Metcalf v. Trainor

• Citation: 472 F. Supp. 576
• Decision Date: 07 May 1979
• Docket Number: 73 C 1603.,No. 68 C 1226,68 C 1226
• Parties: Ella METCALF, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Amelia Dukes, Annie Mae Jones, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Flora Ellis, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, and Margeree Brown, Plaintiffs, v. James L. TRAINOR, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, and William H. Robinson, Director, Cook County Department of Public Aid, Defendants (two cases). Mary K. GUNLOGSON, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Earl and Rochelle Robinson, Individually and on behalf of their minor children, and Judith Coleman, Individually and on behalf of her minor child, Plaintiffs, v. George APOSTALOS, Individually and as superintendent, DuPage County Department of Public Aid, David Daniel, Individually and as director, Cook County Department of Public Aid, Valleywood Apartments, an Illinois corporation, and Wayne Shimp, Individually and as sheriff of DuPage County, Illinois, Defendants (two cases).
• Court: United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)

472 F. Supp. 576

Ella METCALF, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Amelia Dukes, Annie Mae Jones, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Flora Ellis, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, and Margeree Brown, Plaintiffs,
v.
James L. TRAINOR, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid, and William H. Robinson, Director, Cook County Department of Public Aid, Defendants (two cases).
Mary K. GUNLOGSON, Individually and on behalf of her minor children, Earl and Rochelle Robinson, Individually and on behalf of their minor children, and Judith Coleman, Individually and on behalf of her minor child, Plaintiffs,
v.
George APOSTALOS, Individually and as superintendent, DuPage County Department of Public Aid, David Daniel, Individually and as director, Cook County Department of Public Aid, Valleywood Apartments, an Illinois corporation, and Wayne Shimp, Individually and as sheriff of DuPage County, Illinois, Defendants (two cases).

Nos. 68 C 1226, 73 C 1603.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

May 7, 1979.

472 F. Supp. 577

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472 F. Supp. 580

Robert Bennett, Wendy Meltzer, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs

William A. Wenzel, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Welfare Litigation, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBSON, Senior District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the crossmotions of plaintiffs and defendants in these consolidated actions for summary judgment. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the motion of the plaintiffs is granted in part and denied in part, and the motion of the defendants is granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3) and (4). Defendants dispute jurisdiction claiming that the complaints fail to state a substantial federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). Plaintiffs and defendants have filed crossmotions for summary judgment on issues of liability in regard to defendants' administration of the shelter exception program for public aid recipients.

I. BACKGROUND

The pending actions are consolidated cases brought by recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children hereinafter AFDC¹ and of the State Supplemental

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Program hereinafter SSP to the federal Supplemental Security Income hereinafter SSI.² Defendants are the directors of the Illinois, Cook County, and DuPage County Departments of Public Aid³ charged by law with the enforcement of the Illinois Public Aid Code. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, §§ 12-1 and 12-2

Plaintiffs in Metcalf v. Swank, 68 C 1226, brought a class action suit in 1968 challenging the constitutionality of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, § 12-4.11⁴ and § 12-14⁵ imposing a

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maximum shelter allowance of $90 per month for all those on public assistance. Plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as the retroactive payment of wrongfully withheld benefits. On November 12, 1968, a three-judge court granted defendants' motion to dismiss count I of the complaint, a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the shelter maximum. Because exceptions were authorized to be provided by the Illinois Department of Public Aid hereinafter IDPA, after consultation with a legislative advisory committee, the statute withstood a facial constitutional attack. Metcalf v. Swank, 293 F.Supp. 268, 270 (N.D.Ill.1968). The standard of § 12-4.11 to "provide a livelihood compatible with health and well-being for persons eligible for financial aid" was "to be the guideline for the Illinois Department of Public Aid to follow in granting exceptions." Id. The remaining factual claims, including the constitutional allegations of counts II and III that the shelter exception program was "void as applied," were remanded to a single judge. Id. at 269 n. 1, 270

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 21, 1968. On October 29, 1969, the court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state a substantial constitutional claim absent the exhaustion of state administrative remedies. Metcalf v. Swank, 305 F.Supp. 785, 788 (N.D.Ill. 1969). On April 30, 1971, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 444 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1971). The Seventh Circuit denied a rehearing en banc on July 1, 1971. On May 15, 1972, the United States Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and "remanded for further consideration in light of Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 92 S.Ct. 1232, 31 L.Ed.2d 569 (1972)," an intervening decision.⁶ 406 U.S. 914, 92 S.Ct. 1778, 32 L.Ed.2d 113 (1972). On March 16, 1973, the Seventh Circuit remanded counts II and III to the district court for decision finding that plaintiffs' complaint contained allegations "which if proven, contain elements both of constitutional and statutory violation."

On June 20, 1973, Gunlogson v. Apostalos, 73 C 1603, was filed in federal district court. Because count I of Gunlogson v. Apostalos⁷ and counts II and III of the first amended complaint of Metcalf v. Edelman⁸ were substantially identical, the court entered an order on June 26, 1974, consolidating these two cases. On June 26, 1974, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaints in the consolidated cases. Nonetheless, based on the Supreme Court decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), the court ruled that it was without jurisdiction under the eleventh amendment to grant plaintiffs retroactive benefits.

On October 2, 1974, plaintiffs' motion to certify the cases as class actions was denied. Metcalf v. Edelman, 64 F.R.D. 407 (N.D.Ill. 1974).⁹ The court characterized the remaining count of plaintiffs' consolidated complaint as an allegation that defendants did not provide plaintiffs with a livelihood compatible with health and well-being as required

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by statute by refusing to furnish plaintiffs with exceptions to the $97 shelter maximum. Id. at 408. The alleged abuses of the exception system were in the arbitrary and capricious manner of administration in violation of statutory and constitutional standards. Id. at 409. Although the grant of exceptions has been eliminated by the consolidation of the individual component parts of AFDC grants into a single consolidated grant of public aid to a recipient, plaintiffs continue to allege that the new plan merely perpetuates the effect of the alleged abuses of the exception system

Illinois adopted a Consolidated Standard Plan hereinafter CSP on October 1, 1973, for its AFDC program. See Exhibit 16; Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Trainor, 438 F.Supp. 269, 274 (N.D.Ill.1977) hereinafter IWRO v. Trainor. The CSP altered the method of computing the budgeted need for an AFDC family. Prior to the CSP, AFDC grants were computed by the adding together of monetary allowances for approximately seventy items of need like rent, clothing, laundry, transportation, child care, etc., that a particular AFDC recipient required. In the CSP each item of need was "averaged" over the entire AFDC caseload. The individualized determination of an AFDC grant was changed to a flat grant with payments varying only by family size, shelter zone, and type of family (i. e., adult AFDC recipient or nonadult-only children receiving AFDC and the adult caretaker receiving income from another source). The effect of the CSP was to reduce grants to those families whose prior budgeted need was above the new flat grant and to increase grants to those families whose prior budgeted need was lower than the flat grant.

Plaintiffs and defendants filed crossmotions for summary judgment on October 12, 1976, on the issue of liability. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment on January 24, 1977. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support and in opposition to plaintiffs' motion on May 9, 1977. On May 27, 1977, plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment and in opposition to defendants' motion. A final pretrial order was filed on July 16, 1977. Neither party raises or relies upon contested issues of fact in their crossmotions for summary judgment.¹⁰

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND DECISION

A. Statement of the Issues

Because the pleadings do not fully state the present controversy after the implementation of the CSP, the parties filed a memorandum of issues to be decided on the motions for summary judgment.¹¹

Plaintiffs present the following issues:

1. Whether defendants' administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children hereinafter AFDC program with respect to excess rent grants, prior to October 1, 1973, violated the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a), the Code of Federal Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a), the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 23, § 12-4.11.

2. Whether, by virtue of previous illegality, the AFDC Consolidated Standard Plan instituted by defendants on October 1, 1973, violates the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23), the Code of Federal Regulations, 45 C.F.C. § 233.20, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

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3. Whether defendants' present administration of excess rent grants in the State Supplemental Program hereinafter SSP of assistance to aged, blind and disabled persons violates the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Defendants present the following issues.

1. Whether the denial of an excess rent grant under the AFDC program prior

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