Rumage v. State
| Decision Date | 10 January 1900 |
| Citation | 55 S.W. 64 |
| Parties | RUMAGE v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Dallas county court; Kenneth Foree, Judge.
R. S. Rumage was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property, under the value of $50, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the county jail for 60 days, and he prosecutes this appeal.
Court adjourned on September 2, 1899; and what appears to be a statement of the facts, as contained in the record, bears a file mark of September 4, 1899. There is no order in the record allowing 10 days after adjournment of the court within which to file the statement of facts. Consequently we cannot consider same as any part of the record.
Aside from the motion for new trial, which contains an exception to the charge of the court, there is one bill of exceptions in the record. This contains an exception to the court giving a verbal charge to the jury without the consent of defendant. The court appends the following explanation to this bill: "Defendant's counsel did not present any charge in writing, and did not ask time to prepare one." This, in our opinion, did not authorize the judge to give a verbal charge. Article 720, Code Cr. Proc., regulates this: "No verbal charge shall be given in any case whatever, except in cases of misdemeanor, and then only by consent of the parties." However, in the shape in which the record is presented to us, we cannot tell whether said verbal charge was calculated to injure the rights of appellant or not. The charge is not set forth, either in terms or substantially. Before we would be authorized to reverse a case on this ground, it must appear that the charge given was calculated to injure appellant's rights. This is not made to appear.
Appellant, in his motion for new trial, complains that the information on which appellant was convicted is bad for duplicity, in that it contains two separate and distinct offenses: "Said information showing that appellant was charged with having on July 12th received and concealed certain stolen property, consisting of two sets of harness, one of the value of $1, and one of the value of $5, one of which sets of harness being the property of T. Yeargan, and the other the property of Anderson; the proof showing that defendant received one of said sets of harness on the 12th of July, and the other on the 15th of July,...
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Odle v. State, 20955.
...duplicity, it must appear from the face of the indictment that two or more separate offenses are charged in the same count. Rumage v. State [Tex.Cr.App.] 55 S.W. 64." "If the indictment does not in the same count contain a complete description of two offenses, the words applicable to that i......
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Busby v. State
...in the indictment. See Pisano v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 63, 29 S. W. 42; Nicholas v. State, 23 Tex. App. 317, 5 S. W. 239; Rumage v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S. W. 64. Appellant contends that the court committed an error in permitting the state to introduce the checks which were turned over ......
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Melley v. State
...There is lack of harmony among the authorities touching the applicability of this statute to duplicitous indictments. In Rumage v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S. W. 64, the right to raise the question of duplicity for the first time upon a motion in arrest of judgment was denied, citing Coney ......
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Cabiness v. State
...indictment. Nicholas v. State, 23 Tex. App. 326, 5 S. W. 239; Coney v. State, 2 Tex. App. 62; Tucker v. State, 6 Tex. App. 253; Rumage v. State, 55 S. W. 64; and the authorities cited in the opinions in said The motion will be overruled. ...