Melley v. State
Decision Date | 08 November 1922 |
Docket Number | (No. 7185.) |
Parties | MELLEY v. STATE. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Limestone County; A. M. Blackmon, Judge.
P. J. Melley was convicted for unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and appeals. Affirmed.
Wm. Kennedy and T. L. Price, both of Groesbeck, and F. P. Bowman, of Goldthwaite, for appellant.
Ira Lawley, of Groesbeck, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Conviction is for the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of one year.
The indictment was duplicitous. It charged the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquors and the unlawful possession of such liquors for the purpose of sale in the same count. See Todd v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 99, 229 S. W. 516. In submitting the case to the jury the court eliminated one of the offenses. In the motion for arrest of judgment, the appellant assails the verdict upon the ground that the indictment, being duplicitous, was defective in substance. The statute, articles 849 and 850, Code of Crim. Proc., declare that "a motion in arrest of judgment shall be granted upon any ground which would be good upon exception to an indictment or information for any substantial defect therein," but "no judgment shall be arrested for want of form."
Article 575, Code of Crim. Proc., reads thus:
"There is no exception to the substance of an indictment or information, except—
1. That it does not appear from the face of the same that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant.
2. That it appears from the indictment or information that a prosecution for the offense is barred by a lapse of time, or that the offense was committed after the finding of the indictment.
3. That it contains matter which is a legal defense or bar to the prosecution.
4. That the indictment or information shows, upon its face, that the court trying the case had no jurisdiction thereof."
It will be noted that duplicity is not named in the statute as one of the matters of substance. There is lack of harmony among the authorities touching the applicability of this statute to duplicitous indictments. In Rumage v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S. W. 64, the right to raise the question of duplicity for the first time upon a motion in arrest of judgment was denied, citing Coney v. State, 2 Tex. App. 62; Nicholas v. State, 23 Tex. App. 317, 5 S. W. 239. These cases are supported also by Dalton v. State, 4 Tex. App. 335; Busby v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 297, 103 S. W. 638; Smith v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 534, 197 S. W. 589; Hickman v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 161, 141 S. W. 973; Cabiness v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 146 S. W. 934; Green v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 452, 147 S. W. 593.
One accused of an offense may protect himself against the disadvantage of a trial under a duplicitous indictment by a motion to quash or exception to the indictment, or he may demand an election by the prosecution, but, failing to avail himself of one of these privileges, he cannot, according to the weight of authority, avail himself of this defect in the indictment after verdict. Mr. Bishop, on the subject, says this:
Bishop's New Crim. Proc. vol. 1, § 443, subd. 3.
In Ferguson v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 383, 189 S. W. 271, a departure from this rule was made upon the authority of Weathersby v. State, 1 Tex. App. 646; Hickman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 441, 2 S. W. 640; Scales v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 301, 81 S. W. 947, 66 L. R. A. 730, 108 Am. St. Rep. 1014; Wood v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 543, 84 S. W. 1058; Weathersby's Case was affirmed upon the authority of article 3143, Paschel's Ann. Digest of Laws of Texas, vol. 1, which article is in the same terms as article 849 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which has been quoted above.
The court noted, however, that no motion to quash was made, and refused to sustain the complaint of the duplicity upon motion in arrest of judgment. In Hickman's Case, 22 Tex. App. 441, 2 S. W. 640, the indictment was held not to come within the general rule covering duplicitous indictments, but to be so deficient that it could not support the verdict. The opinion says:
In Scales' Case, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 301, 81 S. W. 947, 66 L. R. A. 730, 108 Am. St. Rep. 1014, a motion to quash the indictment was made in limine. The case of Wood v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 543, 84 S. W. 1058, is the only one cited in Ferguson's Case, supra, which supports that decision. The matter is disposed of in the Wood's Case with the statement that two offenses were charged in the same count.
"Where it is done, the indictment becomes duplicitous, and therefore defective"—citing Pisano v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 63, 29 S. W. 42; Heineman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 44, 2 S. W. 619.
No point seems to have been made concerning the manner in which the question was raised. The cases referred to in Wood's Case sustain the contention that the indictment was defective, but not that the fault was available on motion in arrest of judgment. Pisano's Case was affirmed in a short opinion by Judge Davidson, in which he says:
In Heineman's Case, the opinion uses this language:
"We are of the opinion that the indictment is duplicitous, and that it was error to overrule the defendant's exceptions to it."
It appears, from reading the opinion, that it was not a case of motion in arrest of judgment, but that the procedure pointed out by statute (articles 575 and 849) was followed.
From what has been said, it is obvious that in the case of Ferguson v. State, supra, there was some misunderstanding of the authorities upon which the decision was made to rest. This is made manifest by the quotation which we take from Smith v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 537, 197 S. W. 589, which is from the pen of the same judge that prepared the opinion in the Ferguson Case, supra. We quote thus:
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