MERC v. United Steel Structures, Inc.
Decision Date | 16 February 1999 |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Parties | MAINE ENERGY RECOVERY COMPANY v. UNITED STEEL STRUCTURES, INC. |
John H. Montgomery (orally), Gordon F. Grimes, Susan Driscoll, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., Portland, for plaintiff.
Harold J. Friedman (orally), Michelle Allott, Friedman, Babcock & Gaythwaite, Portland, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
[¶ 1] United Steel Structures, Inc. ("USS") appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) after the court granted Maine Energy Recovery Company's ("MERC's") renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(b) and set aside a jury verdict in favor of USS on MERC's claims for breach of contract and breach of express warranty. USS contends that the court erred in vacating the jury verdict in favor of USS, entering a judgment for MERC as a matter of law, and awarding $3,334,400.50 in damages to MERC. We agree that the court erred in setting aside the jury verdict and awarding damages to MERC. Therefore, we vacated the judgment and remand for consideration of MERC's motion for a new trial, which the trial court dismissed as moot.
[¶ 2] The parties presented evidence at trial that tended to establish the following facts. The MERC "waste-to-energy" facility in Biddeford produces fuel from garbage and uses the fuel to produce electricity. In 1983, Kuhr Technology, Inc. ("KTI") entered a contract with General Electric Company ("GE") to design and construct a "turn-key" facility. In 1986, GE and USS entered a contract that obligated USS to design, supply materials for, and construct a metal tipping building and a processing building for MERC. Thereafter, due to the accumulation of moisture inside the completed tipping and processing buildings, substantial corrosion of the buildings occurred. In an attempt to recover damages for the corrosion of the tipping and processing buildings, MERC sued USS for, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of express warranty.1
[¶ 3] The trial court denied USS's Rule 50(a) motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of MERC's case. See M.R. Civ. P. 50(a). The court also denied the Rule 50(a) motions that both USS and MERC offered at the close of the evidence. See id. After the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of USS on all counts, MERC orally renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(b). The court denied MERC's Rule 50(b) motion, stating:
The court entered a judgment for USS on September 18, 1997.
[¶ 4] On September 26, 1997, MERC filed a motion2 asking the court to reconsider its denial of MERC's Rule 50(b) motion. On December 10, 1997, the court granted MERC's motion, vacated the earlier judgment for USS, and entered a judgment for MERC. With notable brevity, the court's written order stated, in pertinent part:
On December 17, 1997, the court awarded damages to MERC in the amount of $3,334,400.50.
[¶ 5] Rule 50(a) provides that a court may grant a judgment as a matter of law "if the court determines that, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the party opposing the motion, a jury could not reasonably find for that party on an issue that under the substantive law is an essential element of the claim." M.R. Civ. P. 50(a). Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 50(b), a party seeking a judgment as a matter of law after trial has the burden of establishing that the adverse jury verdict was "clearly and manifestly wrong." Townsend v. Chute Chem. Co., 1997 ME 46, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 199, 202.
[¶ 6] When we review the grant of a Rule 50(b) motion for a judgment as a matter of law, we examine the jury's verdict to "determine if any reasonable view of the evidence and those inferences that are justifiably drawn from that evidence supports the jury verdict." Townsend, 1997 ME 46, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d at 202 (quotations omitted). We recently stated:
In reviewing a trial court's disposition of a motion for [a] judgment as a matter of law, we view the...
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