Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 299229

• Citation: 42 Conn.Supp. 17,597 A.2d 846
• Decision Date: 11 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 299229,299229
• Court: Superior Court of Connecticut
• Parties: , 6 IER Cases 1507 Hubert J. MELLALY v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY.

Page 846

597 A.2d 846

42 Conn.Supp. 17, 6 IER Cases 1507

Hubert J. MELLALY v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY.

No. 299229.

Superior Court of Connecticut,

Judicial District of New Haven.

July 11, 1991.

Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, New Haven, for plaintiff.

Thomas E. Crosby, Guilford, for defendant.

BERDON, Judge.

The defendant Eastman Kodak Company moves to strike the first count of the plaintiff Hubert J. Mellaly's complaint, which alleges a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Connecticut recognizes such a cause of action if the following elements are present: " '(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he knew or should have known that the emotional distress was a likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.' " Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986), quoting Murray v. Bridgeport Hospital, 40 Conn.Sup. 56, 62, 480 A.2d 610 (1984). The defendant bases its motion on the claim that the allegations of the complaint do not satisfy the second requirement of the rule, that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, and the fourth requirement, that the emotional distress was severe.

Whether the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's resulting distress are sufficient to satisfy either of these elements is a question, in the first instance, for this court. Only where reasonable minds can differ does it become an issue for the jury. Reed v. Signode Corporation, 652 F.Sup. 129, 137 (D.Conn.1986); 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment (h) (on the issue of extreme and outrageous conduct) ¹ and comment (j) (on the issue of severe emotional distress). ² Since the defendant raises these issues by a motion to strike, ³ the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. King v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 90, 93, 486 A.2d 1111 (1985). Additionally, the court must construe them in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff; Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 678, 513 A.2d 66 (1986); and if facts provable under the allegations would support the cause of action, the motion to strike must fail. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108-109, 491 A.2d 368 (1985).

Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress. "So far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, the rule which seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind." W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984), § 12, p. 60. The Restatement puts it as follows: "Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment (d).

The plaintiff's claims arise out of his employment with the defendant while working under the plaintiff's assigned supervisor, Robert Kane. "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests." 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment (e).

Furthermore, the "extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know." 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment (f). This factor is also present in this case. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew, prior to his employment, that he had the disease of alcoholism, that he was a recovering alcoholic with approximately eleven years of continuous abstinence from alcohol, and that Kane's egregious conduct was based upon this knowledge.

The plaintiff alleges further that Kane ...