Meeks v. Miller
| Citation | 956 So.2d 864 |
| Decision Date | 24 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-CT-00200-SCT.,2005-CT-00200-SCT. |
| Parties | W. Mark MEEKS, M.D. v. Sheila Fox MILLER, Peggy Fox Watz and Gary Merkell Fox, Next Friends and Sole Beneficiaries of the Intestate Estate of Merkell M. Fox. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
C. York Craig, Jr., Ridgeland, Paul Hobart Kimble, J. Lawson Hester, Jamie D. Travis, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
Barry Stuart Zirulnik, Jackson, Carlton W. Reeves, attorneys for appellees.
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
EASLEY, Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. Merkell M. Fox (Fox) filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. W. Mark Meeks (Dr. Meeks) on February 28, 1995, for treatment Fox received from Dr. Meeks in late 1993.1 Following Fox's death, the trial court substituted Fox's beneficiaries, Sheila Fox Miller, Peggy Fox Watz, and Gary Merkell Fox (collectively "Miller"), as the plaintiffs. In 1998, the trial court granted Dr. Meeks's motion for summary judgment. Feeling aggrieved, Miller appealed that decision to this Court.
¶ 2. On appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of the factual issue of whether Dr. Meeks was acting as an employee of the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) when he treated Fox. See Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302 (Miss.2000) (Miller I). The Court established five factors to be analyzed to determine whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor. Miller I, 762 So.2d at 310.
¶ 3. On remand, the trial court denied Dr. Meeks's motion for summary judgment, finding:
[A]t all times material relevant to the rendition of professional medical services to M. Merkell Fox, W. Mark Meeks, M.D.[,] acted in the capacity of a private person engaged in [the] private practice of medicine and as an independent contractor and not in his capacity as a State employee.
¶ 4. Following the judgment of the trial court on remand, the case was again appealed. This time, Dr. Meeks appealed the trial court's ruling to this Court, and the appeal was assigned to the Mississippi Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals examined the trial court's analysis of the five Miller factors to be considered and reversed the trial court's denial of Dr. Meeks's summary judgment. Meeks v. Miller, 956 So.2d 942, 945, 2006 WL 1737757, 2006 Miss.App. LEXIS 500, 8-9 (Miss.Ct.App.2006).
The Court of Appeals stated:
During the period that the alleged negligence occurred, September 22, 1993, through December 13, 1993, Dr. Meeks was employed by the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi (the "Board") as an Assistant Professor of Medicine at the UMMC. Dr. Meeks entered into an employment contract with UMMC in April of 1993.
Pursuant to his contract, Dr. Meeks was required to be a member of the University of Mississippi Clinical Associates ("UMCA") and participate in the practice plan of the Division of General Internal Medicine. Dr. Meeks['s] membership in these associations was due to his status as a faculty member at UMMC.
Dr. Meeks was paid a base salary of $77,279, and he had the right to earn 100% of additional income generated through fees up to $140,000, inclusive of the base salary. Upon reaching the threshold amount of $140,000, any additional earnings were to be split evenly between Dr. Meeks and UMMC. This additional income was generated through participation in the practice plan, where he had a clinical practice and treated patients at the UMMC Pavilion.
Meeks, 956 So.2d at 945, 2006 Miss.App. LEXIS 500 at 8-9. The Court of Appeals further stated:
Because we find that Dr. Meeks was an employee of UMMC and as a result [of being] a state employee, we hold that the trial court erred when it denied Dr Meeks' summary judgment. As an employee of UMMC, Dr. Meeks is immune from liability.
Meeks, 956 So.2d at 951, 2006 Miss.App. LEXIS 500, 25.
¶ 5. Finding that the trial court's denial of Dr. Meeks's motion for summary judgment to be in error, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment in favor of Dr. Meeks. Further, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals which held that Dr. Meeks was immune to Miller's lawsuit as an employee of UMMC, but we affirm the judgment for reasons other than those stated by the Court of Appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶ 6. On appeal, Dr. Meeks contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for summary judgment. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review and "examine[s] all the evidentiary matters before us, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits." Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So.2d 479, 483 (Miss.2006) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss.1996), overruled in part on other grounds, Owens v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 910 So.2d 1065, 1074 (Miss. 2005)). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made." Price, 920 So.2d at 483 (citing Berry, 669 So.2d at 70). "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So.2d 751, 754 (Miss.App.2006) (citing City of Jackson v. Sutton, 797 So.2d 977, 979 (Miss.2001)).
¶ 7. "Issues of fact sufficient to require a denial of a motion for summary judgment are obviously present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another party takes the opposite position." Price, 920 So.2d at 483 (citing American Legion Ladnier Post No. 42 v. Ocean Springs, 562 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss.1990)). "If any triable issues of fact exist, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed." Price, 920 So.2d at 484. Otherwise, the decision is affirmed. Id. at 483 (citing Miller v. Meeks, 762 So.2d 302, 304 (Miss. 2000)).
¶ 8. In Miller I, this Court adopted a five-factor test to determine whether a physician is an employee of the state and should be protected by sovereign immunity. Here, there is no need for this Court to analyze the five factors. In this appeal, Miller acknowledges that Dr. Meeks had an employment contract and was employed by UMMC as a professor. As such, we need only address whether Dr. Meeks acted within the scope and course of his employment at UMMC when he treated Fox. "Course of employment" is defined as "[e]vents that occur or circumstances that exist as part of one's employment; esp., the time during which an employee furthers an employer's goals through employer-mandated directives." Black's Law Dictionary 356 (7th ed.1999). "Scope of employment" is defined as "[t]he range of reasonable and foreseeable activities that an employee engages in while carrying out the employer's business." Id. at 1348.
¶ 9. In Children's Med. Group, P.A. v. Phillips, 940 So.2d 931, 935 (Miss.2006), the Court stated:
Under Section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958); see also Commercial Bank v. Hearn, 923 So.2d 202, 208 (Miss.2006). If an employee "deviates or departs from his work to accomplish some purpose of his own not connected with his employment—goes on a `frolic of his own'—the relation of master and servant is thereby temporarily suspended," and the employer is not vicariously liable. Seedkem S., Inc. v. Lee, 391 So.2d 990, 995 (Miss.1980) (citations omitted). See also Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747, 756 (Miss.2004) (); Gulledge v. Shaw, 880 So.2d 288, 295 (Miss.2004) (); Adams v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 831 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Miss.2002) ().
¶ 10. We do not need to remand this case to the trial court to determine whether Dr. Meeks was acting within a state-protected environment or practice when he treated Fox. The contract of employment signed by Dr. Meeks with the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi allowed Dr. Meeks to see patients subject to the terms of the contract as a condition of his employment by the Board of Trustees. Nothing in the employment contract provides that Dr. Meeks must have resident physicians present at all times when patients are treated. Further, Dr. Meeks's testimony provided that most of the time, residents are not present when patients are treated at the Pavilions, where Fox was treated by Dr. Meeks. No evidence was presented which disputes Dr. Meeks's assertion. No statute or caselaw requires that a doctor must be "teaching" at the precise moment that treatment is provided to a patient or have residents present at all times in order to satisfy the employee status of UMMC.2 By his employment contract, Dr. Meeks is an employee of UMMC.
¶ 11. The employment contract makes clear that all income generated from such patients must be reported quarterly. The contract does not exclude treating private-pay or insured patients. The contract states in pertinent part:
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