Melton v. Nat'l Dairy LLC

• Citation: 705 F.Supp.2d 1303
• Decision Date: 31 March 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:08-cv-174-TFM.
• Parties: Dewayne MELTON, et al., Plaintiffs,v.NATIONAL DAIRY LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

705 F.Supp.2d 1303

Dewayne MELTON, et al., Plaintiffs,v.NATIONAL DAIRY LLC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:08-cv-174-TFM.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

March 31, 2010.

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Ann Carroll Robertson, Susan Gale Donahue, Wiggins Childs Quinn & Pantanzis, PC, Birmingham, AL, Bobbie Shaw Crook, Bobbie S. Crook P.C., Dothan, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Allison Star Kahalley, Jesse Cecil Gardner, Mary Elizabeth Olsen, Michael Vance McCrary, The Gardner Firm PC, Mobile, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TERRY F. MOORER, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action is assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and order entry of judgment by consent of all the parties (Docs. 27-29, filed June 17, 2008) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants National Dairy Holdings, L.P. and Dairy Fresh of Alabama, LLC (Doc. 94, filed August 3, 2009) and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Teamsters (Doc. 102, filed August 3, 2009). The motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for review. Upon consideration of the motions, the Court finds they are due to be GRANTED.

I. Parties

Plaintiffs are Dewayne Clennon Melton (“Melton”), J.T. Brooks (“Brooks”), Larry Amos (“Amos”), Pierre Harvey (“Harvey”), and Henry Cody (“Cody”). Plaintiffs are all employees or former employees of Defendant Dairy Fresh of Alabama, LLC.

Defendants are Dairy Fresh of Alabama, LLC (“Dairy Fresh”), National Dairy LLC (“National Dairy”), and The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers, Local Union No. 991 (“Teamsters” or “the Union”).

II. Jurisdiction

The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both.

III. Nature of the Case

The underlying facts of this case are necessarily viewed in favor of the nonmovant plaintiff. Specifics for each plaintiff will be incorporated in the respective sections pertaining to each plaintiff and their various claims. Generally, Plaintiffs are all African American current or former drivers for Dairy Fresh and its parent company National Dairy. All five plaintiffs were and are members of the Union. Plaintiffs initiated this suit on March 12, 2008 when they filed their complaint. See Doc. 1. Defendants timely filed their respective answers. See Docs. 21-23. After Defendants Dairy Fresh and National Dairy filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Plaintiffs conceded that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would not stand because there were no governmental actors involved in the suit and stated the inclusion of § 1983 was a typographical error. Moreover, they stated they had no intention of pursuing a pattern or practice of discrimination claim and were not bringing suit as a class action. Therefore, the Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. In response to the Court order to amend, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on October 17, 2008. See Doc. 51, Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for racial harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

On January 30, 2009, Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment against Larry Amos stating that he was judicially estopped from pursing his claims because he did not disclose the claims to the bankruptcy court. After the motion was ripe for review, the Court denied the joint motion for summary judgment as to Larry Amos.

After a lengthy discovery period, Defendants filed their respective motions for summary judgment. See Docs. 94 and 102. In addition to the motions, Defendants filed their briefs in support and a number of evidentiary attachments. See Docs. 95-111. Plaintiffs timely filed their consolidated response on September 8, 2009. See Doc. 120. Afterwards, Defendants filed a motion to strike two exhibits to Plaintiffs' consolidated response, specifically the Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel, Bobbie Crook and the Purported Transcription of Tape Recording. See Docs. 121 and 123. Plaintiffs filed responses in opposition and also filed a motion to substitute the declaration of Melton for Bobbie Crook's declaration. See Docs. 128 and 130. The Court heard the matters on October 13, 2009. Afterwards, the Court granted the motion to strike the declaration of Bobbie Crook, denied the motion to substitute the declaration of Melton, and granted the motion to strike the transcript of the tape. See Doc. 133. The Court did permit Plaintiffs to substitute the tape itself for the transcript. Id. As such, the Court for summary judgment purposes considers the tape, but does not consider either the declaration or the transcript. The motions for summary judgment are fully briefed and now ripe for this Court's review.

IV. Summary Judgement Standard

A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (b). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority, 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.1998). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At the summary judgment juncture, the court does not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” but solely “determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Only disputes about the material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id. A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law,” and a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; accord Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.2007); see also Slomcenski v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1344-45 (11th Cir.2003)) (“In determining whether an issue of fact is ‘genuine’ for the purpose of defeating summary judgment, we ask whether the evidence is ‘such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ”). Thus, the initial burden of proof rests on the movant. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; Gonzalez, 161 F.3d at 1294. This burden is satisfied when the movant shows that if the evidentiary record were reduced to admissible evidence at trial, it would be insufficient to permit the non-movant from carrying its burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The admissibility of evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern admissibility of evidence at trial. Clemons v. Dougherty County, Georgia, 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 n. 5 (11th Cir.1982) (citing Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir.1980)).

Once the movant meets its burden under Rule 56, the non-movant must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990); see also Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n. 6 (11th Cir.1997) (conclusory assertions in absence of supporting evidence are insufficient to withstand summary judgment). “Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.” Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir.2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The party opposing summary judgment must respond by setting forth specific evidence in the record and articulating the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim, and my not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir.2001). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted). Thus, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citations omitted).

In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir.2003); Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1242-43. Further, “all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513; see also McCormick, 333 F.3d at 1243 (the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant).

If the non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must...