Meier v. Huntington Ridge Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc., No. M2007-02511-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 10/23/2008), M2007-02511-COA-R3-CV.
| Decision Date | 23 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. M2007-02511-COA-R3-CV.,M2007-02511-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | MICHAEL LLOYD MEIER, ET AL. v. HUNTINGTON RIDGE TOWNHOUSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County; No. 06C2346; Walter Kurtz, Judge.
Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed.
Darrell Gene Townsend, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Huntington Ridge Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc.
C. Bennett Harrison, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michael Lloyd Meier.
Richard H. Dinkins, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Patricia J. Cottrell, P.J., M.S., and Andy D. Bennett, J. joined.
Homeowners association appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of owners who sued for a declaration that the Association was responsible for the cost of repair of defective floor trusses. The trial court found that found that the defective floor trusses were considered "common elements" under the covenants of the Association. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
The facts pertinent to this appeal are not disputed. Jane C. Cates ("Ms. Cates") and Michael Lloyd Meier and his wife, Lisa Ann Meier ("the Meiers") own adjoining units in a residential development in Davidson County known as Huntington Ridge. In the spring of 2004, Ms. Cates noticed structural defects in her unit causing her walls to deflect and her unit's floors to sag. She notified the Huntington Ridge Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc. ("the Association") which initially took responsibility and obtained bids for repairs. In January of 2006, the Meiers began experiencing the same structural defects to their unit as Ms. Cates. Similar to Ms. Cates, the Association found the same structural defects were affecting the Meiers' unit.
No repairs were undertaken, however, and, following a turnover in the composition of its board of directors, the Association took the position that, while it was the Association's responsibility to make the repairs to the units, the cost of repairs could be charged back to the owners. The Association's basis for its position was that the structural defects were problems with the "limited common elements" within the meaning of the Second Amendment to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("Declaration of Covenants") governing the development, rather than "common elements."
Robert Warren, a structural engineer, found that the structural defects resulted from the improper handling and installation of the floor truss system during the building's initial construction. He also found the floor trusses themselves to be defective. Warren determined that the floor trusses were progressively failing producing the inability of the truss system to sustain the loads applied by the walls and roofing system. He determined that the rate of failure, if unabated, would eventually cause the collapse of the units as well as having an adverse effect on the adjacent units within the same building structure which could eventually lead to catastrophic collapse.
Ms. Cates and the Meiers instituted suit seeking, inter alia, to have the court "declar[e] the obligation of the Association to affect the repairs upon the plaintiff's townhomes. . .". Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment and, by agreement of the parties, the Association's response to the motion was considered by the court as a cross motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court held that the floor trusses were "common elements" within the meaning of the Declaration of Covenants and that, consequently, the Association was obligated to make the necessary repairs. The trial court directed its order be a final order. The sole issue in this appeal is whether floor trusses are "common elements" or "limited common elements" as defined in the Declaration Of Covenants.2
The interpretation of a written instrument is a question of law. Rodgers v. Burnett, 108 Tenn. 173, 184, 65 S.W. 408, 411 (1901); City of Memphis v. Wait, 102 Tenn. 274, 277, 52 S.W.161, 162 (1899); Brown v. Brown, 45 Tenn. App. 78, 95-96, 320 S.W.2d 721, 728 (1958). Because the interpretation of a written instrument is a question of law, interpretational issues are particularly suited to disposition by summary judgment. See, e.g., Browder v. Logistics Mgmt., Inc., No. 02A01-9502-CH-00016, 1996 WL 181435, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 1996) Denton v. Hahn, 2004 WL 2083711 (Tenn. Ct. App.).
A trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal. Draper v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Tenn. 2005); BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003); Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tenn. 2001); Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 2000). We review the summary judgment decision as a question of law. Finister v. Humboldt Gen. Hosp., Inc., 970 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn.1998); Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn.1997). Accordingly, this court must review the record de novo and make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been met. Eadie v. Complete Co., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tenn. 2004); Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004); Staples v. CBL & Assoc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000).
The Declaration of Covenants defines "common elements" in part pertinent to this appeal as follows:
. . . all of the property, except for the Units, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, shall include those items defined as "General Common Elements" in the Act3, including the following:
. . .
(b) All foundations, bearing walls and columns, roofs, carports, halls, lobbies, stairways, and entrances and exits or communication ways;
. . .
(h) All other elements of the buildings desirable or rationally of common use or necessary to the existence, upkeep and safety of the property.
"Limited Common Elements" is defined to mean:
. . . all Common Elements contiguous to and serving exclusively a single Unit or one or more adjoining Units as an inseparable appurtenance thereto, the enjoyment, benefit or use of which is reserved to the lawful occupants of such Unit or Units. Said Limited Common Elements shall include, but shall not be limited to, the separate furnace, air conditioner and water heater located within or adjacent to a Unit and serving only such Unit, pipes, ducts, electrical wiring and conduits located entirely within a Unit or adjoining Unit and serving only such Unit or Units, any balconies and patios and such portions of the perimeter walls, floors and ceilings, doors, vestibules, windows, entryways and all associated fixtures and structures therein, as lie outside the Unit boundaries.
The Association contends that the trusses fall under the subcategory of "limited common elements" becaus...
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