Merrill v. Utah Labor Com'n
| Decision Date | 24 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 20070584.,20070584. |
| Citation | 2009 UT 26,223 P.3d 1089 |
| Parties | Nathan H. MERRILL, Petitioner, v. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; Vermax of Florida, Inc., dba Dakota Cabinets; Workers Compensation Fund; and Wausau Business Insurance, Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Phillip B. Shell, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Sharon J. Eblen, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Labor Commission.
James R. Black, Thomas R. Lee, Eugene C. Miller, Salt Lake City, amicus Workers Compensation Fund.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 We granted certiorari to consider whether Utah Code section 34A-2-413(5) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions by discriminating on the basis of age. Section 34A-2-413(5) provides an offset reducing the amount of benefits for individuals receiving both workers' compensation benefits and social security retirement benefits. Specifically, when an individual qualifies for both social security retirement benefits and workers' compensation benefits, and when the individual has received 312 weeks of workers' compensation, workers' compensation benefits are reduced by fifty percent of the amount the individual is receiving in social security retirement benefits. We hold that this offset violates Utah's uniform operation of the law guarantee and reverse and remand.
¶ 2 The opinion of the court of appeals contains a thorough factual history, which we will not repeat here. See Merrill v. Labor Comm'n, 2007 UT App 214, ¶¶ 2-6, 163 P.3d 741. Instead, we recount only those facts relevant to the appeal. Nathan Merrill was injured while working for Vermax of Florida, Inc., dba Dakota Cabinets (Dakota). The Utah Labor Commission (the Commission) determined that Merrill had become permanently and totally disabled and was unable to find other employment. The Commission originally ordered that Merrill receive workers' compensation payments of $395 per week, plus other statutorily prescribed payments to be determined. Dakota subsequently challenged the $395 award, arguing that it needed to be offset pursuant to subsection (5) of Utah Code section 34A-2-413, which provides:
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5) (2005).1
¶ 3 The appellant argues that this subsection violates both the uniform operation of laws provision of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He asserts that the offset treats him differently than others similarly situated without a rational basis. The Commission determined that it did not have authority to consider the constitutionality of the statute and ordered an offset in the payments. Mr. Merrill appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of appeals held:
In enacting section 413(5), the Utah Legislature may have legitimately concluded that the statute would assure employees adequate recovery for wages lost due to disability but also avoid duplication in benefits by reducing workers' compensation awards once workers also begin receiving social security retirement payments. Additionally, the legislature may have intended to reduce the cost of workers' compensation insurance premiums for employers. Thus, we can conceive of at least two legitimate legislative purposes behind the challenged legislation.
Merrill, 2007 UT App 214, ¶ 18, 163 P.3d 741.
¶ 4 The court of appeals further held that "the legislature chose a reasonable means to achieve its objective" and that the statute survived rational basis review under the Utah Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 5 On certiorari, we review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for correctness. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12, ¶ 9, 84 P.3d 1201. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we also review for correctness. Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1995); see also Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990) (). "It is important to note at the outset that our uniform operation of the laws analysis is guided by the well-settled proposition that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); see also Ryan, 903 P.2d at 424.
¶ 6 Mr. Merrill has challenged the constitutionality of the statute under both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution. The uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution provides, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. art. I, § 24. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides for equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The purpose of the uniform operation of laws provision is to prevent "classifying persons in such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a law are treated differently by that law, to the detriment of some of those so classified." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). "The essence of the uniform operation of laws principle is that `legislative classifications resulting in differing treatment for different persons must be based on actual differences that are reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation.'" Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988)). "[P]ersons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).
¶ 7 The uniform operation of laws provision and the Equal Protection clause address similar concerns in determining the constitutionality of a statute. Both have as their basic concept "the settled concern of the law that the legislature be restrained from the fundamentally unfair practice of creating classifications that result in different treatment being given [to] persons who are, in fact, similarly situated." Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 888. "The two provisions are substantially parallel." State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ¶ 31, 114 P.3d 585. Accordingly, because our "review [of] legislative classifications under article I, section 24 [of the Utah Constitution] . . . is at least as exacting and, in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the [Fourteenth Amendment of the] federal constitution," Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 889, we evaluate the constitutionality of the statute under Utah law.
¶ 8 The United States Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect classification, and statutes that create classifications based on age are analyzed under a rational basis review. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). We likewise subject classifications based on age to rational basis review. Purdie v. Univ. of Utah, 584 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1978).
¶ 9 We undertake a three-part inquiry to determine if a statute violates the uniform operation of laws. "In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I, § 24, we must determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989).
¶ 10 The first step in the test is to determine if the classification made in the statute is reasonable. In deciding if a classification is reasonable, we have considered: (1) if there is a greater burden on one class as opposed to another without a reason; (2) if the statute results in unfair discrimination; (3) if the statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable; or (4) if the statute singles out similarly situated people or groups without justification. See Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866, 868 (1971) (); Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 640 () (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 890); State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ¶ 41, 114 P.3d 585 (); Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ¶ 18, 108 P.3d 701 (...
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