Merrill v. Labor Com'n
| Decision Date | 21 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 20060693-CA.,20060693-CA. |
| Citation | 163 P.3d 741,2007 UT App 214 |
| Parties | Nathan H. MERRILL, Petitioner, v. LABOR COMMISSION; Vermax of Florida, Inc. dba Dakota Cabinets; and Wausau Business Insurance, Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Phillip B. Shell, Murray, for Petitioner.
Sharon J. Eblen, Salt Lake City, for Respondents.
Thomas R. Lee, Provo, James R. Black, Eugene C. Miller Jr., Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, Salt Lake City, for Amicus Curiae.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge, and BILLINGS and McHUGH, JJ.
¶ 1 Nathan H. Merrill petitions for review of the Utah Labor Commission's Order denying Merrill's Motion to Review concerning the constitutionality of Utah Code section 34A-2-413(5), see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5) (2005). On appeal, Merrill argues that section 34A-2-413(5) violates the equal protection guarantees of both the Utah and federal constitutions. We affirm.
¶ 2 Merrill first sustained a lower back injury at work on May 14, 1998. He reinjured his back while working for the same employer on April 13, 2001, and was forced to stop working due to his injuries on August 28, 2001. The Utah Labor Commission (the Labor Commission) subsequently awarded Merrill permanent and total disability benefits due to the injuries, effective August 28, 2001. As a result, Merrill began receiving workers' compensation benefits in the amount of approximately $1700 per month.
¶ 3 Merrill was not yet sixty-five when he became permanently disabled and, therefore, was not receiving social security retirement benefits at that time. Merrill did, however, begin receiving compensation for his injury under the Social Security Act in the form of social security disability benefits. Accordingly, from the time the Labor Commission awarded Merrill permanent and total disability until he turned sixty-five in December 2002, Merrill received approximately $1700 per month in workers' compensation benefits and $1100 per month in social security disability benefits. When Merrill turned sixty-five, his social security disability benefits automatically converted to social security retirement benefits, with the amount he received remaining unchanged. Overall, since the date of his initial award, Merrill has continued to receive unreduced awards of both workers' compensation benefits and social security benefits.
¶ 4 Both the Social Security Act and the Workers' Compensation Act contain "coordination of benefit" provisions designed to protect employer-funded compensation systems from paying overlapping benefits. The provisions reduce the benefits awarded to an individual under one compensation program based on benefits an individual is eligible to receive from another compensation program. For example, under the Social Security Act, the sum of workers' compensation benefits and social security benefits may not exceed eighty percent of a worker's average earnings. See 42 U.S.C. § 424a(2)(5) (2000). Similarly, under section 34A-2-413(5) of the Workers' Compensation Act—the provision at issue here—a permanently disabled worker will receive disability compensation unaffected by the simultaneous award of any other benefit for six years. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5). After six years, however, section 413(5) requires that workers' compensation disability payments be reduced by half of the dollar amount of social security retirement benefits received by an individual during the same period. See id.
¶ 5 In August 2007, Merrill will have received six years of workers' compensation benefits, unreduced by any benefits he has received from social security. At that time, the offset provision under section 413(5) will take effect and Merrill's workers' compensation benefits will be reduced by approximately $550 per month—half of his $1100 monthly social security retirement award—resulting in workers' compensation payments of about $1150 each month. Accordingly, Merrill will receive roughly $2250 per month in combined workers' compensation and social security benefits, compared to the $2800 per month he currently receives.
¶ 6 Merrill filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission on June 7, 2006, contesting the constitutionality of section 413(5). The Labor Commission denied his motion to review on June 29, 2006, and Merrill now seeks review in this court.
¶ 7 Merrill argues that the coordination of benefits provision in the Workers' Compensation Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5), violates Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution in that it fails to provide equal protection of the laws because it discriminates on the basis of age.1 "[W]e review the constitutionality of the statute upon which the Commission's action is based without deference, as a conclusion of law." Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah Ct.App.1992). However, "when reviewing statutes for constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and `we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.'" Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs. Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995) (quoting Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993)).
¶ 8 Merrill asserts that section 413(5) of the Workers' Compensation Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and its corresponding clause in the Utah Constitution because it reduces an individual's workers' compensation award based solely on the individual's age. Merrill argues that because section 413(5) is only triggered by a disabled individual's receipt of social security retirement benefits at age sixty-five, other younger workers who are similarly disabled are able to receive social security disability benefits in conjunction with workers' compensation benefits for longer periods of time before the offset provision takes effect. Merrill further argues that section 413(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. We disagree and uphold the statute as constitutional.
¶ 9 Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. art. I, § 24.
This provision of the Utah Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." However, . . . "[t]he different language of Article I, [Section] 24, the different constitutional contexts of the two provisions, and different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a different result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, [Section] 24 than might be reached under federal law."
Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669-70 (Utah 1984)). Here, although Merrill asserts violations under both the Utah and federal constitutions, his argument does not distinguish between the two, and therefore we address both arguments under one analysis because Utah's "Uniform Operation of Laws provision is, in fact, the Utah equal protection guarantee." Wood v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 32, 67 P.3d 436 (plurality).
¶ 10 Under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution we utilize a deferential standard of review unless the statute infringes a fundamental right or creates suspect classifications. See Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 941 (reviewing an Article I, Section 24 challenge); see also Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-15, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam) (). The circumstances here do not implicate a suspect class or a fundamental right. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (); see also In re Tobin, 424 Mass. 250, 675 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1997) (). Accordingly, where no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the deferential standard requires only that (1) the classification at issue be reasonable, (2) the legislative objectives be legitimate, and (3) there be a reasonable relationship between the two. See Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 941 (); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562 ().
¶ 11 Merrill first argues that there are two basic classifications under the statute: (1) injured workers who are eligible to receive social security retirement benefits and (2) injured workers who are not eligible for social security retirement benefits. Merrill contends that reaching the age of sixty-five is the only distinguishing factor between the two classes, and therefore the statute discriminates based on age.
¶ 12 We begin by recognizing that there is nothing inherently unreasonable in distinguishing between individuals based on age and that age distinctions have often been upheld as constitutional in other contexts. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979) (); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14, 96 S.Ct. 2562 ...
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Merrill v. Utah Labor Com'n
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