Meriwether v. Abc Training/Safety Council Tex. Gulf Coast Chapter
| Decision Date | 24 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-CV-862-N-BH,3:15-CV-862-N-BH |
| Parties | KENNETH JAMES MERIWETHER Plaintiff, v. ABC TRAINING/SAFETY COUNCIL TEXAS GULF COAST CHAPTER Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Pursuant to Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se in forma pauperis case has been automatically referred for full case management. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, this case should be DISMISSED.
On March 18, 2015, Kenneth James Meriwether (Plaintiff) filed this pro se case against ABC Training/Safety Council Texas Gulf Chapter (Defendant) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (doc. 2 at 1.)1 He claims that Defendant is a "third party" that performs safety certification in the "computer rooms" at its private facility. (doc. 12 at 3, 6.)2 Once an individual completes and passes the safety certification test, he will receive a "safety card, which is needed to enter into [Dow Chemical's] plant to work." (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied him reasonable accommodation during testing for a safety certification required for his employment at Dow Chemical on February 19, 2013, by refusing to read him the test questions due to his dyslexia. (Id. at 1.)
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Defendant. (Id. at 8.) On February 27, 2015, he received notice that his claim had been denied because there was "no employee/employer relationship." (doc. 2 at 2.)
Plaintiff's claims are subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because he has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. That statute provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-70 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to "raise the right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere "labels and conclusions" nor "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.
Plaintiff generally cites to the "Americans Disabilities Act of 1990" as the basis for his lawsuit. (doc. 2 at 1.)
The ADA is a civil statute prohibiting disability discrimination in certain situations and is divided into three main sections. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-213. Title I of the ADA covers discriminationagainst the disabled regarding employment decisions and hiring. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17; see Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 373 F. App'x 528 (5th Cir. 2010). Title II of the ADA covers disability discrimination by public entities, such as state or local governments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132-65; see Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). Title III of the ADA covers discrimination against the disabled regarding public accommodations and services operated by private entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189; see Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 57, 59 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's failure to accommodate his disability directly impacted his employment (doc. 2 at 1), and he attaches to his complaint a "Dismissal and Notice of Suit Rights" (id. at 2-4) from the EEOC, which only has jurisdiction over Title I claims. See 29 C.F.R. § 1640.7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is a "third-party" testing facility that is not his employer or a labor union. (doc. 12 at 6.) To the extent he sues under Title I of the ADA, he fails to state a claim under Title I of the ADA because he does not have an employer-employee relationship with Defendant. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2),(4)-(5), 12112(a) ().
Liberally construing Plaintiff's claims, it appears that he is alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12189 of Title III of the ADA. This section requires any "person that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for . . . professional, or trade purposes" to offer "such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons withdisabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements." 42 U.S.C. § 12189.
Courts "may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte." Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999). "[W]here it is clear from the face of a complaint filed in forma pauperis that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, those claims are properly dismissed" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993); accord, Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2006).
Because Congress did not establish a limitations period for claims under Title III of the ADA, the "general rule" is that the courts borrow the most analogous limitations period from state law. Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 237 (5th Cir. 2011). Texas's personal injury limitations period is generally applied to discrimination claims, including violations under the ADA and the Civil Rights Act, because most discrimination claims involve "injury to the individual rights of a person" and are analogous to personal injury tort claims. See id. (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987)); see Tapp v. Univ. of Texas Health Scis. Ctr. at Houston-Sch. of Dentistry, No. Civ. A. H-11-2971, 2011 WL 6339819, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2011), aff'd, 538 F. App'x 508 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Hartline v. Nat'l Univ., No. 2:14-CV-0635-KJM-AC, 2015 WL 4716491, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (). Texas has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, so Plaintiff had two years from the date his claims accrued to file suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003 ().
While state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law determines the accrual date. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5thCir. 2008). Generally, a claim accrues when the plaintiff has "a complete and present cause of action," or "when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
"Under federal law, the [limitations] period begins to run 'the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured.'" A plaintiff's awareness encompasses two elements: "(1) The existence of the injury; and (2) causation, that is, the connection between the injury and the defendant's actions." A plaintiff need not know that she has a legal cause of action; she need know only the facts that would ultimately support a claim. Actual knowledge is not required "if the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to investigate further." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); Walker, 550 F.3d at 414.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's failure to accommodate occurred on February 19, 2013. (doc. 2 at 1.) This is also the date that his claim accrued. See Frame, 657 F.3d at 237-39. His complaint was filed on March 18, 2015, more than two years later. (doc. 2.) His claims under Title III of the ADA are therefore time-barred in the absence of equitable tolling.
The applicable limitations period may be equitably tolled in appropriate circumstances. See Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998). See FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Equitable tolling preserves a plaintiff's claims where strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable. Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1995). Federal law requires that litigants diligently pursue their actions before equitable tolling becomes available, however. See Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1999); Covey v. Arkansas River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 1989) (). The Fifth Circuit has stated thatequitable tolling is appropriate in cases where a plaintiff is either actively misled by the defendant or is prevented in some "extraordinary way" from asserting his rights. Rashidi v. American President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff has the burden of proof to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff alleges that his claims should be considered timely because he filed a complaint with the EEOC on February 27, 2013, and received a "right to sue" letter on February 27, 2015, which granted him 90 days to file...
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