Megginson v. Turner
| Decision Date | 27 July 1990 |
| Citation | 565 So.2d 247 |
| Parties | Ken MEGGINSON; the Democratic Party of the State of Alabama; and John Baker as state party chairman for the Democratic Party of Alabama v. J.E. TURNER. 89-1390. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Robert S. Edington, Mobile, for appellant.
Norman J. Gale, Jr. of Clay, Massey & Gale, Mobile, for appellee.
Richard F. Allen of Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Perry A. Hand, as Secretary of State.
The plaintiff, J.E. Turner, the Republican nominee for the House of Representatives, District 102, sued Perry Hand, as secretary of state of the State of Alabama; John Baker, as state party chairman for the Democratic Party of Alabama; L.W. Noonan, as probate judge of Mobile County; Ken Megginson; and the Democratic Party of the State of Alabama, alleging that Ken Megginson was not a legally qualified candidate for the Democratic nomination for election to the House of Representatives from District 102, because, Turner alleges, Megginson failed to timely file a statement naming his principal campaign committee as required by Ala.Code 1975, § 17-22A-4. Turner sought injunctive relief restraining the defendants from issuing a certificate of nomination to Megginson. The Circuit Court of Mobile County granted the injunctive relief, and this expedited appeal followed.
The trial court found and held as follows:
After studying the record and the briefs of counsel and amicus curiae, we conclude that the trial court's ruling removing Megginson as a candidate is due to be affirmed, on the authority of the cases cited by the trial court.
Our affirmance, however, is not to be understood as agreement with the plaintiff that the trial court's judgment prevents the Alabama Democratic Party from exercising its prerogative, as provided by § 17-16-41, to nominate a candidate for the nomination vacated by the court's judgment. Because the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine whether the party could fill the vacancy, we decline to interpret its judgment as holding that it could not. Indeed, we construe the trial court's statement that "his name may not appear on the ballot for the general election" as being made in the context of the only issue over which it had jurisdiction: whether, after qualifying as the only candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for the office in question, Megginson's failure to meet the five-day deadline prescribed by § 17-22A-4 requires his removal as a candidate and thus creates a vacancy that is subject to being filled pursuant to § 17-16-41.
Further, we find nothing in the statute or in the cases cited by the appellee that prevents the Democratic Party's executive committee from exercising its prerogative to fill the vacancy by such a method as the committee "may see fit to pursue." § 17-16-41. The appellee's reliance on Harris v. Weatherford, 459 So.2d 876 (Ala.1984), is misplaced. Because Harris failed to file his initial qualifying paper with the appropriate office, he never became a candidate, and thus his "disqualification," under those circumstances, did not create a vacancy. Here, Megginson properly qualified as a candidate, as defined by § 17-22A-2 and thus was subject to the five-day requirement of § 17-22A-4. Because he then failed to meet the five-day statutory deadline, his candidacy was revoked and a vacancy occurred.
AFFIRMED.
SHORES, J., not sitting.
When I filed my special opinion in this case on July 27, 1990, it was my understanding that the Democratic Executive Committee was scheduled to meet that day. In view of the fact that the Committee did not meet that day, and in view of the fact that I did not have sufficient time to write an opinion adequately expressing the reasons for my dissenting views, I have now taken the time to more fully state the reasons why I think that there is no vacancy which the Democratic Party can fill under the provisions of Alabama law. I especially wanted my dissenting opinion to contain what I consider to be the critical question in this case: What the legislature intended by the words "where a vacancy may occur in any nomination," which are contained in Ala.Code 1975, § 17-16-41. 1 I now withdraw that special opinion filed July 27, 1990 and substitute the following opinion, which expands on the reasons why I think that there is no vacancy that the Democratic Party can fill under the provisions of Alabama law:
I concur completely in that portion of the opinion that affirms the trial judge's determination that Megginson could not be certified as the nominee of the Democratic Party for House District 102. I must respectfully disagree, however, with the conclusion of the majority that Megginson's removal as a candidate authorizes the Alabama Democratic Party, under the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-16-41, to nominate a candidate to appear on the general election ballot, because, under the facts of this case, there was no "nomination" by the Democratic Party of Megginson that could have become vacant within the meaning of the law when it was determined that Megginson had failed to become the Democratic nominee because of his failure to comply with the provisions of law regulating the holding of primary elections in this State. 2
The legislature of this State has provided the method for determining when there is a "vacancy" in a "nomination" made by a political party and has provided for a party executive committee to fill a vacancy in a nomination under certain circumstances. Section 17-16-41 provides:
"The state executive committee, in cases where the office to be filled is not a county office, and the county executive committee, in cases where the office to be filled is a county office, but subject to the approval of and in accordance with the method prescribed by the state executive committee, where a vacancy may occur in any nomination, either by death, resignation, revocation or otherwise, or in case of any special election, shall have the power and authority to fill such vacancy, either by action of the committee itself or by such other method as such committee may see fit to pursue."
(Emphasis added.)
The critical question, of course, is whether there had been a nomination as contemplated by this statute. Under the facts of this case, I do not believe that Megginson ever became the nominee of the Democratic Party, because he admittedly failed to comply with the election laws governing the holding of primary elections. Because he was the only candidate for the office he sought, his failure to comply with the law, in my opinion, left the Democratic Party without a nominee for this particular general election. I think that the legal position of the party is the same as if no one had declared as a candidate to become the nominee of the party.
The law that applies in this case is contained in at least three cases of this Court: Harris v. Weatherford, 459 So.2d 876 (Ala.1984); Foster v. Dickinson, 293 Ala. 298, 302 So.2d 111 (1974); and Herndon v. Lee, 281 Ala. 61, 199 So.2d 74 (1967).
In Harris v. Weatherford, a case the majority cites and attempts to distinguish--unsuccessfully, I believe--registered voters in Mobile sought to prevent the name of one Cecil B. King from being certified or printed on the general election ballot as a Republican nominee for a district court judgeship. In that case, the Republican Party wanted to certify King as the Republican nominee under the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-16-41, on the ground that a "vacancy" had occurred because one Joseph D. Thetford, who had filed his declaration of candidacy for the judgeship, had withdrawn his name from consideration as a candidate. Thetford had filed his "declaration of candidacy" in Mobile County in the office of William Stoudenmire, who was chairman of the Mobile County Republican Committee and who was a member of the State Republican Committee. In that case, the Court found that Thetford's filing in Mobile did not comply with the statutory requirement that all candidates for nomination to state public office "shall file their declaration of candidacy with the state party chairman." 459 So.2d at 879. 3
The majority seeks to distinguish Harris v. Weatherford on the following grounds:
I find the majority's distinction troubling. This Court in Harris...
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