Roper v. Rhodes
| Decision Date | 11 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | 1060331. |
| Citation | 988 So.2d 471 |
| Parties | William Earl ROPER and Cynthia Lanell Roper v. Ronald A. RHODES; James V. Perdue, in his official capacity as probate judge of Crenshaw County; and Beth Chapman, in her official capacity as secretary of state of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Mark G. Montiel, Montgomery; and Kristen T. Ashworth of Bowron, Latta & Wasden, P.C., Mobile, for appellants.
William R. King, Luverne, for appellee Ronald A. Rhodes.
Bart Harmon and Winthrop E. Johnson of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery; and John A. Nichols, Luverne, for appellee James V. Perdue.
Troy King, atty. gen., Kevin C. Newsome, deputy atty. gen., and James W. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for appellee Secretary of State Beth Chapman.
William Earl Roper and Cynthia Lanell Roper appeal from a judgment of the Crenshaw Circuit Court dismissing the Ropers' action against Ronald A. Rhodes; James V. Perdue, in his official capacity as probate judge of Crenshaw County; and Beth Chapman, in her official capacity as secretary of state of Alabama.1 We dismiss the appeal.
William Earl Roper served on the Crenshaw County Board of Education, district 1, until 2006. Rhodes and one other candidate challenged William for that office in the June 6, 2006, Democratic primary. Following the primary election, William and Rhodes participated in a runoff election on July 18, 2006. William and Rhodes received an equal number of votes in the runoff election. To break the tie, the chairman of the Crenshaw County Democratic party conducted a "domino draw," and Rhodes prevailed. See § 17-13-21 (formerly § 17-16-39), Ala.Code 1975. On August 14, 2006, Rhodes was certified as the nominee for the Democratic party.
On October 30, 2006—eight days before the November 7, 2006, general election— William and Cynthia filed an action in the Crenshaw Circuit Court against Rhodes, Judge Perdue, and the secretary of state. The complaint alleged that, during the time leading to the primary and runoff elections, Rhodes had violated certain reporting provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act, § 17-22A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the FCPA").2 Although it asserted different theories,3 the complaint sought two basic forms of relief: the revocation of Rhodes's certificate of nomination and the removal of his name from the ballot for the general election. The Ropers also filed a petition asking the trial court to issue an injunction postponing the November 7, 2006, election for the office of Crenshaw County Board of Education, district 1, or, in the alternative, prohibiting the certification of the election results for that office pending the outcome of this case.
Rhodes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Among other things, Rhodes asserted that the Ropers' action was untimely filed and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court held a hearing on November 6, 2006, to consider the Ropers' petition for an injunction postponing the election for the board-of-education office or prohibiting the certification of the election results for that office.
At the November 6, 2006, hearing, the trial court initially denied Rhodes's motion to dismiss and proceeded to hear testimony. On November 14, 2006, the trial court entered an order holding that the Ropers' action was an election contest, which had been untimely filed, and the trial court therefore denied all the Ropers' claims for relief.4 The Ropers appealed to this Court.
The Ropers' claims for relief are based on allegations that Rhodes failed to file reports required to be filed under the FCPA. Specifically, the Ropers alleged that, before the primary and runoff elections, Rhodes had not filed the reports described in § 17-22A-8 of the FCPA.5 Relying primarily on Harvey v. City of Oneonta, 715 So.2d 779 (Ala.1998), and the authorities cited therein, the appellees argue that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the Ropers' claims that Rhodes had violated provisions of the FCPA. We agree.
In Harvey, Mattie Harvey, a candidate for place number 3 on the Oneonta City Council, filed an action alleging that her opponent, Glen Whited, had not complied with the FCPA and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 715 So.2d at 779. It was undisputed that Whited had failed to file a statement required by the FCPA before the election, and Harvey sought a declaration that Whited had not complied with the FCPA and an injunction preventing the certification of Whited as the winner.6 715 So.2d at 779-80. Holding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the action, this Court dismissed Harvey's appeal. 715 So.2d at 779.
This Court held that, instead of an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, Harvey should have filed an election contest under § 11-46-69, Ala.Code 1975, which sets forth the time limitation and the grounds for filing a contest to a municipal election. The Court first examined § 17-15-6, Ala.Code 1975, which stated:
"`No jurisdiction exists [in] or shall be exercised by any judge, court or officer exercising chancery powers to entertain any proceeding for ascertaining the legality, conduct or results of any election, except so far as authority to do so shall be specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute; and any injunction, process or order from any judge, court or officer in the exercise of chancery powers, whereby the results of any election are sought to be inquired into, questioned or affected, or whereby any certificate of election is sought to be inquired into or questioned, save as may be specially and specifically enumerated and set down by statute, shall be null and void and shall not be enforced by any officer or obeyed by any person; and should any judge or other officer hereafter undertake to fine or in any wise deal with any person for disobeying any such prohibited injunction, process or order, such attempt shall be null and void, and an appeal shall lie forthwith therefrom to the supreme court then sitting, or next to sit, without bond, and such proceedings shall be suspended by force of such appeal; and the notice to be given of such appeal shall be 14 days.'"
715 So.2d at 779 (emphasis added in Harvey). On the authority of Davis v. Reynolds, 592 So.2d 546 (Ala.1991), this Court in Harvey noted that "a candidate who does not file a statement or report required by the FCPA before the election in question is ineligible to be elected to the office at that election." Harvey, 715 So.2d at 780. Consequently, "[a]ny challenge to Whited's election on that basis [i.e., Whited's failure to file an FCPA-required statement] should have been filed as an election contest pursuant to § 11-46-69(a)(2)." 715 So.2d at 780-81. Because Harvey had not filed an election contest in compliance with § 11-46-69, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear Harvey's claims. 715 So.2d at 781. This Court held that the judgment of the circuit court was void and dismissed the appeal. 715 So.2d at 781.
Although the secretary of state and Judge Perdue discuss Harvey in their briefs to this Court, the Ropers do not address it. The Ropers maintain that their action is not an election contest and that, therefore, it is not subject to the statutory requirements—such as time limitations—for bringing an election contest. Instead, they contend, it is a pre-election action (i.e., an action filed before the general election) seeking to enforce § 17-22A-21, Ala.Code 1975, which states:
The Ropers argue that this Court has jurisdiction to enforce the "unambiguous and clear" language of § 17-22A-21. (Ropers' reply brief, p. 7.) The Ropers note that they filed their action before the general election, and they contend that rather than contesting an election, they were seeking to prevent Rhodes's name from appearing on the ballot for the November 7, 2006, election. The Ropers cite Megginson v. Turner, 565 So.2d 247 (Ala.1990),7 to support their assertion that "[t]he remedy provided in the [FCPA]—revocation of the certificate of election—is mandatory and requires the removal of the offending candidate's name from the ballot." (Ropers' reply brief, p. 5.)
The section of the FCPA on which the Ropers rely—§ 17-22A-21—requires the forfeiture of an election under certain circumstances by a candidate who fails to file a statement or a report required by the FCPA. The fundamental problem with the Ropers' reliance on § 17-22A-21, however, is that they fail to place § 17-22A-21 in the context of the entire statutory scheme established by the legislature in Title 17. Moreover, the Ropers misapprehend this Court's decision in Davis v. Reynolds, 592 So.2d 546 (Ala.1991).
In Davis, this Court examined § 17-22A-21 within the context of the FCPA and noted:
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