Morris v. Hartford Courant Co.

• Citation: 513 A.2d 66,200 Conn. 676
• Parties: , 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,713 Edward V. MORRIS v. The HARTFORD COURANT COMPANY.
• Decision Date: 05 August 1986
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 66

513 A.2d 66

200 Conn. 676, 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,713

Edward V. MORRIS v. The HARTFORD COURANT COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 5, 1986.

Decided Aug. 5, 1986.

Eugene C. Cushman, New London, for appellant (plaintiff).

Ralph G. Elliot, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and KINNEY, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, Edward V. Morris, brought suit against his former employer, The Hartford Courant Company, alleging in the first count of his revised substituted complaint ¹ that he had been wrongfully discharged based upon a false accusation that he had misappropriated company funds and, in the second count, that his discharge had resulted in the infliction of severe emotional distress. The defendant moved to strike each count of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After the trial court granted the motion to strike, the plaintiff declined to plead further pursuant to Practice Book § 157, and judgment was subsequently entered for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to strike because both counts allege cognizable causes of action. We find no error.

The plaintiff's revised substituted complaint alleges that for an eleven and one-half year period he was employed by the defendant in the circulation department. The complaint does not allege that there was an employment contract for a specified term. We, therefore, infer from the complaint that the plaintiff-employee and the defendant-employer had an employment at will relationship, that is, the plaintiff was hired for an indefinite period and his employment was terminable at the will of the defendant. See Sommers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146 Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426 (1959). On December 14, 1981, the defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment by presenting him with a termination notice asserting that he had misappropriated company funds. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted this action specifically alleging in the complaint that his dismissal was wrongful because the defendant had failed to investigate its assertions and that, therefore, it "violated public policy by falsely charging [him] with criminal conduct...." The complaint also alleged that the defendant "knew or should have known, or was substantially certain that the discharge ... would cause [the plaintiff] severe emotional distress."

Because this appeal is before us pursuant to a motion to strike, we note preliminarily that all well pleaded facts in the complaint as amended must be construed in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff. Norwich v. Silverberg, 200 Conn. 367, 370, 511 A.2d 336 (1986); Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 655, 509 A.2d 11 (1986); Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 365, 446 A.2d 3 (1982); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 472, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Stradmore Development Corporation v. Commissioners, 164 Conn. 548, 550-51, 324 A.2d 919 (1973). Accordingly, we must assume, in this case, that the plaintiff was falsely accused of criminal conduct. The question before us becomes, therefore, whether a false accusation of criminal activity is sufficient to support an action for wrongful discharge or for infliction of emotional distress.

I

The principal issue before us is whether the plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful discharge fits within the narrow public policy exception to the general proposition that contracts for an indefinite term of employment are terminable at will. In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 475, 427 A.2d 385, we recognized, as have the vast majority of other courts, a common law cause of action in tort for discharges "if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." (Emphasis in original.) See Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984); Kilbride v. Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., 186 Conn. 718, 443 A.2d 922 (1982); see generally note, "Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort," 13 Conn.L.Rev. 617 (1981); note, "Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception," 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1931 (1983). This public policy exception to the employment at will rule carved out in Sheets attempts to balance the competing interests of employer and employee. Under the exception, the employee has the burden of pleading and proving that his dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy. The employer is allowed, in ordinary circumstances, to make personnel decisions without fear of incurring civil liability. Employee job security, however, is protected against employer actions that contravene public policy. ²

In his revised substituted complaint the plaintiff attempted to bring his case within the narrow ambit of Sheets by alleging that the defendant "falsely charg[ed] the [plaintiff] with criminal conduct" and that "as a result wrongfully discharged the plaintiff from his employment." There is no allegation that the defendant knew that the plaintiff did not misappropriate company funds and nevertheless deliberately accused him of it. Nor did the plaintiff allege that the accusation was made with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. As the plaintiff conceded at oral argument, and as is apparent in the revised substituted complaint, it is alleged only that the defendant negligently investigated the matter. The trial court concluded that such an allegation does not implicate an important violation of public policy. On appeal the plaintiff persists in portraying his dismissal as contravening public policy. We disagree with the plaintiff's characterization.

The plaintiff has failed to identify any particular public policy affronted by his termination. Given the inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy, it is often difficult to define precisely the contours of the exception. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision. Nor has he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy. Under the allegations of the present complaint it is unnecessary for us to articulate the limits of the public policy exception any more definitely than we have done previously. We also need not consider, therefore, whether an allegation that the false accusation was knowingly or recklessly made would have established a viable cause of action under these limits. The plaintiff here claims merely that it violates public policy to accuse an employee of a crime falsely. He alleges only that the defendant failed to investigate the charge "reasonably and adequately." A false but negligently made accusation of criminal conduct as a basis for dismissal is not a "demonstrably improper reason for dismissal" (emphasis in original) and is not "derived from some important violation of public policy." Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 475, 427 A.2d 385.

Therefore, although we continue to recognize that a wrongful discharge is actionable when based upon some important violation of public policy, the motion to strike the first count of the complaint was properly granted because its allegations did not fall within the necessary parameters.

II

The plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred in striking the second count of his revised substituted complaint alleging the unintentional infliction of emotional distress. ³ 3] The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike because it concluded that the emotional distress count was merely derivative of the first count. Having found no actionable discharge in the first count, the court concluded there was no breach of duty as alleged in the second count. Although we disagree with the basis for the trial court's conclusion, the motion to strike was properly granted.

The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for wrongful discharge does not, as the trial court concluded, ineluctably lead to the conclusion that a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress cannot be based upon the conduct of the defendant employer. As we have said, in order for a wrongful discharge action to lie properly in an employment at will situation, the termination must be based upon "some important violation of public policy." Id. There is nothing in that doctrine, however, to preclude an action for unintentional infliction of emotional distress based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process. ⁴ Therefore, the trial court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff's second count failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted merely because it related to the same events as those alleged in the stricken first count.

Although grounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike; Cyr v. Brookfield, 153 Conn. 261, 263, 216 A.2d 198 (1965); where the trial court sustains a motion to strike on erroneous grounds, if another ground is appropriate, the granting of the motion will be upheld by this court. Fraser v. Henninger, 173 Conn. 52, 59, 376 A.2d 406 (1977); Oppenheimer v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 149 Conn. 99, 105, 176 A.2d 63 (1961). Of course, the alternative ground must have been alleged in the motion to strike in some form. Oppenheimer v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., supra. As we have concluded, the trial court granted the motion to strike on erroneous grounds. It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether the motion to strike could properly have been based on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court.

In the memorandum of law filed in...