Melber v. 6333 Main Street, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1998
• Parties: , 698 N.E.2d 933, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 5173 Michael MELBER et al., Respondents, v. 6333 MAIN STREET, INC., Appellant, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 104

676 N.Y.S.2d 104

91 N.Y.2d 759, 698 N.E.2d 933, 1998

N.Y. Slip Op. 5173

Michael MELBER et al., Respondents, v. 6333 MAIN STREET, INC., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 4, 1998.

Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Woods & Goodyear, L.L.P., Buffalo (Lisa A. Coppola and R. Anthony Rupp III, of counsel), for appellant.

Morris, Cantor, Barnes, Goodman & Furlong, Buffalo (Mark H. Cantor, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

On this appeal, we are again asked to delineate the class of perils targeted by Labor Law § 240(1) and subject to its extraordinary protections. We hold that in the circumstances presented, plaintiff did not encounter a hazard contemplated by the statute, and we therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

Plaintiff was a carpenter employed by ADF Construction Co., which had been hired by defendant to construct a one-story medical office building. While installing metal studs in the top of a drywall, in order to reach the height necessary to complete his work plaintiff stood on 42-inch stilts. Although the stilts supported him without incident as he worked on the drywall, plaintiff needed a clamp located some distance away and, without removing his stilts, "walked" down an open corridor to obtain the tool. On the way, he tripped over electrical conduit protruding from the unfinished floor and fell to the ground, suffering injury.

Plaintiff and his wife subsequently brought suit alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and § 241(6). After discovery, both parties sought partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion and denied defendant's, concluding that the accident was within the ambit of the statute, and a divided Appellate Division affirmed (224 A.D.2d 995, 637 N.Y.S.2d 554). The majority held that because stilts were the functional equivalent of scaffolding and because retrieving the clamp was necessary and incidental to his work, Labor Law § 240(1) applied. The dissenting Justices concluded "the Legislature did not contemplate that an accident occurring at ground level while one is walking, albeit elevated on stilts, should give rise to absolute liability under Labor Law § 240(1)." "As a practical matter," they asked, "what device could be 'so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed?' " (224 A.D.2d 995, 996, 637 N.Y.S.2d 554, supra.)

After a trial on damages, defendant appealed to this Court as of right on the basis of the two-Justice dissent. Agreeing with the dissent that plaintiff's accident fell outside the scope of Labor Law § 240(1), we now reverse.

As we have repeatedly recognized, Labor Law § 240(1) is " 'for the protection of work[ers] from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed' " (see, e.g., Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513, 520-521, 493 N.Y.S.2d 102, 482 N.E.2d 898, rearg. denied 65 N.Y.2d 1054, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 484 N.E.2d 1055, quoting Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, 100 N.E. 596; see also, 1969 N.Y.Legis.Ann., at 407-409). Consistent with this purpose, we have held that the statute establishes absolute liability for a breach which proximately causes an injury (Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452, 459-461, 497 N.Y.S.2d 880, 488 N.E.2d 810), treated the statutory duty as nondelegable (Haimes v. New York Tel. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 132, 136-137, 412 N.Y.S.2d 863, 385 N.E.2d 601) and broadly construed the statute's terms in a variety of circumstances (see, e.g., Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457, 463, 672 N.Y.S.2d 286, 695 N.E.2d 237 [citing cases] ). We have, however, also determined that the extraordinary protections of the statute in the first instance apply only to a narrow class of dangers--a determination critical to the resolution of this appeal.

In Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932, we first addressed the question of "the nature of those occupational hazards which the Legislature intended should warrant the absolute protection that the statute affords" (id., at 513, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932). Recognizing that the statutory language did not itself specify the hazards to be guarded against, but rather focused on the safety devices to be used to avoid them, we held:

"The contemplated hazards are those related to the effects of gravity where protective devices are called for either because of a difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level or a difference between the elevation level where the worker is positioned and the higher level of the materials or load being hoisted or secured. It is because of the special hazards in having to work in these circumstances, we believe, that the Legislature has seen fit to give the worker the exceptional protection that section 240(1) provides" (id., at 514, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932).

Accordingly, we concluded in Rocovich that a worker injured when his foot and ankle fell into a 12-inch trough containing heated industrial oil did not state a Labor Law § 240(1) claim. We reasoned that "it is difficult to imagine how plaintiff's proximity to the 12-inch trough could have entailed an elevation-related risk which called for any of the protective devices of the types listed in section 240(1)" (id., at 514-515, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932).

We reached that same conclusion in Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82. There, a welder suffered back strain from having to work in a contorted position on a platform that allowed him to work above a deep shaft. In deciding that the welder did not state a Labor Law § 240(1) claim, we explained that the "special hazards" to which we referred in Rocovich "do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity. Rather, the 'special hazards' referred to are limited to such specific gravity-related accidents as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted or inadequately secured" (id., at 501, 601 N.Y.S.2d...