MÉndez–aponte v. Bonilla

• Decision Date: 08 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–2534.,09–2534.
• Citation: 32 IER Cases 705,645 F.3d 60
• Parties: Prudencio MÉNDEZ–APONTE; María De Los Angeles López–De Méndez; Conjugal Partnership Méndez–López, Plaintiffs, Appellants,v.Fernando BONILLA, in his official and personal capacities as Secretary of State; Jane Doe I, as wife of Fernando Bonilla; Conjugal Partnership Bonilla–Doe, Defendants, Appellees,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, represented by the Secretary of Justice Hon. Roberto Sánchez–Ramos; State Department of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

645 F.3d 60

32 IER Cases 705

Prudencio MÉNDEZ–APONTE; María De Los Angeles López–De Méndez; Conjugal Partnership Méndez–López, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.Fernando BONILLA, in his official and personal capacities as Secretary of State; Jane Doe I, as wife of Fernando Bonilla; Conjugal Partnership Bonilla–Doe, Defendants, Appellees,Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, represented by the Secretary of Justice Hon. Roberto Sánchez–Ramos; State Department of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants.

No. 09–2534.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 1, 2011.Decided July 8, 2011.

Nicolás Nogueras–Cartagena, María Teresa Figueroa–Colón, and Nicolás Nogueras Jr. Law Offices, on brief for appellants.Irene S. Soroeta–Kodesh, Solicitor General, Leticia M. Casalduc–Rabell, Deputy Solicitor General, Zaira Z. Girón–Anadón, Deputy Solicitor General, and Rosa Elena Pérez–Agosto, Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for appellees.Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and SILER,^* Circuit Judges.TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Prudencio Méndez–Aponte, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Protocol Affairs at the Puerto Rico State Department, sued Fernando Bonilla, in his personal and official capacity as the Secretary of State of the Puerto Rico State Department, alleging that Bonilla fired him due to his political affiliation. Méndez–Aponte's claim did not survive Bonilla's motion for summary judgment. The district court sanctioned Méndez–Aponte's attorneys $1000 each because it concluded that the pleadings and responses that they submitted violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). Méndez–Aponte and his attorneys now appeal alleging that the district court erred in granting Bonilla's summary judgment motion and imposing sanctions. We affirm the district court's decision.

I. Background

Méndez–Aponte was the Assistant Secretary of State for Protocol Affairs at the Puerto Rico State Department from June 1, 2001 until March 3, 2006. Méndez–Aponte alleges that, in 2005, in the course of his official duties and during “official meetings where the economic situation of the government of Puerto Rico and of the [Puerto Rico] State Department ... were discussed,” he suggested to Marisara Pont–Marchese, the interim Puerto Rico Secretary of State, that investing in Iraqi dinars would be a good long-term investment for Puerto Rico.

Méndez–Aponte alleges that on August 21, 2005, a journalist from El Nuevo Día, a Puerto Rican newspaper, called him to inquire about rumors that employees at the Puerto Rico State Department were selling Iraqi dinars during office hours. Méndez–Aponte contacted Bonilla to inform him about the journalist's inquiry and they set up a meeting to discuss the matter the next day. The next day, before this discussion could take place, Méndez–Aponte found out from the press that Bonilla had fired him and had also asked the Director of the Government Ethics Office to investigate the rumors that dinars were sold at the Puerto Rico State Department. According to Méndez–Aponte, that same day, the Subsecretary of State asked Méndez–Aponte to meet with an investigator who was conducting an inquiry regarding the allegations. On August 24, 2005, Méndez–Aponte received a written notification, dated August 22, 2005, informing him that he had been removed from his position due to illegal conduct. Specifically, the letter stated that Méndez–Aponte was suspended because he “engaged in ... conduct that is clearly detrimental to the moral and good name of the Department.” ¹

On June 27, 2006, Méndez–Aponte, his wife, and their conjugal partnership filed a complaint against, inter alios,² the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Fernando Bonilla, in his official and personal capacities, Bonilla's wife, and their conjugal partnership, in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs filed their complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, alleging violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. They asked the court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their Puerto Rico law claims.

On April 27, 2007, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint including Bonilla, in his personal and official capacity as Secretary of State of the Puerto Rico State Department, as the only defendant. Bonilla filed an answer to the amended complaint on October 15, 2007. On August 12, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a notice of partial voluntary dismissal of their claims alleging Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. On August 26, 2008, the district court entered partial judgment dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claims alleging violations of Méndez–Aponte's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

On April 4, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the district court dismiss the plaintiffs' section 1983 political discrimination claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination or, in the alternative, because Bonilla was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs filed a timely opposition to the motion for summary judgment and a statement of contested material facts on April 23, 2009. On September 16, 2009, the district court entered an order granting Bonilla's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Méndez–Aponte's section 1983 political discrimination claims with prejudice and dismissing the supplemental state law claims without prejudice. See Méndez–Aponte v. Puerto Rico, 656 F.Supp.2d 277 (D.P.R.2009). The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to properly dispute the defendant's statement of uncontested material facts because their denials and qualifications of the defendant's fact statements were “mostly irrelevant to the matter at hand and consist of mere ‘speculation, generalities, conclusory assertions, improbable inferences and, for lack of a better phrase, a lot of “hot air.” ’ ” Id. at 281 (quoting Domínguez v. Eli Lilly and Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 728 (D.P.R.1997)). The court therefore took its factual findings mainly from Bonilla's statement of uncontested material facts.³ Id.

The district court concluded that Méndez–Aponte could be terminated without cause because he held a trust position for which party affiliation was an appropriate qualification for continued employment. Id. at 288–89. The court therefore dismissed Méndez–Aponte's political discrimination claim. Id. at 289. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), the court also imposed a sanction of $1,000 each on attorneys Nicolás Nogueras–Cartagena and Patricia Ramírez Gelpí. Id. at 291. The court found that the attorneys failed to properly dispute Bonilla's statement of uncontroverted facts, that their memorandum of law failed to specify the documents in the record that supported their contentions and left blank the number of the exhibit to which they were referring the court, and that their “long and generally incomprehensible opposition [was] frivolous and totally devoid of any semblance of colorable merit.” Id. at 290–91.

II. Discussion

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Our review of the district court's entry of summary judgment is de novo. Del Toro Pacheco v. Pereira, 633 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir.2011). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Lopera v. Town of Coventry, 640 F.3d 388, 395 (1st Cir.2011); Del Toro Pacheco, 633 F.3d at 62. “We ignore any ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.’ ” Del Toro Pacheco, 633 F.3d at 62 (quoting Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir.2009)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).⁴ “We may affirm summary judgment on any ground manifest in the record.” Klaucke v. Daly, 595 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The First Amendment protects public employees from adverse action due to their political affiliation, unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2011). A plaintiff seeking to establish a political discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must establish four elements: “(1) that the plaintiff and defendant have opposing political affiliations, (2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's affiliation, (3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Bonilla argues that political affiliation is a proper requirement for Méndez–Aponte's position and that, therefore, Bonilla could properly fire Méndez–Aponte for his political affiliation.

The question of whether political affiliation is an appropriate basis for dismissal is a legal one for the court. Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 429 (1st Cir.2010); Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005). This circuit has typically conducted a two-part analysis to make this determination. See Hadfield, 407 F.3d at 16; Duriex–Gauthier v. López–Nieves, 274 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir.2001). We ask (1) “whether the governmental unit decides ‘issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation,’ ” Ruiz–Casillas v. Camacho–Morales, 415 F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Jiménez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241–42 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc)), and (2) whether “the specific responsibilities of the position resemble those of a policymaker or other officeholder whose functions are such that party affiliation is an appropriate criterion for holding the post,” Hadfield, 407...