Meier, Matter of
| Decision Date | 30 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 333,333 |
| Citation | 256 Ga. 72,344 S.E.2d 212 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Robert A. MEIER. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Thomas C. Blaska, Atlanta, for Robert A. Meier.
William P. Smith, III, Gen. Counsel, Bridget B. Bagley, Asst. Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Ga., Ga., Justice Center, Atlanta, for State Bar.
Robert A. Meier was retained in 1982 by Mrs. Willa Dean Raybon to represent her son Dennis Batts on criminal charges. Mrs. Raybon paid Mr. Meier a $500.00 retainer. After plea bargaining the Fulton County District Attorney informed Meier that he would recommend 12 years to serve. Meier told Mrs. Raybon that if he could show that Batts was participating in a drug rehabilitation program, this might influence the court to impose a lighter sentence. He also told her that he needed $500.00 for expenses connected with enrolling Batts in Reality House, a rehabilitation center. Mrs. Raybon gave Meier a signed check for $500.00 with the payee left blank. It was cashed with the name of Guy Dozier, who was at one time employed by Reality House, entered as payee. Mr. Dozier never received nor negotiated the check.
In November, 1982, Batts entered a guilty plea to all charges. Sentencing was deferred. A great deal of confusion occurred concerning the sentencing hearing. Mrs. Raybon testified that she learned that sentencing would be February 14, 1983. After much difficulty she located Meier who told her that the sentencing had been scheduled the previous week and that he had had Dozier and another witness from Reality House present to testify but that he could not proceed due to the absence of Batts. The February 14 sentencing was continued because Meier did not have witnesses or documentation. On February 21, 1983, Batts, who had meanwhile enrolled in Reality House, was sentenced to 9 years. Meier was present but had no witnesses or documentation.
Mrs. Raybon discharged Meier and filed a complaint against him. She testified that he admitted that he had cashed the check to Dozier and offered to return the money to her. The State Bar brought charges that Meier violated Rule 4-102, Standards 3, 4, 44, 63 and 65.
After an evidentiary hearing at which Meier refused to testify, the Special Master found no evidence that Meier engaged in professional conduct involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the Special Master found no violation of Standard 3, Rule 4-102. He also found no violation of Standard 4, Rule 4-102, which prohibits professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation, in that although Meier did not have witnesses from a drug rehabilitation program at the sentencing hearing as he had originally promised, the witnesses were in fact unnecessary since Batts had already enrolled in a drug treatment program. Also, the Special Master found no abandonment of the client which could amount to a violation of Standard 44 of Rule 4-102.
Because of his failure to account for the check which Mrs. Raybon gave him, the Special Master found that Meier violated Standard 63, Rule 4-102. However, because he found that the identity of the actual recipient of the funds was not established, and because he found no evidence of commingling, the Special Master found no violation of Standard 65, Rule 4-102.
The State Bar excepted to the Special Master's findings of no violation of Standards 3, 4, 44 and 65. The State Bar complained that the Special Master failed to take into consideration the refusal of Meier to testify in his own behalf, arguing that since a bar disciplinary case is a civil proceeding, when a witness invokes a privilege against self-incrimination, an adverse inference may be drawn. Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 209 S.E.2d 611 (1974); Hathcock v. Hathcock, 249 Ga. 74, 287 S.E.2d 19 (1982).
The State Disciplinary Board recommended that Meier be found to have violated Bar Rule 4-102, Standards 3, 4, 63, 65 and that he be suspended for two years. The State Bar urges that he be disbarred.
Meier objects that the Disciplinary Board made its recommendation based on a cold record and that the recommendations of the Special Master, who was the trier of fact and in a position to observe the witnesses and hear their testimony, were not followed. He also contends that while his attorney was not allowed to be present at the meeting of the State Disciplinary Board at which the recommendations of the Special Master were considered, the attorney for the State Bar was present. He complains that the State Disciplinary Board would not reconsider its recommendations in light of new evidence found by respondent concerning his fee arrangement. Finally, Meier urges that a two year suspension is an inappropriately severe punishment.
The supplemental record in this case contains affidavits from the attorney for the State Bar and the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board which show that the attorney for the State Bar was not present while the board deliberated. At this stage of the proceedings, the State Disciplinary Board functions as a reviewing body which reviews and acts upon the report of the Special Master. Due process does not require either the presence of parties or attorneys for parties or the presentation of new evidence.
The State Bar in its reply points out that there is no evidence in the record to support Meier's allegation that he considered the $500.00 an attorney's fee. The State Bar responds to his claim that new evidence of the fee arrangement entitles him to a rehearing by noting that the allegedly new evidence, the affidavit of two witnesses to the fee arrangement, was available from the outset of the proceedings against Meier.
Meier complains that the punishment recommended by the State...
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