De Mers v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 30 August 1888
• Citation: 39 Minn. 158,39 N.W. 98
• Parties: DE MERS ET AL. v DANIELS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

39 Minn. 158

39 N.W. 98

DE MERS ET AL.vDANIELS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

August 30, 1888.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

It is not a necessary inference from the fact that a statute prescribes a penalty for the doing of an act that such an act done is to be deemed unlawful and void.

The statute imposing a penalty upon the owner of town-site lands, who sells the same before having complied with the requirements of the law relating to the execution and recording of the town-site plat, construed as not intended to avoid sales or contracts for the sale of such lands, although such statutory requirements may not have been complied with.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; HICKS, Judge.

Burt W. Eaton and Davis, Kellogg & Severance, for Frank S. De Mers et al., appellants.

Weed Munroe, for Don A. Daniels, respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

This action is for the recovery of the amount of two promissory notes executed by the defendant to the plaintiffs. The defense which we are to consider rests upon these facts: The notes were given for the purchase price of certain lots, and a part of a block in a tract of land which had been platted as an addition to a town-site, in the county of Polk, by these plaintiffs and others, the proprietors of the land. The contract of purchase was evidenced by a bond for a deed, executed to the defendant by such proprietors. At that time the plat of a part of these lands had not been signed by all of the proprietors, nor had the same been filed for record, as prescribed by chapter 29, Gen. St. 1878, relating to town plats. For this reason the contract is claimed to have been void, and it was so considered by the court below,where judgment was directed in favor of the defendant, upon the pleadings. The defendant is to be considered as having knowledge of these defects when he made the contract. Section 9 of the statute above referred to declares that “if any person disposes of, offers for sale, or leases for any time, any out or in lot in any town or addition to any town or city, or any part thereof, before all the foregoing requisitions of this chapter are complied with, every person so offending shall forfeit and pay the sum of twenty-five dollars for each and every lot or part of a lot sold or disposed of, leased, or offered for sale.” By a subsequent section it is provided that such forfeitures shall be prosecuted and recovered in the name of the county treasurer. It must be conceded to be an established principle of law that when a statute prescribes a penalty for the doing of a specific act, that is prima facie equivalent to an express prohibition; and that, when the object of such an enactment is deemed to have been the protection of persons dealing with those in respect to whose acts the penalty is declared, or the accomplishment of purposes entertained upon grounds of public policy, not pertaining to mere administrative measures, such as the raising of a revenue, the act thus impliedly prohibited will, in general, be treated as unlawful and void as to the party who is subjected to the penalty. This rule is not, however, without qualification. The question is one of interpretation of the legislative intention. The imposing of a penalty does not necessarily give rise to an implication of an intention that, where an act is done which subjects a party to the penalty, the act itself shall be void, and of no legal effect; and if it seems more probable, from the subject and the terms of the enactment, and from the consequences which were to be anticipated as likely to result from giving such an effect to the penal law, that it was not the intention of the legislature to make the transaction void, but only to punish the offending party in the manner specified, the law should be so construed. Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79;Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 546;Middleton v. Arnolds, 13 Grat. 489;Niemeyer v. Wright, 75 Va. 239. The only provision in this statute from which it can be inferred that contracts for the sale or leasing of platted lands were intended to be prohibited, and avoided if made, is that which subjects the vendor or lessor, who has not first complied with the requirements of the law, to a pecuniary penalty. If the purpose of this section was also to prevent such sales and contracts by making them illegal, a purchaser, having such knowledge of the facts as any reasonably prudent purchaser would acquire, violates the law, and is as much in the wrong, as the vendor. The fact that no penalty, forfeiture, or disability is declared with respect to purchasers, under any circumstances, is worthy of being considered in this connection. The act is...