Meraz v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-84-00373-CR,08-84-00373-CR |
| Citation | 714 S.W.2d 108 |
| Parties | Gerardo Garcia MERAZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Charles Mallin, El Paso, for appellant.
Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty. of El Paso County, El Paso, for appellee.
Before STEPHEN F. PRESLAR, C.J., and OSBORN and SCHULTE, JJ.
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated sexual abuse and injury to a child. The jury found the Appellant guilty of both offenses and sentenced him to eighteen years confinement for the offense of aggravated sexual abuse and eight years for the injury to a child offense. Prior to trial, a jury determined that the Appellant was competent to stand trial. The principal question in this case is the standard of review on the issue of competency to stand trial where the ground of error is that the finding of the jury is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the basis that the finding of the jury that Appellant was competent to stand trial is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
A defendant has the burden to prove his incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. State, 591 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 46.02, sec. 1(b) (Vernon 1979). At the competency hearing, the court's charge instructed the jury that a person is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. The term " 'preponderance of the evidence' as used in this charge, means the greater weight and degree of credible testimony or evidence introduced before you and admitted in evidence in this case." The question was then presented to the jury, "[d]o you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently incompetent to stand trial?" By Ground of Error No. One, Appellant assigns error in that the finding of the jury that he was competent is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
In making that determination, the jury was acting under the court's instruction, "[a] person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Dr. Salvador Aguirre, board certified psychiatrist and professor of psychiatry at the Texas Tech University College of Medicine, testified that, after several examinations of the Appellant and a review of his past medical records, Appellant had a diagnosis of a form of paranoid schizophrenia and, bearing in mind the definition of incompetency under Texas law, it was his opinion that Appellant was not competent and did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him. Furthermore, he gave a detailed analysis of the mental disease which Appellant was suffering from and the various hallucinations and symptomatology of the Appellant. Dr. Aguirre was of the further opinion that the Appellant was not faking his mental illness, and that his past medical history revealed that he had been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia since the time he was of the age of fourteen years. Medical records introduced into evidence and considered by Dr. Aguirre in forming his opinion that the Appellant was incompetent were (1) medical psychiatric records from Thomason General Hospital wherein the Appellant was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, (2) the psychiatric records of the Veterans' Administration, El Paso office, where the Appellant was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, (3) Veterans' Administration from Waco, Texas, the same diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and (4) psychiatric records from the El Paso State Center where the Appellant was diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia. The records thus reveal that the Appellant had been committed several times, beginning around the age of fourteen years, with the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with each commitment, to one of the medical facilities or mental hospitals. Dr. Aguirre further testified that the Appellant suffered from hallucinations, believed that the whole world was against him and people were trying to kill him, that he lived in a world of his own, and everything outside was harmful or potentially harmful to him, and in this case, he felt that the assistance of his lawyer was a very act that wanted to harm him. Dr. Aguirre had seen the patient more than a month before trial and saw him again briefly before the trial, and he was unequivocal in his opinion that the Appellant was incompetent as defined under Texas law and that he did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him.
Dr. Briones, a psychiatrist certified by the American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry, testified that he was the author of a certificate of mental examination of the Appellant which states that the Appellant has a mental disorder and requires observation, treatment and hospitalization. He testified to having made examinations of the Appellant and that at his request he was examined by a Dr. Johnson, a psychologist, and that Dr. Johnson had critical results regarding the Appellant's ability to communicate with a rational degree of understanding; that Dr. Johnson felt that he was incapable of participation on his own; that there was some question about how impaired he was and that for that reason he, Dr. Briones, spent a lot of time with him in regard to competency. He felt initially he was competent, but on the basis of more recent interviews he determined that he was not competent. Dr. Briones thought the Appellant was competent in December; in June, he thought he was not competent. At the time of this hearing on July 23, he was of the opinion that he was not, although he found him able to relate, to answer questions and participate in an interview, and that he knew he was in a courtroom but he still had some confusion about the hearing. The State called no witnesses, but relied on cross-examination which brought out the fact that the Appellant was in the Marine Corps for three years, possibly of the rank of lance corporal; that he completed his service term satisfactorily or at least received a normal discharge; that the Appellant's occupation was equipment operator and inferentially that an individual normally would have to be able to communicate and comprehend in order to perform satisfactorily at that job; and that the medical records which the doctors had examined were not formed for the specific purpose of competency but rather they dealt with the mental disease. The question was also raised as to whether the Appellant was faking his illness or attempting to magnify it, and one of the doctors testified that "[n]ow that I recall, he does mention he is trying to make his illness look more ridiculous than it is." Dr. Aguirre said there is no psychiatric test which can be employed to determine whether an individual is giving fake responses, that psychologists have such a test but that it was not administered to the Appellant. Dr. Briones testified that on the day of the competency hearing Appellant was able to relate, answer questions and participate in the interview, and that he knew his lawyer.
The evidence in support of the jury findings can be extracted from the above to be that he knew who his lawyer was; he mentioned he was trying to make his illness look more ridiculous than it was; there might be incentive for persons facing charges to fake their results; there was no psychiatric test which could be employed to determine such faking; one of the doctors at one time thought the Appellant was competent; on the day of the competency trial Appellant was able to relate, answer questions and participate in an interview; he knew he was in a courtroom; that the Appellant was in the Marine Corps for three years and completed his service term satisfactorily or at least received a normal discharge; the Appellant's occupation was equipment operator and an individual normally would have to be able to communicate and comprehend in order to perform satisfactorily at that job. That evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it amounts to some evidence of competency.
When that evidence is extracted from the whole, that which remains greatly outweighs it. The evidence all came from only two witnesses, so there is no question of whom to believe. Both were experts in their field and had examined the past, long medical records of the Appellant. They had interviewed him and examined him over a period of time and were each adamant in their diagnosis and opinion that he was not competent to stand trial. As to the possible faking, Dr. Aguirre was of the opinion that he was not faking and the various medical records were all in agreement that he had a form of paranoid schizophrenia since he was of the age of fourteen years. The fact that Appellant knew his lawyer and knew he was in the courtroom does not prove that he had sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or that he had a factual understanding of the proceedings against him; but the evidence was that he had been under treatment and medication at the time of trial. Also, it was the doctor's opinion that he was not competent and did not have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him, and that on the day of trial he "still has some confusion about this hearing." Added to that is the fact that he felt that the assistance of his lawyer was the very act that wanted to harm him. We admit to ineptness in setting out in analyzing it, but our review of the entire record leads to the conclusion that the finding of the jury is against the great weight and...
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