Merchant v. Garland Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-CV-03727-B (BH) |
| Parties | KEITH MERCHANT #57001177, Plaintiff, v. GARLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's complaint should be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff Keith Merchant (Plaintiff), federal prisoner convicted of attempted enticement of a minor in 2021, sues an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Agent), the City of Garland Texas (City), and the Garland Police Department (GPD), for allegedly depriving him of due process and a fair trial by tampering with evidence. Plaintiff has not alleged, and the docket does not reflect, that his federal conviction following a guilty plea has been invalidated, overturned, or in any way called into question. See United States v Keith Lee Merchant, 3:18-cr-214-B (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2021); see also https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search for Plaintiff).
Plaintiff alleges that Agent took his cell phone as evidence shortly after he was arrested. (See doc. 11 at 7.) Data was extracted and copied from it, but not in a manner that ensured there was no tampering with any evidence, as required. (See id.) When Plaintiff met with his attorney to go over discovery, he discovered that 10-20 messages on his phone which could “be deemed exculpatory evidence” were missing from the “chat conversation” that he had with Agent, who was working in an undercover capacity during the conversation. (See id.; doc. 3 at 6.) During his interrogation by Agent and an unidentified person working at GPD, Plaintiff made a “statement” about two of the messages missing from his phone. (See doc. 11 at 8.) When he later watched the interrogation video with his attorney, however, the statements he made about the missing messages were also missing. (See id.) He claims that Defendants tampered with evidence by concealing from his phone messages from his conversation with Agent and then altering the interrogation video that referenced these missing messages (See id. at 8-9; doc. 15 at 2.) He contends GPD was “in charge of handling” his phone when it was analyzed, and its “lax” policies for handling evidence may have resulted in the evidence tampering. (See doc. 3 at 6.)
Plaintiff seeks a court-appointed attorney to issue a subpoena for pertinent records from the application he was using to talk with Agent to show that Defendants concealed exculpatory evidence. (See doc. 11 at 5.) He also seeks an order to preserve his phone and the interrogation video so that he can determine whether Defendants tampered with any evidence as well as “monetary damages in the amount of $2, 245, 320.” (See id. at 5.)
Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma paueris. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curium). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint his also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A)(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or of any part of it, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Plaintiff claims against the state defendants arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute “provides for a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff's claims appear to be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). It provides that a plaintiff who seeks to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment or other unlawful action that renders a conviction or sentence invalid must first prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 486-87. Heck applies to claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as those seeking damages. Shabazz v. Franklin, 380 F.Supp.2d 793, 805 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Here, success on Plaintiff's claims of evidence tampering would imply that his federal conviction is invalid. As noted, he does not allege that it has been overturned, invalidated, or in any way called into question, so his claims are barred by Heck. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F, 3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) () (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87).
Where, as here, the issues are appropriate for early and final determination, however, or where there are alternate reasons for dismissal that further judicial economy, consideration of whether Heck bars a plaintiff's claims is not required or may be done in the alternative. See Patton v. Jefferson Correctional Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 462 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (); Little v. Board of Pardons and Parole Division, 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) ()(citing Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994)); Smithback v. Cockrell, No. 3:01-CV-1658-M, 2002 WL 1268031, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2002) ().
However, before applying Heck, which results in only a conditional bar that allows refiling of the lawsuit in the event that the conviction is subsequently invalidated, it is appropriate for a court, in the interest of judicial economy, to determine whether alternative bases for dismissal exist which would result in an absolute bar for refiling. If such an alternative basis exists, the claims should instead be dismissed with prejudice on those grounds in order to prevent the subsequent filing of clearly meritless lawsuits.
Cook v. Neuner, Civil Action No. 12-1428, 2012 WL 2856495, at *3 (E.D. La. June 20, 2012), rec. accepted, 2012 WL 2856492 (E.D. La. July 11, 2012) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
As discussed below, Plaintiff would still fail to state a claim even if his conviction was overturned or called into question, so early determination is appropriate.
A plaintiff may not bring a civil rights claim against a servient political agency or department unless such agency or department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. See Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). Unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government itself. Id. at 313. “Plaintiff fail[s] to show that [City] granted [GPD] the capacity to sue or be sued.” Clayton v. Garland Police Dept., No. 3:09-CV-2048-D ECF, 2010 WL 2640258, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010), rec accepted, 2010 WL 2605258 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2010) ( suit against GPD because it is not a jural entity). His claims against GPD should be dismissed.
Municipalities including cities, may be held liable under § 1983. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cty., 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Jones v. City of Hurst, Tex., No. 4:05-CV-798-A, 2006 WL 522127, at *3 (N.D....
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