Melero v. State
| Decision Date | 28 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74--243,74--243 |
| Citation | 306 So.2d 603 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Victoriano MELERO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Legal Intern, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Elliot H. Scherker, Legal Intern, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, C.J., and HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
Appellant, defendant in the trial court, seeks review of a judgment and sentence of 20 years imprisonment for second-degree murder following a jury trial.
The issues involved in this case surround statements made by the accused to a police officer on two occasions.
The appellant was charged with second-degree murder in connection with the murder of his wife. After he allegedly killed her, appellant attempted to commit suicide by cutting himself with a knife and a razor blade in the arms and neck.
The incriminating statements which he gave to the police were obtained while the defendant was being transported to the hospital and later at the hospital.
The appellant contends that the first statement was obtained illegally because it involved a custodial interrogation in which the police officer failed to advise the appellant of his constitutional rights in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's dictum in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We think this point lacks substantial merit.
The record is clear that the police officer had arrived at the scene in his patrol car, and without ever entering the apartment where the homicide had occurred, he got into the ambulance which was taking the appellant to the hospital. All the officer knew at that point was that a woman had died and a man was badly injured. He asked the appellant, 'what happened?' to which the appellant replied, 'I killed my wife.' The officer testified that he then stopped asking any more questions until after the appellant was at the hospital.
We do not think the officer's question and the appellant's answer constitutes custodial questioning within the meaning of Miranda. In our view, the officer's question properly is categorized as 'general on-the-scene questioning,' referred to in Miranda, which might normally be expected in the investigation of any crime.
Next, the appellant challenges the admissibility of a detailed account of the crime which the appellant rendered to the same police officer approximately one hour after he arrived at the hospital.
After arriving at the hospital, the police officer waited approximately fifteen minutes before attempting any further questioning. He then fully advised the appellant of his constitutional rights. The officer then testified:
'Fifth, I asked him: On your rights as they have been related to you, are you now willing to answer the questions without having an attorney present? At this time, I asked him, 'Do you understand what I asked you?' He said,
The officer's testimony further revealed that at the time he read the appellant his rights a doctor and two interns were attending to the appellant's medical needs. The officer stated that the doctors were suturing his wounds and also giving him superficial shots for his wounds.
The officer stated that he waited another 45 minutes before again approaching the appellant. He then asked the appellant if he were willing to talk to him, and the appellant answered that he was. At this time, the doctors were completing the bandaging of the appellant's wounds. The officer stated that he did not re-advise the appellant of his rights, before taking his confession.
The appellant now contends that his waiver of his constitutional rights was not made knowingly and intelligently nor was his confession voluntary. And, appellant further argues that a reversal is mandated because the trial judge did not enter a specific finding that his confession was voluntary in accordance with the Florida Supreme Court's holding in McDole v. State, Fla.1973, 283 So.2d 553.
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State v. DeConingh
...cert. denied, 381 So.2d 764 (Fla.1980); DeCastro v. State, supra; Lane v. State, 353 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Melero v. State, 306 So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Paulk v. State, 211 So.2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968). This court has held that where there is no evidence of coercion or other im......
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Peterson v. State
...case here). Kimble v. State, 372 So.2d 1017 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); McCloud v. Wainwright, 359 So.2d 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Melero v. State, 306 So.2d 603 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). We do not so interpret McDole and Wilson, but in view of the apparent conflict the instant opinion creates, we deem it ad......
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Peterson v. State
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Postell v. State, 79-1376
...competent evidence. Lane v. State, 353 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Gibbs v. State, 344 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Melero v. State, 306 So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). We turn now to Postell's challenge to her sentence. Postell claims that she fulfilled all requirements for sentencing und......