Mercado v. Dall. Cnty.

• Decision Date: 17 January 2017
• Docket Number: C/w Civil Action No. 3:15–CV–4008–D),Civil Action No. 3:15–CV–3481–D (
• Citation: 229 F.Supp.3d 501
• Parties: Arturo MERCADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

229 F.Supp.3d 501

Arturo MERCADO, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:15–CV–3481–D (

C/w Civil Action No. 3:15–CV–4008–D)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed January 17, 2017

Anthony Matthew Garza, Charhon Callahan Robson & Garza PLLC, Michael Charles Zweber, Charhon Callahan Robson

& Garza, Eric Puente, Puente Hindieh & Fernandez PLLC, Raymond Mark Hindieh, Puente & Hindieh PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Peter L. Harlan, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Dallas County, Texas ("Dallas County"), alleging that it violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to grant them immediate release on bond and by detaining them based on immigration holds after they were otherwise eligible for release. Dallas County moves in a first amended motion¹ to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6), and (7) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19. It separately moves under Rule 12(f) to strike the exhibits to plaintiffs' first amended complaint ("amended complaint"). Plaintiffs move to lift the discovery stay currently in place and to compel Dallas County to produce their individual immigration detainers. For the following reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Dallas County's motion to dismiss, denies Dallas County's motion to strike, and denies plaintiffs' motion to compel detainers and lift stay as moot.

I

Because this case is the subject of a prior memorandum opinion and order, see Mercado v. Dallas County, Texas , 2016 WL 3166306 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2016) (Fitzwater, J.) (" Mercado I "), the court will recount only the background facts and procedural history that are pertinent to this decision.

Plaintiffs are former detainees of the Dallas County jail ("DCJ").² They allege that, while they were being held in detention by Dallas County in connection with state criminal charges, they were the subjects of federal immigration detainers issued by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), an agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), that requested, inter alia , that Dallas County detain them for up to 48 hours after the time they otherwise would have been released, in order to facilitate their arrest by ICE. According to the amended complaint, each plaintiff either attempted to post bond and was denied pretrial release due to an ICE detainer or did not attempt to post bond because he believed that doing so would be futile. In addition, after each plaintiff was cleared for release,³ he was detained solely on the basis of the ICE detainer.

In their amended complaint, plaintiffs sue Dallas County⁴ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that Dallas County did not allow them immediate release on bond,⁵ in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and detained them after they were otherwise cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that they had committed a criminal offense,⁶ in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Dallas County moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (6), and (7). It also moves under Rule 12(f) to strike the exhibits attached to plaintiffs' amended complaint. Plaintiffs oppose Dallas County's motions and move to lift the discovery stay currently in place and to compel Dallas County to produce plaintiffs' ICE detainers.

II

The court first considers Dallas County's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(1), in which it challenges plaintiffs' standing.⁷

A

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims." Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can mount either a facial or factual challenge. See, e.g., Hunter v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. , 2013 WL 607151, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2013) (Fitzwater, C. J.) (citing Paterson v. Weinberger , 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981) ). When a party makes a Rule 12(b)(1) motion without including evidence, the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is facial. Id. The court assesses a facial challenge as it does a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in that it "looks only at the sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading and assumes them to be true. If the allegations are sufficient to allege jurisdiction, the court must deny the motion." Id. (citation omitted) (citing Paterson , 644 F.2d at 523 ). "The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

B

The standing doctrine addresses the question of who may properly bring suit in federal court, and "is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."⁸ Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). It "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). To establish standing, a plaintiff must meet both constitutional and prudential requirements. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp. , 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir. 2001). Dallas County contends that plaintiffs lack constitutional standing, which requires that a litigant establish three elements: (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete and actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) a fairly traceable causal link between the injury and the defendants' actions; and (3) that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ; Little v. KPMG LLP , 575 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2009).

C

Dallas County maintains that plaintiffs cannot meet the "causal link" requirement of constitutional standing with respect to their "overdetention" claim because 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) provides that the local law enforcement agency "shall" maintain custody of an alien pursuant to an ICE detainer, and plaintiffs' alleged detention in the DCJ after they were otherwise eligible for release was caused by the independent action of ICE in issuing the immigration detainers, not by Dallas County. Regarding plaintiffs' § 1983 claim based on Dallas County's alleged failure to allow bond, Dallas County contends that plaintiffs have failed to allege that Dallas County or Dallas County Sheriff Lupe Valdez ("Sheriff Valdez") had the authority to set bond or to allow them to post bond in connection with the state criminal charges pending against them (only the presiding judge in these cases had authority to set bonds in connection with the state criminal charges); plaintiffs do not allege that they actually tendered bond in the requisite amount in order to become eligible for release; and plaintiffs have therefore failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the injury complained of (denial of bond) that is fairly traceable to Dallas County or Sheriff Valdez and is not the independent action of a third party not before the court (the presiding judge in each respective criminal case).

Plaintiffs respond that Dallas County's standing argument raises issues that should be addressed on the merits (i.e., whether Dallas County is ultimately responsible for the overdetention of plaintiffs and whether it was futile for plaintiffs to attempt to post bail); that Dallas County's treatment of plaintiffs (i.e., detaining them for 48 hours rather than almost instantaneously transferring them to ICE custody) was a policy choice that resulted in plaintiffs' overdetention; that plaintiffs did not post bail because attempting to do so is known to be futile for those with immigration holds because it will not result in immediate release and it is Dallas County's policy choices that caused plaintiffs' pretrial detention, regardless of whether plaintiffs attempted to post bail; and that Dallas County's policies and practices removed the possibility of pretrial release because a detainee with an immigration hold will not be released even if he posts bail, thus nullifying the judges' decisions to set bail for the plaintiffs.

D

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs were injured for purposes of Article III standing or that their injuries are redressable. To the extent Dallas County challenges the "fairly traceable" element of standing, the court rejects Dallas County's arguments, concluding that plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the facts necessary for the court to conclude that they have Article III standing.

"[T]he fairly traceable element of standing doctrine imposes a causation standard that is lower than the tort standard of proximate causation." TF–Harbor, LLC v. City of Rockwall, Tex. , 18 F.Supp.3d 810, 820 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Dist. 19 v. City of Boerne , 659 F.3d 421, 431 (5th Cir. 2011) ), aff'd , 592 Fed.Appx. 323 (5th Cir. 2015) ; see also, e.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG , 708 F.3d 82, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting cases and discussing difference between "fairly traceable" standard and proximate causation). "[T]he fairly traceable element does not require that the defendant's challenged action be the last act in the chain of events leading to the plaintiff's injury." TF–Harbor , 18 F.Supp.3d at 820 (citing Bennett , 520 U.S. at 168–69, 117 S.Ct. 1154 ).

In support of their "overdetention" claim, plaintiffs allege that ICE detainers are "requests" that Dallas County could have refused to honor,⁹ and that it was Dallas County's decision to...