Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity

• Decision Date: 02 September 1986
• Citation: 506 N.Y.S.2d 174,119 A.D.2d 200
• Parties: Charles F. MERONI, Jr., etc., Respondent, v. The HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION FOR the UNIFICATION OF WORLD CHRISTIANITY, Appellant, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 174

506 N.Y.S.2d 174

119 A.D.2d 200

Charles F. MERONI, Jr., etc., Respondent, v. The HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION FOR the UNIFICATION OF WORLD CHRISTIANITY, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Sept. 2, 1986.

Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C., New York City and Levy, Gutman, Goldberg & Kaplan, New York City (Eric M. Lieberman and Terry Gross, of counsel), for appellant, et al., defendant.

Joseph A. Tracy, Scarborough, for respondent.

Before LAZER, J.P., and THOMPSON, NIEHOFF and KUNZEMANN, JJ.

NIEHOFF, Justice.

In October 1977 the plaintiff's son Charles, who was at that time a student at Columbia University, entered a training program for membership in the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, also known as the Unification Church. Within a month the plaintiff's son left the program and eventually returned home, where he remained until January 9, 1978, when he took his own life.

The plaintiff, believing that the Unification Church and the Collegiate Association for the Research of Principles, also known as C.A.R.P., the church's alleged recruiter, were responsible for his son's suicide, instituted this action.

All causes of action against C.A.R.P. were dismissed on or about October 7, 1981, and those causes of action are not in issue on this appeal. Our concern on this appeal is with the causes of action pleaded against the Unification Church.

The amended complaint, which is the subject of this appeal, pleads four causes of action against the Unification Church.

In his first cause of action, the plaintiff alleges a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his deceased son's estate. The second cause of action alleges a claim for wrongful death, also on behalf of the decedent's estate. The complaint also asserts causes of action on the plaintiff's own behalf to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and to recover damages for wrongful death.

Special Term (125 Misc.2d 1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706) dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress on his own behalf. However, the court denied those branches of the appellant's motion which were to dismiss the three remaining causes of action against the Unification Church.

For the reasons that follow, the appellant's motion to dismiss should have been granted in its entirety, and the plaintiff's amended complaint dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the appellant.

Our Court of Appeals recently "concluded that the Unification Church has religion as its 'primary' purpose inasmuch as much of its doctrine, dogmas, and teachings and a significant part of its activities are recognized as religious" (Matter of Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm. of City of N.Y., 55 N.Y.2d 512, 518, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292, 435 N.E.2d 662). That being so, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the courts of this State from evaluating the Unification Church's religious beliefs (Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2382, 49 L.Ed.2d 151, reh. denied 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155). Stated otherwise, it is not for us to approve or disapprove of the church's beliefs.

However, although it is well established that freedom of religious belief is absolute, freedom to act, even in the name of religion "remains subject to regulation for the protection of society" (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 184 L.Ed.2d 1213; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167, 25 L.Ed. 244; Matter of Holy Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity v. Rosenfeld, 91 A.D.2d 190, 197, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920, appeal denied 63 N.Y.2d 603, 480 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 469 N.E.2d 103). Thus, a church may be held liable for intentional tortious conduct on behalf of its officers or members, even if that conduct is carried out as part of the church's religious practices (Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F.Supp. 367, 371-372, affd., 1 Cir., 602 F.2d 458; Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F.Supp. 1125, 1134).

With that principle in mind, the plaintiff claims that the Unification Church committed the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress upon his son. In Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215, the Court of Appeals described that tort as follows:

"An action may lie for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress 'for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society' (Prosser, Torts [4th ed], § 12, p 56). The rule is stated in the Restatement, Torts 2d, as follows: 'One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress' ( § 46, subd [1]; see for one aspect Comment d: 'Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community')".

In evaluating the plaintiff's amended complaint to determine whether it states a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "the court must assume that its allegations are true (Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 458, 99 N.E.2d 255), and must deem the complaint to allege whatever can be imputed from its statements by fair and reasonable intendment * * * The test of the sufficiency of a complaint is whether it gives sufficient notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and whether the requisite elements of any cause of action known to our law can be discerned from its averments" (Pace v. Perk, 81 A.D.2d 444, 449, 440 N.Y.S.2d 710). In considering the sufficiency of the challenged causes of action, the bill of particulars is also to be taken into account (Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 565, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 255 N.E.2d 765).

Although we sympathize with the plaintiff for the loss of his son, we find that his amended complaint, together with his bill of particulars, as a matter of law, fail to allege conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community (Fischer v. Maloney, supra at p. 557, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215).

In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant Unification Church subjected the decedent to "highly programmed behavioral control techniques in a controlled environment thereby narrowing his attention and causing him to go into a trance. He was subjected to an intense fasting from foods and beverages, a program of chanting and related activities". The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant church sought and succeeded in exercising a "form of hypnotic control, sometimes called 'brainwashing' ". The plaintiff claims that as a direct result of this "intensive program", the decedent suffered an "emotional breakdown".

The bill of particulars further describes the "intensive, heavy and protracted" program of exercises as including long hikes and group exercises. The form of information control exercised over the decedent consisted of isolating the decedent from "all information about himself or others which would cause him to question the activities of the Unification Church. This would include access to printed, aural and visual media, access to any area or people outside the training camp, and limited or monitored access to friends and family through telephone calls". The plaintiff's bill of particulars also makes reference to confessions, lectures, and highly structured work and study schedules.

The amended complaint also alleges that an affiliate member of C.A.R.P., with the knowledge and consent of the officers and directors of C.A.R.P., purposefully set out to recruit the decedent to become a member and employee of the Unification Church knowing that he was at that time "emotionally disturbed". The bill of particulars describes the "emotional...