Meraz v. State

Decision Date17 January 1990
Docket Number983-86,Nos. 982-86,s. 982-86
Citation785 S.W.2d 146
PartiesGerardo Garcia MERAZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Joseph A. Calamia, El Paso, for appellant.

Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty., and Robert Dinsmoor, Asst. Dist. Atty., El Paso, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON STATE'S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

DUNCAN, Judge.

The appellant was convicted by a jury in one trial of two offenses: aggravated sexual assault and injury to a child. The jury assessed his punishment on the sexual assault offense at eighteen years in the Texas Department of Corrections and on the injury to a child at eight years in the Texas Department of Corrections.

Prior to his trial, the appellant claimed he was incompetent to stand trial. Art. 46.02, V.A.C.C.P. Accordingly, the trial judge impaneled a jury to resolve that issue. Art. 46.02, § 4(a), V.A.C.C.P. Obviously, this jury found the appellant competent to stand trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction to the Eighth Court of Appeals. The principal issue in his direct appeal was his assertion that the adverse resolution of his incompetency plea was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, according to the appellant, he should not have been tried on the principal offenses. The court of appeals agreed with the appellant and reversed and remanded his conviction. Meraz v. State, 714 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1986). In doing so, the court of appeals concluded that it had both a constitutional right and obligation to review the facts associated with an incompetency plea and resolve whether an adverse jury finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

In their petitions for discretionary review the State claims that the court of appeals' decision in this case is in general conflict with this Court's opinions in Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) and Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and in express conflict with Arnold v. State, 719 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Accordingly, the State argues that the court of appeals cannot review the facts of a case and resolve whether a jury's decision is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We granted the State's petitions for discretionary review to again consider this issue and extract the courts of appeals from the quagmire they "are caught in [because of] a conflict between those holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals [i.e., Van Guilder v. State, supra; Schuessler v. State, supra; and Arnold v. State, supra] and the legion of cases to the contrary by the Supreme Court of Texas." Meraz v. State, supra, 714 S.W.2d at 111.

Due to the nature of the issue to be reviewed, recounting the facts of the principal offense is unnecessary. However, it is appropriate to note the evidence that was presented in connection with the appellant's incompetency plea. As the court of appeals noted:

Dr. Salvador Aguirre, board certified psychiatrist and professor of psychiatry at the Texas Tech University College of Medicine, testified that, after several examinations of the Appellant and a review of his past medical records, Appellant had a diagnosis of a form of paranoid schizophrenia and, bearing in mind the definition of incompetency under Texas law, it was his opinion that Appellant was not competent and did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him. Furthermore, he gave a detailed analysis of the mental disease which Appellant was suffering from and the various hallucinations and symptomatology of the Appellant. Dr. Aguirre was of the further opinion that the Appellant was not faking his mental illness, and that his past medical history revealed that he had been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia since the time he was of the age of fourteen years. Medical records introduced into evidence and considered by Dr. Aguirre in forming his opinion that the Appellant was incompetent were (1) medical psychiatric records from Thomason General Hospital wherein the Appellant was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, (2) the psychiatric records of the Veterans' Administration, El Paso office, where the Appellant was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, (3) Veterans' Administration from Waco, Texas, the same diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and (4) psychiatric records from the El Paso State Center where the Appellant was diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia. The records thus reveal that the Appellant had been committed several times, beginning around the age of fourteen years, with the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with each commitment, to one of the medical facilities or mental hospitals. Dr. Aguirre further testified that the Appellant suffered from hallucinations, believed that the whole world was against him and people were trying to kill him, that he lived in a world of his own, and everything outside was harmful or potentially harmful to him, and in this case, he felt that the assistance of his lawyer was a very act that wanted to harm him. Dr. Aguirre had seen the patient more than a month before trial and saw him again briefly before the trial, and he was unequivocal in his opinion that the Appellant was incompetent as defined under Texas law and that he did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him.

Dr. Briones, a psychiatrist certified by the American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry, testified that he was the author of a certificate of mental examination of the Appellant which states that the Appellant has a mental disorder and requires observation, treatment and hospitalization. He testified to having made examinations of the Appellant and that at his request he was examined by a Dr. Johnson, a psychologist, and that Dr. Johnson had critical results regarding the Appellant's ability to communicate with a rational degree of understanding; that Dr. Johnson felt that he was incapable of participation on his own; that there was some question about how impaired he was and that for that reason he, Dr. Briones, spent a lot of time with him in regard to competency. He felt initially he was competent, but on the basis of more recent interviews he determined that he was not competent. Dr. Briones thought the Appellant was competent in December; in June, he thought he was not competent. At the time of this hearing on July 23, he was of the opinion that he was not, although he found him able to relate, to answer questions and participate in an interview, and that he knew he was in a courtroom but he still had some confusion about the hearing. The State called no witnesses, but relied on cross-examination which brought out the fact that the Appellant was in the Marine Corps for three years, possibly of the rank of lance corporal; that he completed his service term satisfactorily or at least received a normal discharge; that the Appellant's occupation was equipment operator and inferentially that an individual normally would have to be able to communicate and comprehend in order to perform satisfactorily at that job; and that the medical records which the doctors had examined were not formed for the specific purpose of competency but rather they dealt with the mental disease. The question was also raised as to whether the Appellant was faking his illness or attempting to magnify it, and one of the doctors testified that '[n]ow that I recall, he does mention he is trying to make his illness look more ridiculous than it is.' Dr. Aguirre said there is no psychiatric test which can be employed to determine whether an individual is giving fake responses, that psychologists have such a test but that it was not administered to the Appellant. Dr. Briones testified that on the day of the competency hearing Appellant was able to relate, answer questions and participate in the interview, and that he knew his lawyer.

The evidence in support of the jury findings can be extracted from the above to be that he knew who his lawyer was; he mentioned he was trying to make his illness look more ridiculous than it was; there might be incentive for persons facing charges to fake their results; there was no psychiatric test which could be employed to determine such faking; one of the doctors at one time thought the Appellant was competent; on the day of the competency trial Appellant was able to relate, answer questions and participate in an interview; he knew he was in a courtroom, that the Appellant was in the Marine Corps for three years and completed his service term satisf ctorily or at least received a normal discharge; the Appellant's occupation was equipment operator and an individual normally would have to be able to communicate and comprehend in order to perform satisfactorily at that job.

Id. at 109-110.

It is also appropriate to note that the issue in this case has generated a substantial amount of discord between this Court and the various courts of appeals. The primary culprit in this larceny of confusion is one sentence in Art. V, § 6 of the Texas Constitution. The relevant sentence states: "Provided, that the decision of said courts [courts of appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error." Id. Nearly a century ago, in Choate v. San Antonio A.P. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 406, 44 S.W. 69 (1898), the Texas Supreme Court analyzed this sentence and interpreted it as follows: "The purpose of that provision to amend section 6, art. 5, of the constitution ... was not to enlarge their [courts of civil appeals] power over questions of fact, but to restrict, in express terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and to confine it to questions of law.' " Id. 44 S.W. at 69. The Supreme Court's opinion observes that before Art. V, § 6, supra, was amended to read as it does today, ...

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