Meek v. Schwanbeck

• Decision Date: 11 May 1953
• Citation: 130 N.E.2d 834,99 Ohio App. 83
• Parties: , 58 O.O. 170 MEEK, Appellee, v. SCHWANBECK, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 83

99 Ohio App. 83

130 N.E.2d 834, 58 O.O. 170

MEEK, Appellee, v. SCHWANBECK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Lucas County.

May 11, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

An unfavored driver about to enter an intersection, who observes another vehicle approaching from his right and who guesses from a casual glance at the approaching vehicle that he can cross in safety, does not exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent unfavored driver should exercise under the circumstances in proceeding into and across the intersection.

Fuller, Harrington & Seney and Gerald Riley, Toledo, for appellant.

Marshall, Melhorn, Block & Belt and Arnold Bunge, Toledo, for appellee.

FESS, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a finding and judgment of the court, without the intervention of a jury, in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $851.33.

On August 4, 1949, at about 3 p. m., plaintiff was driving his 1941 Buick four-door sedan easterly on Gordon Street toward the intersection of Hiett Avenue at a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour. At the same time, defendant was driving her 1934 Ford coupe in a northerly direction on Hiett Avenue, approaching the intersection. Plaintiff testified that a two-story residence occupies the lot on the southwest corner of the intersection, which residence 'sits rather high on a terrace and there is a hedge in front of it, but if you get up, well, within 10 feet of the curb you can see down the street,' and that 'the terrace is back far enough you can see down the street before you get into the intersection.' Defendant testified that she would have to get right up to the intersection before she could see what was approaching from her left. As plaintiff was about to enter the intersection at a point 10 feet therefrom, he looked to his right and saw the defendant's car approaching about 100 feet down Hiett Avenue. Thereafter, he proceeded into and across the intersection without again looking to his right.

The prima facie speed limit in the area of the collision was 25 miles per hour. On direct examination, no inquiry was made of plaintiff regarding the speed of defendant's car, but upon cross-examination, he said she must have been traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour. It is apparent from his testimony that his estimate of defendant's speed was based upon the suddenness and result of the collision rather than upon his observation at the time he looked. The trial court found that 'misjudging her true speed and assuming that defendant was traveling at a reasonable and proper rate of speed and that he had plenty of time to cross Hiett Avenue before defendant would reach the intersection, plaintiff proceeded into the intersection.'

As defendant was about to enter the intersection, she observed plaintiff's car just about in the middle of the intersection about two car lengths ahead of her. Instead of turning her car to her left, she applied her brakes and turned to the right in an effort to avoid the collision. The left front end of her car struck defendant's car at a point immediately in front of its right rear wheel. The evidence is in dispute as to whether plaintiff's car was within the intersection or was just leaving it. The trial court found that plaintiff's car was leaving the intersection.

Although plaintiff's automobile was 1,200 pounds heavier than defendant's, plaintiff's automobile, as a result of the impact, swung around in an arc of approximartely 90 degrees and the left rear end collided with a utility pole 15 feet from the east curb of Hiett Avenue on the north side of Gordon Street. After the collision, defendant's automobile stopped almost at the point of impact. In the conclusions of fact, the court found that plaintiff was free from negligence and that the sole proximate cause of the collision and resultant damage to plaintiff's automobile was the negligence of the defendant in driving her automobile at a speed greater than was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the streets and the other conditions then existing, in failing to keep her automobile under control, in failing to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully using said thoroughfares, particularly the automobile driven by the plaintiff, in failing to give any signal or warning of her intention to enter said intersection, and in failing to stop her automobile, slacken the speed thereof, or divert the course thereof so as to avoid striking plaintiff's automobile.

Again we are confronted with the perplexing problem of the relative rights and obligations of drivers simultaneously approaching an intersection. The statutory rules with respect to right of way are designed to avoid those dangers inherent in simultaneous approaches by requiring a yielding of the right of way, and to prevent careless drivers from crashing highway intersections. Since Morris v. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St. 147, 187 N.E. 2, 89 A.L.R. 831, the principle has been definitely established that the driver approaching from the left must yield the right of way to a driver approaching from the right, provided the otherwise favored driver is proceeding in a lawful manner. It was to be hoped that Morris v. Bloomgren, supra, had settled the confusion which had arisen following Heidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N.E. 44, 58 A.L.R. 1186, in 1928, and George Ast Candy Co. v. Kling, 121 Ohio St. 362, 169 N.E. 292, in 1929. But in the intervening twenty years further difficulty has been experienced in the...