Mendoza v. Gallup Independent Co.

Decision Date16 August 1988
Docket NumberNo. 10501,10501
Citation1988 NMCA 73,764 P.2d 492,107 N.M. 721
Parties, 15 Media L. Rep. 2319 Harry MENDOZA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The GALLUP INDEPENDENT CO., John K. Zollinger, Robert C. Zollinger, Donald W. Green a/k/a "Veritas", and Reed Eckhardt, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

Defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. We granted defendants' application for interlocutory appeal, which raised the following two issues: (1) whether the statement at issue constitutes opinion, as a matter of law and, accordingly, whether the trial court erred in denying defendants' summary judgment motion; and (2) whether defendants made a prima facie showing that the statement, regardless of its nature, was made absent actual malice. We deem issue one to be dispositive and, accordingly, will not address the remaining issue. We reverse.

This action arose out of the publication of a column entitled "The Week's Wash" appearing in the opinion-editorial section of "The Gallup Independent" on April 18, 1987. See attached Appendix A. Plaintiff, Harry Mendoza (Mendoza), a Gallup city councilman, sued defendants for libel. The column describes a Gallup "tourism promotion" office outside of City Hall. Several tourists approach the "tourism counselor" for information. The counselor's office is made of packing crates, much like the famed character Lucy's psychiatrist office in Charles Shultz' "Peanuts" cartoon. The defamatory statements arise from the following exchange between the "tourism counselor" and "two tall, swarthy suit-and-tie types":

"I'm agent Frammis and this is agent Stanfran," one said, flashing open a dark wallet with gold leaf and fine black printing inside. "We're here to investigate your City Council."

"R-r-right in there," WW [Week's Wash] stammered. "But it's not in session just now. C-can I direct you to any particular member?"

"We have received a report," said the other one, "that the council has been taken over by the Mexican Mafia. What can you tell us about that?"

This was scarey. Word sure travels fast.

"Well, um, er, the new council hasn't met yet. But the new mayor is known for shooting first and asking questions later."

They patted the bulges under their coats.

"B-but he doesn't take office until May 5," WW hurried on. "He's already taken one straw vote on replacing the city manager, however."

"That may be it," said agent Stanfran. "Did anything happen that might support our tip?"

"Well, it's only one instance, and it's pretty controversial," WW equivocated, "and I can't say if it's the start of a trend. But you can decide for yourself.["]

"The vote was Munoz, Mendoza, and Gutierrez on one side and Richards and Hight on the other."

Mendoza alleges that the above statements imputed his involvement in corruption, dishonesty and criminal activity. The thrust of Mendoza's complaint is that the writing falsely links him to the Mexican Mafia. He does not contend, however, that the writing accuses him of any specific criminal act or wrongdoing. Defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the column was opinion and absolutely privileged as a matter of constitutional law; and (2) that defendants did not knowingly or recklessly publish a false statement of fact and, thus, did not act with actual malice as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Mendoza responded with affidavits of various persons who interpreted the column as conveying factual allegations concerning him, together with his own affidavit on the issue of actual malice. The trial court, carefully and correctly noting factual disputes in the affidavits, denied defendants' summary judgment motion and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.

Whether the published statement constitutes opinion or fact.

We initially note that if the statements are purportedly "facts" as opposed to "opinions", then the trial court properly denied summary judgment because there are factual disputes on material issues which are properly resolved by a fact finder. The same is not true, however, if the statements constitute opinion. An action for defamation lies only for false statements of fact and not for statements of opinion. Saenz v. Morris, 106 N.M. 530, 746 P.2d 159 (Ct.App.1987). We recognize that:

Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3006-07, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (footnote omitted).

When the alleged defamatory statements could be fact or opinion, it is proper to deny summary judgment, as the trial court did here, and allow the fact finder to resolve the dispute. See Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321 (Ct.App.1981). However, if the statements are unambiguously opinion, the trial court may properly rule as a matter of law. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982). Thus, we must initially determine whether the alleged defamatory material contains a protected statement of opinion.

In commenting on the differences between statements of fact and opinion, the California supreme court noted:

The distinction frequently is a difficult one, and what constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature and content of the communication taken as a whole. Thus, where potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.

Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 644, 552 P.2d 425, 428 (1976).

In resolving the distinction between fact and opinion, the trial court should consider: (1) the entirety of the publication; (2) the extent that the truth or falsity of the statement may be determined without resort to speculation; and (3) whether reasonably prudent persons reading the publication would consider the statement to be an expression of opinion or a statement of fact. Marchiondo v. Brown; see SCRA 1986, 13-1004. In applying the above test to the statements, we believe the column expresses statements of opinion rather than fact.

In considering the "entirety" requirement, the published statement must be read in context. First, the column here was situated on the "Opinion" page of the newspaper along with four other articles and an editorial cartoon. Readers of the opinion-editorial page generally expect to read the columnist's views and opinions as opposed to factual news stories. Aldoupo lis v. Globe Newspaper Co., 398 Mass. 731, 500 N.E.2d 794 (1986) (En banc); see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F.Supp. 481 (D.Mass.1980); National Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 1299 (S.D.Ohio 1983).

Second, the column indicates, by the tag line "DAYS OF OUR LIVES", that it is fictitious in nature and not intended to represent factual statements. In addition, the column is entitled "The Week's Wash" and depicts a drawing of a clothes line laden with clothing. The column's setting is unreal. The tourism office is set up "on the front walk of City Hall in a booth made out of a couple of apple crates, Lucy-style." The homemade sign reads: " 'Free Tourism Information--The tourism counselor is IN.' " Equally fictitious are the visitors to the booth: one visitor has heard that " 'Red Rock Park has cracks in it the size of the Grand Canyon * * * * ' "; another has heard that Gallup has the " 'world's biggest zero.' "1 The tongue-in-cheek style used by the author alerts all but the most careless readers that the descriptions were no more than rhetorical hyperbole. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 3112, 77 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1983); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F.Supp. 463 (D.N.H.1987); Ollman v. Evans.

Moreover, under the second-prong of the Marchiondo test, the column constitutes "pure opinion". See 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 566 (1977); Saenz v. Morris. Under the Restatement, "[a] defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." Restatement, supra, Sec. 566 at 170. However, if the material, as a whole, fully discloses the facts upon which the opinion is based and permits the reader to reach his own opinion, the statement is generally an opinion rather than an assertion of fact, and is absolutely protected. Saenz v. Morris; Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co., 97 N.M. 243, 638 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App.1981).

In the case at bar, "WW" is asked whether the Mexican Mafia has taken over the council. "WW" reaches no conclusion, but reports the vote results on the straw poll, together with the surnames of the councillors who cast the votes. The writer invites readers to reach their own conclusions by stating to "agents" Stanfran and Frammis, " '[I]t's only one instance * * * and I can't say if it's the start of a trend. ...

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8 cases
  • Young v. Wilham
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • May 25, 2017
    ...lies only for false statements of fact and not for statements of opinion." Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 1988-NMCA-073, ¶ 4, 107 N.M. 721, 764 P.2d 492. The same is true for false light claims. See Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983) (explaining that "the defense availab......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • October 27, 2014
    ..."[a]n action for defamation lies only for false statements of fact and not for statements of opinion." Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 107 N.M. 721, 723, 764 P.2d 492, 494 (Ct. App. 1988). The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982), held that the......
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    • December 17, 2012
    ...See Motion to Dismiss at 5 (citing Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 400, 649 P.2d 462, 468 (1982); Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 107 N.M. 721, 723, 764 P.2d 492, 494 (Ct.App.1988); Moore v. Sun Publ'g Corp., 118 N.M. 375, 382, 881 P.2d 735, 742 (Ct.App.1994)). The Credit Union Times conten......
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    ...fiery political dialogue, rhetoric, and public debate have been protected under the First Amendment. See Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 107 N.M. 721, 725, 764 P.2d 492, 496 (Ct.App.1988). Therefore, the courts have been "particularly assiduous in using protections given opinion by common and......
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