Messick v. Grainger
Citation | 205 S.W.2d 739,356 Mo. 1227 |
Decision Date | 10 November 1947 |
Docket Number | 40225 |
Parties | Joy F. Messick, Appellant, v. J. Reed Grainger |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from Polk Circuit Court; Hon. Charles H. Jackson Judge.
Affirmed.
Herman Pufahl and Neale, Newman, Neale, Freeman & Wampler for appellant.
(1) House Bill 602, approved July 3, 1946, is made up of Sections 2 to 37, inclusive, Section 37 being the emergency provision. These thirty-seven sections are the only statutes in the State of Missouri bearing upon or relating to the manner of conducting a contested election case. Our courts have universally held that as applied to election contest procedure these sections constitute "a code unto itself", and that other and general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in such cases. State ex rel. Wells v. Hough, 193 Mo. Sup. 16, s.c. 91 S.W. 905; Hancock v. Spencer, 166 Mo. Sup. l.c 285; Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 182 S.W. 86; Creason v. Yardley, 198 S.W. 830; State v. Cave, 199 S.W. 1014; State ex rel. Brown v. Stewart, 281 S.W 768; State v. Becker, 9 S.W.2d 155; State ex rel. Caysing v. Ryan, 67 S.W.2d 983; Armantrout v. Bohon, 162 S.W.2d 867; State v. Killoren, 188 S.W.2d 1. (2) The contestee, by agreeing to continue the case from November 29, 1946, to November 30, 1946, entered his general appearance and waived any right that he might have had to object to the service of the notice of contest or the fact that the notice was served by the contestant personally instead of by an officer. Bohn v. Delvin, 28 Mo. 319; Orear v. Clough, 52 Mo. 55; Peters v. St. L. & L. Railroad, 59 Mo. 406; Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544; Cook v. Globe Pub. Co., 227 Mo. 471; State ex rel. Newell v. Cave, 272 Mo. 653, 199 S.W. 1014; State ex rel. Bulger v. Southern, 278 Mo. 610; Harrison v. Murphy, 106 Mo.App. 465; Bitter v. Gold Creek Mining Co., 111 A.L.R. 621; 4 C.J., p. 1312; C.J.S., pp. 12, 13, 26, 42, 53.
W. W. Sunderwirth, J. W. Collins and Bradshaw & Fields for respondent.
(1) Jurisdiction of person of contestee requires service of "Notice of Contest" by officer of court. Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Rideout, 142 S.W.2d 1055; Jeck v. O'Meara, 122 S.W.2d 897; Armantrout v. Bohon, 162 S.W.2d 867; Phelps v. Fenix, 134 S.W.2d 84; Sec. 2, House Bill 602; State ex rel. Woodson v. Robinson, 192 S.W. 1001; Castello v. Court, 28 Mo. 259; State ex rel. v. Southern, 214 S.W. 100; State ex rel. v. Cave, 199 S.W. 1014; Green v. Owen, 38 S.W.2d 496; State ex rel. v. Ryan, 67 S.W.2d 983; State ex rel. Penrose v. Killoren, 188 S.W.2d 1; State ex rel. v. Green, 143 S.W.2d 64; State ex rel. Brown v. Stewart, 281 S.W. 768. (2) There was no entry of general appearance by respondent. Nulsen v. Natl. Pigments & Chemical Co., 145 S.W.2d 410; State v. Taylor, 173 S.W.2d 902; Oetting v. Green, 166 S.W.2d 548; Supreme Court Rule 3.23; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 114 F.2d 526; Armantrout v. Bohon, 162 S.W.2d 867.
Bradley, C. Dalton and Van Osdol, CC., concur.
Appellant, as contestant, on November 23, 1946 filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Cedar County notice of contest, the purport of which was to contest the election of respondent to the office of collector of Cedar County at the general election November 5, 1946. The cause reached the circuit court of Polk County, where respondent's motion to dismiss the proceeding was sustained; the proceeding dismissed and contestant appealed.
At the general election, November 5, 1946, in Cedar County, contestant was the Democratic nominee for collector and contestee was the Republican nominee. It is alleged in the notice of contest that the official count gave contestee a majority of 10 votes and he was commissioned. It appears from the notice of contest that contestant challenged 54 absentee ballots and one other counted for contestant. Also, other charges are made. The notice of contest recited that at 9 a.m., on November 29, 1946, or as soon thereafter as the court would hear the same, the matters contained in the notice of contest would be presented to the court, and it was recited that at the same time contestant would ask the court to make an order for a recount of the ballots for collector. Application for a recount of the ballots was filed along with the notice of contest.
The notice of contest was served on contestee by contestant himself, on same day filed, by delivering to contestee a copy of the notice. On the same day the sheriff of Cedar County served upon contestee copy of the application for a recount of the ballots.
November 30, 1946, contestee filed in the circuit court of Cedar County his motion to dismiss, the meat of which motion follows: "Comes now F. Reed Grainger, hereinabove designated contestee, and appearing specially for the purpose of this motion only and for no other purpose, respectfully prays the court to dismiss this proceeding; and as grounds therefor the contestee states that no official process server of this court or other bonded officer has ever at any time served upon said contestee, F. Reed Grainger, any notice of contest of the contestee's election to the office of county collector of Cedar County, Missouri; that, in fact, the only information the contestee has of the pendency of this action is a so-called 'notice of contest' delivered on November 23, 1946, to the contestee by a private person, to wit, Joy F. Messick, the contestant herein; that the action of the said contestant in delivering said notice to the contestee did not constitute service of the statutory notice of contest required for summons and as a prerequisite to this court's jurisdiction in a contested election proceeding involving a county office."
Thereafter and on the same day that contestee filed motion to dismiss, Judge O. O. Brown, judge of the circuit court of Cedar County, on his own motion, disqualified himself to sit in the cause. The disqualifying order recites that
December 6, 1946, the parties appeared in the circuit court of Polk County, contestee limiting appearance to the presentation of his motion. As stated, the motion was sustained and the proceeding dismissed. The order and judgment sustaining the motion follows:
The law governing an election contest of the kind here is a new act effective July 3, 1946. See Laws 1945, pp. 887-894. The new act or article, is in lieu of article 8, chapter 76, R.S. 1939, Secs. 11632-11675. Sec. 2 of the new article, among other things, provides that no election of any county officer
On the subject of notice and service thereof, Sec. 2 of the new article is practically the same as old Sec. 11632. The notice of contest under Sec. 2 takes the place of a petition in the ordinary cause and the service of the notice upon the contestee fills the office of a summons in the ordinary cause. See State ex rel. Woodson v. Robinson (banc), 270 Mo. 212, 192 S.W. 1001, l.c. 1003; Hale v. Stimson (banc), 198 Mo. 134, l.c. 145, 95 S.W. 885; State ex rel. Wells v. Hough (banc), 193 Mo. 615, 91 S.W. 905; State ex rel. Penrose v. Killoren, 354 Mo. 22, 188 S.W.2d 1. The Robinson case, on the subject of jurisdiction of the subject matter, was overruled in State ex rel Newell v. Cave, 272 Mo. 653, l.c. 662, 199 S.W....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Bernhardt v. Long
... ... this state ... The ... notice of contest takes the place of the petition in the ... ordinary suit. Messick v. Grainger, 356 Mo. 1227, ... 205 S.W.2d 739, l.c. 741, and cases there cited ... The ... notice of contest alleges: That ... ...
- State v. Bryant