm the district court's finding that the black and hispanic appellees proved their vote dilution claims that the present at-large system in Dade County, Florida, does not comply with the mandate of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982
                

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 22, 1986, the black and hispanic appellees filed this action to challenge Dade County's electoral system for county commissioners. The disputed system is part of a "federated plan" that provides for the allocation of authority between Dade County and the metropolitan governments. The County Commission is composed of a mayor and eight commissioners. Although the mayor may live anywhere in Dade County, each of the commissioners must reside in a different one of the eight residence districts. Each commissioner, however, must run for election county-wide. Thus, although Dade County is divided into various residence districts, the elections are conducted at-large and county-wide. See generally Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 908 F.2d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.1990) (Meek I ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1108, 113 L.Ed.2d 217 (1991).

In Meek I, this court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the appellees satisfied their burden as to the first Gingles prong, and also noted that the second Gingles prong was not in dispute. Meek I, 908 F.2d at 1549. After concluding that the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dade County by applying erroneous legal principles, this court in Meek I reversed and remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether the appellees satisfied the third Gingles prong under the proper legal standards. Meek I, 908 F.2d at 1549 (specifically directing the district court to "decide whether Blacks or Hispanics have thus far usually elected preferred representatives" and "whether Blacks or Hispanics are impaired in their ability to elect representatives of their choice by the manner in which the voting districts are now drawn").

On remand, the district court again found a genuine factual dispute over whether hispanics constitute a minority of eligible electors and are capable of being victimized by racial bloc voting, citing evidence that they represent 50.50 percent of Dade County's population. The court also found evidence of persistent black electoral success which, in its view, also precluded summary judgment for the black plaintiffs on the third Gingles prong.

On December 11, 1991, intervenors R.H. Swann and David Sampson moved to intervene as defendants under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, either permissively or as of right. ¹ Swann and Sampson are residents of Dade County and registered voters. The district court denied the motions on January 14, 1992. The court ruled that intervention as of right was inappropriate because the movants' interests were "identical" to those of the existing official defendants, who therefore could be relied upon to represent them adequately. On the issue of permissive intervention, the court found that "[t]he duplicative nature of Applicants' interest makes undue delay in the resolution of this case likely, and sheds no new light on the issues before the Court." The court did, however, permit the movants "to intervene as amici."

The Miami-Dade Chapter of the A. Phillip Randolph Institute ("Randolph") and Northeast Citizens of Dade County

                ("Northeast") also moved on December 11, 1991, for leave to participate as amici curiae, eschewing party status "because they are not registered voters in Dade County nor entities with personal political rights that will be directly affected in any way by the determinations of the Court in this case."   They did allege, however, that they were "comprised of registered electors in Dade County whose personal political rights and voting strength will be affected by the outcome of this litigation."   Randolph and Northeast were permitted to participate as amici.
                

On May 21, 1992, Swann and Sampson filed a renewed motion to intervene as parties "in order to preserve their ability to take an appeal in the event that the Court renders a decision adverse to the Defendants and the County Defendants fail to take an appeal." The next day, on May 22, 1992, the district court entered partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to the first two prongs of the Gingles test. On May 27, 1992, the district court denied the renewed motion to intervene without specifying the grounds for the denial.

After a bench trial lasting approximately three weeks, the district court entered an August 14, 1992 order, as amended on September 11, 1992, concluding that the black and hispanic appellees met their burden under the third Gingles prong, and established their vote dilution claim against Dade County's at-large system for electing persons to the County Commission. Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, 805 F.Supp. 967, 987, 994 (S.D.Fla.1992). On August 21, 1992, the County Commission held a special session and decided unanimously not to pursue an appeal. All four intervenors--Swann, Sampson, Randolph, and Northeast--filed motions to intervene as parties for purposes of appeal on September 1. That same day the district court denied the motions without explanation, although the court's order did refer to the January 14, 1992, denial of intervention, which it attached as an exhibit. In the September 1, 1992 motion to intervene, the intervenors stated that "[t]he sole purpose of the requested leave to intervene is to pursue the appeal which has not been taken by Dade County" and represented that they were "willing to accept the County's pleadings for such an appeal."

All four intervenors filed notice of appeal on September 11, 1992. Appellees have filed a series of motions to strike and to dismiss the appeal. We ordered those motions carried with the case.

DISCUSSION

I. INTERVENTION

We have jurisdiction to review an order denying intervention as a matter of right because such a determination is a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 that "ends the litigation on the merits," Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945), for the intervenor, Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. RR., 331 U.S. 519, 524, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 1389-90, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947). Standing alone, an order denying permissive intervention is neither a final decision nor an appealable interlocutory order because such an order does not substantially affect the movant's rights. Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 524, 67 S.Ct. at 1389-90. See also Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 374-76, 107 S.Ct. 1177, 1181-82, 94 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1442-43 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030, 109 S.Ct. 1768, 104 L.Ed.2d 203 (1989).

Even though the district court's September 11, 1992 injunction order is appealable by the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we would have no jurisdiction to review it in the absence of our conclusion that the district court improperly denied the intervenors' motions to intervene. EEOC v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 635, 637 (11th Cir.1984) (explaining this court's anomalous rule); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir.1983) (same). Before proceeding to the merits of the appeal, therefore, we first discuss our jurisdiction by reviewing the district court's intervention orders under

rule 24(a) or (b). FSLIC v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 983 F.2d 211, 215 (11th Cir.1993); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1977).

A. Motion to Dismiss

Appellees contend that Swann and Sampson could have appealed immediately from the January 14 and May 27, 1992, orders denying intervention of right and urge that the unexplained failure to file notice of appeal until September 11, 1992, deprives us of jurisdiction to review the September 1, 1992, order. While we agree that the time for appeal from the January and May denials of intervention of right had expired, a fact that deprives us of authority to review them now, we reject appellees' argument that the September 1 motions were...