Meskimen v. Larry Angell Salvage Co.
Citation | 592 P.2d 1014,286 Or. 87 |
Decision Date | 03 April 1979 |
Docket Number | No. A7606-08835,A7606-08835 |
Parties | Paul MESKIMEN, Respondent-Cross-Appellant, v. LARRY ANGELL SALVAGE COMPANY, an Oregon Corporation, Durmac, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, and Lawrence G. Angell, Defendants, Citizens Bank of Corvallis, Appellant-Cross-Respondent. ; SC 25636. |
Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Milton R. Smith, Portland, argued the cause for appellant-cross-respondent. With him on the briefs were Edward H. Warren, and Acker, Underwood, Beers, Smith & Warren, Portland.
John Dudrey, of Frederickson, Weisensee & Cox, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent-cross-appellant.
Before DENECKE, C. J., and TONGUE, BRYSON and LINDE, JJ.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages to his fishing boat which was struck by the tugboat "Satan," operated by defendant Angell. The accident occurred on March 16, 1976, on the Oregon Slough, north of Portland.
At the time of the accident, defendant Larry Angell Salvage Company was buying and renovating a tugboat, the "Satan," from defendant Citizens Bank of Corvallis. It is not contested on appeal that defendant Angell's negligence caused the accident.
The principal assignments of error raise the issue of whether the bank is liable for Angell's negligence on a respondeat superior theory. The jury found that it was and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff. The bank appeals. 1 Plaintiff cross-appeals from certain adverse rulings by the trial court.
Defendant bank's connection with the other defendants and the "Satan" began when the bank lent $434,871.15 to defendant Duramac, Inc., to renovate the boat. Duramac defaulted on its loan payments and thereafter reached a amicable agreement with the bank whereby the bank repossessed the boat and entered into a contract regarding the sale of the boat to defendant Larry Angell Salvage Company. The contract by which these arrangements were made (referred to as the March 2 contract) was received as evidence for plaintiff's contention that Angell 2 was the bank's employee. The lengthy March 2 contract provides in part as follows:
During trial defendant bank moved for a directed verdict, to strike portions of the complaint, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court's denials of these motions are assigned as error. The assignments raise the issue as to whether plaintiff offered sufficient evidence for the court to submit to the jury plaintiff's contention that Angell, during renovation and at the time of the accident, was the bank's servant. We stated, in Jenkins v. AAA Heating, 245 Or. 382, 386, 421 P.2d 971, 973 (1966), as follows:
* * *"
Jenkins states that the existence of the master-servant relationship Jenkins, at 387, 421 P.2d at 973, also noted that the "definition of a servant in the Restatement (Second), Agency, § 220(1) (1958), is generally accepted by most courts." That section provides:
"A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."
See also Great American Ins. v. General Ins., 257 Or. 62, 66-67, 475 P.2d 415 (1970).
Although the bank did not actually control Angell's activities at the time of the accident, which occurred while the renovations to the "Satan" were being made, the jury could have found from the March 2 contract and the evidence as a whole that the bank had a sufficient right of control to create a master-servant relationship.
As stated in paragraph X of the contract, the bank employed Ronald McReary, an engineer, "as its representative to work with Angell regarding renovation (of the 'Satan') and approval of procedures thereunder."
On March 15, 1976, McReary wrote to the bank stating that "(p)ursuant to our discussion of March 3, 1976, we have proceeded to pursue organizing and scheduling the completion work generally outlined * * *" as to the "Satan" and advised that he had completed the necessary applications by Angell "for radio licenses needed before operating 'Satan' during move from Vancouver, Washington to Angell Salvage moorage." This is the move, with Angell at the wheel of the "Satan," in which plaintiff's boat was damaged.
The contract provides that Angell was to "work full time to supervise and assist to plan renovation," that he was to receive a salary for doing so, and that the bank would have some veto power over Angell's decisions in the form of financial controls as well as their agent McReary's control.
Defendant bank argues there are other ways to read or construe the contract. Arguably, this is correct. However, we have consistently held that if the agreement is ambiguous, its meaning is a matter to be decided by the trier of the facts when, as here, extrinsic evidence is received. David M. Scott Const. v. Roush, 273 Or. 877, 880, 544 P.2d 162 (1975); Rolfe v. N. W. Cattle & Resources, Inc., 260 Or. 590, 600-01, 491 P.2d 195 (1971). Also, the contract, if ambiguous, is construed most strongly against the party which drew it. Busto v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 276 Or. 707, 712, 556 P.2d 96 (1976). Here, the bank, through its attorney, prepared the contract.
We conclude the contract was ambiguous and the jury, assessing the contract together with other evidence received, could conclude that the agreement created an employment relationship between the bank and Angell. The court did not err in submitting the matter to the jury.
Defendant bank next contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury in regard to employer-employee relationship as follows:
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